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Abstract
Large demands for water by the mining industry are of increasing concern around the
world and access to water is seen as a signicant constraint on future mine development.
Citizens, environmental groups and other non-governmental organizations have called for
better regulation of water consumption by the mining industry in many regions across
the globe. This thesis analyzes the eciency of a specic command and control water
management policy in the Lower Athabasca River Region in Alberta, Canada applied to oil
sands mining operations. This policy imposes dierent restrictions on water withdrawals
from the river according to the severity of threat to the aquatic ecosystem due to low
water levels. In developing the policy, the Alberta government focused on the potential
environmental impacts of projected water use by the oil sands industry. Economic cost was
considered only in terms of the cost to the oil sands industry of constructing water storage
facilities. This thesis undertakes a more robust examination of economic cost by developing
a stochastic optimal control model for an oil sands rm choosing production and water use
rates, as well as the optimal timing to build a water storage facility. A Hamilton Jacobi
Bellman equation is specied which incorporates uncertain oil prices as well as uncertain
water ow volumes in the Athabasca River and a numerical solution is implemented using
a nite dierence approach. The price of oil is modelled as a log-mean reverting stochastic
process. Uncertainty in river ows is captured by modelling the restrictions on water
withdrawals as a regime switching stochastic process. The thesis estimates the economic
cost of the restrictions in terms of the dierence in value of the oil-producing asset with
and without water restrictions.
In Chapter 2, the model is used to analyze the Phase 1 water regulations, which were
rst applied in 2007. The Phase 1 regulations classied river water ows into green,
yellow, or red zones with green implying abundant water and red implying reduced water
ows. The water restrictions varied depending on river ow zone. In the thesis, the
impact of these restrictions is captured by modelling the zones as dierent regimes with
the probability of switching between regimes based on historical river ow data. The
analysis also considers a number of cases in which the future river ow conditions are
lower than those experienced historically. In Chapter 2, the total cost of the regulations is
estimated as well as the marginal cost of increasing the water restrictions. For the Phase 1
restrictions, no information was available regarding the potential environmental benets of
the restrictions. Our conclusions show that the cost of the Phase 1 restrictions was quite
small given the current reserve base and capacity of the industry. The chapter demonstrates
how the marginal cost of tightening restrictions depends on the state variables, including
resource stock and price. It is also shown that marginal cost is nonmonotonic with respect
v
to price volatility. The marginal cost is shown to vary across individual oil sands projects
depending on reserve levels and lease length.
Chapter 3 undertakes an analysis of the Phase 2 regulations, implemented in 2015 as
an update of the Phase 1 regulations. The development of the Phase 2 regulations was
supported by a detailed scientic report (Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC) Report)
outlining the likely environmental benets of a suite of dierent water restrictions (rule
sets) in terms of wetted area around the river. Wetted area was used as the indicator
of ecosystem disturbance. The suite of water restrictions considered encompassed a much
ner delineation of dierent water zones than in the Phase 1 regulations. The P2FC report
presented an ecient frontier contrasting the eect on wetted area with the cost of water
storage implied by the dierent restrictions. Based on their analysis the Committee chose
one of the rule sets as the preferred option. This chapter uses the model developed in
Chapter 2 to create a similar ecient frontier, comparing the change in wetted area with
the economic cost to the oil sands. Assumptions regarding future river ows, operating
costs, oil prices, future production and storage capacity and remaining established oil
reserves are examined to determine their impact on the ecient frontier and the relative
cost-eectiveness of the various options. The most important factors in determining the
cost of the water restrictions are found to be the assumed storage capacity, cost of storage,
projected river ow conditions, productive capacity and reserves. It is also found that
given the signicant growth of oil sands productive capacity assumed in the P2FC report,
the recommended water restriction rule set is robust. However, for a smaller assumed
growth in oil sands capacity, the proposed water restrictions impose very little cost on the
oil sands industry. In this case, a dierent rule set would be recommended based on its
better expected outcome in terms of maintaining the chosen ecosystem indicator.
A key input to the analysis is the assumed model for oil prices. Chapter 4 applies
dierent versions of the Kalman lter to estimate three one-factor stochastic models. The
regime switching model turns out to outperform the other two single-regime models. How-
ever, the single-regime log mean-reverting model is judged to be adequate for the analysis
in Chapters 2 and 3 and is preferred because it greatly reduces the complexity of the
numerical computation and the interpretation of results.
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1.1 Overview of the Thesis
Water is an invaluable and indispensable gift of nature. However, with the growth of
human population and rapid pace of economic development, human activities impose huge
negative impacts on the quantity and quality of water resources. Although there is not
a global water shortage, water scarcity has been a serious concern in specic countries
and regions. We can glimpse the importance of the water resource problem from the fact
that the United Nations set sustainable management of water as one of 17 Sustainable
Development Goals in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations
2015). In this context, regulators in nations and regions across the globe are responsible
for creating water management policies to relieve water scarcity while balancing rights of
important stakeholders. This thesis examines one of these practices: a water management
regulation in the Lower Athabasca River Region developed by the Alberta government in
Canada.
The Athabasca River runs through the province of Alberta, Canada owing from south-
west to northeast. The Athabasca oil sands, the largest deposit in the world (Masliyah
et al. 2004), is located in northeastern Alberta, which is around the lower course of the
Athabasca River. The large amount of water required by oil sands production is provided
by the Athabasca River. Compared to other water usage such as agricultural and domestic
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use, oil sands mining operations are the dominant water user from the Athabasca River.1
Although the water allocation to the oil sands sector in 2018 was under 2.5% of the river's
average annual ow and the actual withdrawal is even less2, seasonal water uctuations
mean that potential impacts on the ecosystem are a concern. This will be exacerbated if
oil sands production increases in future, combined with the potential impacts of climate
change. In 2007, the Alberta government began to implement restrictions on water use,
referred to as the Water Management Framework. This framework had two phases. Each
phase prescribed a rule set, which is composed of a rule to classify river ow conditions
into dierent zones and a rule to impose associated water withdrawal limits for dierent
zones. The intent of the framework is to protect the aquatic ecosystem by imposing rel-
atively strict withdrawal constraints in dry seasons and loosening these restrictions when
the river ow is abundant. The Phase 1 rule set dened green, yellow, and red zones for
river ows associated with abundant, mildly dry, and very dry conditions. For each zone,
there is a criterion for setting the water withdrawal limit by the oil sands mining projects.
The Phase 2 Framework, which was implemented in 2015, further renes the Phase 1
Framework in that it denes multiple dierent river ow zones for dierent periods during
a year and sets water withdrawal limits for those zones.
The development of environmental regulations such as the Water Management Frame-
work, is a complex task involving the balancing of the interests of dierent stakehold-
ers while maintaining the integrity of the ecosystem. Based on the standard economics
paradigm, a regulation would be judged to be welfare improving, and hence desirable, if
the benets of the regulation outweigh its costs. The focus of the development of the Water
Management Framework was maintaining an undisturbed ecosystem, which implies keep-
ing river ows to within historical norms. No attempt was made to put an economic value
on an undisturbed ecosystem. The Phase 1 Framework was developed fairly quickly as a
stopgap before more serious investigations could be done regarding the benets of dierent
alternative rule sets. No study was made of the economic costs of the rule set. The Phase
2 Rule set considered a number of dierent possible rule sets and calculated economic cost
in terms of the cost for oil sands rms to install storage. The benet of the various rule
sets was summarized by a particular ecosystem indicator, and a cost-eectiveness analysis
was undertaken whereby the costs of storage for each rule set were contrasted with their
eectiveness at maintaining the ecosystem indicator.
1Information is provided on the websites of Alberta Environment and Parks (https://www.
environment.alberta.ca/apps/OSEM/) and the Athabasca River Basin Research Institute (http:
//arbri.athabascau.ca/About-the-Athabasca-River-basin/Index.php) (accessed on January 11,
2020).
2Information is provided on the website of Alberta Environment and Parks (https://www.
environment.alberta.ca/apps/OSEM/) (accessed on January 11, 2020).
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The objective of this thesis is to reevaluate the economic costs of the Phase 1 and Phase
2 Frameworks using a more robust methodology for estimating economic cost. The cost of
storage is only one component of the economic cost of the regulations and may not capture
the full opportunity cost of the regulations. The thesis does not attempt to put a monetary
valuation on the ecosystem benets of the regulations. For the Phase 1 Framework, we
infer the marginal costs of the water withdrawal limits in the applied rule set. The ecient
water withdrawal limits would be those that equate the marginal economic costs and the
marginal economic environmental benets. For the Phase 2 Framework, we compare the
total economic costs of multiple candidate rule sets. The optimal rule set is the most cost
eective one, i.e. the least costly one when the environmental benets are at the same
level.
The study of the Phase 1 Framework is carried out in Chapter 2. We apply a stochastic
optimal control approach to investigate the economic costs to the oil sands industry due
to the water constraints imposed by the Phase 1 Framework. In particular, we develop
a dynamic economic model of optimal exploitation of the oil resource given uncertain oil
prices and stochastic river ows and we implement a numerical solution. We calculate
the total and marginal costs of tightened restrictions corresponding to dierent water
withdrawal limit levels given the specic river ow classication. As noted, we have no
information on the marginal benet of tightened restrictions, However, the marginal cost
curve can give a lower bound on what marginal benets should be to justify tightening
restrictions. Apart from this, our study also suggests the best timing to invest in water
storage facilities.
The examination of the Phase 2 Framework (Alberta 2015) is conducted in Chapter 3.
In 2015, the Phase 2 Framework replaced the Phase 1 Framework. In fact, the Phase 2
Framework Committee (P2FC) was established in 2008 to develop and assess multiple can-
didate water constraint rule sets and recommend one of them for the Phase 2 Framework.
The nal report by the P2FC was released in 2010. The Alberta government ne tuned
the rule set recommended in the report to correct some mistakes and adopted it for the
Phase 2 Framework (the Phase 2 Choice). The economic costs due to the water constraint
imposed by the Phase 2 Choice can be inferred as was done for the Phase 1 Framework.
However, we do not repeat the process in Chapter 3. Instead, we focus on the justica-
tion of the assessment of the candidate rule sets by the P2FC. In the P2FC's research, a
detailed analysis is given to assess candidate rule sets, especially from the environmental
eect perspective. For each rule set, the P2FC used a software tool (the Flow Calculator)
to determine its environmental benet in terms of maintaining wetted area along the river.
The P2FC also estimated the water storage levels for alternative rule sets that are able to
provide sucient water to maintain the oil sands production at full production capacity.
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The economic costs are inferred simply according to the estimated water storage capac-
ities. The P2FC report comparing the dierent rule sets in terms of their impact on an
ecosystem indicator provides a starting point for a more detailed assessment of the cost
eectiveness of the regulation. This chapter explores the economic costs of the dierent
rule sets, considering the potential eects of stochastic oil prices, stochastic river ows, and
associated optimal production levels, in a dynamic setting. Using the stochastic optimal
model developed for Chapter 2, we estimate economic costs for the suite of dierent rule
sets proposed by the P2FC based on their assumptions for productive capacity, required
storage levels, etc. Furthermore, we also determine optimal water storage levels for each
candidate rule set in dierent river ow scenarios. By checking multiple factors aecting
the economic costs, we conclude that the rule set recommended by the P2FC is not neces-
sarily always the optimal choice. In the chapter we discuss what factors have the biggest
impact on economic cost, and in what cases our conclusions agree with those of the P2FC.
A key component of the research in Chapters 2 and 3 is the modelling of the stochastic
process of the price of the underlying asset (i.e. the oil price). Chapter 4 focuses on
the estimation of the dynamics of oil prices, a topic which has been the focus of much
research in the literature. In that our optimal control problem involves two stochastic
factors: the oil prices and the river ows, with the intention of avoiding unnecessary
computational complexity, we adopt a model of oil prices with only one stochastic factor.
In this chapter, we consider three one-factor stochastic models, respectively in level mean-
reverting, log mean-reverting, and regime switching log mean-reverting forms. We apply
dierent versions of the Kalman lter to estimate these models. The results show that
generally the regime switching model outperforms the other two. The log mean-reverting
model is better than the level mean-reverting models for forecasting long term oil futures
contracts. Considering that the project lifespans in Chapters 2 and 3 are more than 1 year,
and the regime switching model signicantly increases the complexity of calculation and
interpretation of our optimal control problem without signicantly changing the results,
we adopt the log mean-reverting model for the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3.
1.2 Main Contributions
 We develop an economic model incorporating uncertainties in oil prices and wa-
ter withdrawal limits to investigate the oil sands sector's stochastic optimal control
problem under water management regulations and numerically solve the derived two-
factor Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
 We use the aforesaid model to examine the eciency of a particular command and
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control regulation. We delineate a marginal cost curve for water restrictions and
examine key factors that aect the marginal cost. An interesting result is that the
marginal cost curve is non-monotonic with respect to price volatility. Our investiga-
tion also shows that the marginal costs of the same regulation vary across projects
depending on the lease length and remaining reserves. This nding demonstrates
the well known result that a uniform command and control regulation is unlikely to
achieve eciency.
 Our estimates of the full economic cost of a suite of candidate water restrictions
allows us to examine their cost-eectiveness in terms of maintaining wetted area
along the river. In our example, changing price uncertainty does not aect the relative
cost-eectiveness of the dierent candidate restrictions. Dierent assumptions about
future river conditions aects the magnitude of economic cost, but again does not
change the relative cost-eectiveness. Changing assumptions about reserves and
productive capacity does change the ranking of alternative restrictions.
 We apply two extensions of the Kalman lter (the extended Kalman lter and the




An Economic Analysis of Alberta's
Water Management Regulations for Oil
Sands Mining
2.1 Introduction
The management of scarce water supplies is an issue of increasing concern in many areas
of the world and is exacerbated by uncertainty surrounding the impacts of a warming
planet on water availability. Surface and ground water sources are typically exploited as
common pool resources meeting diverse needs. As noted by Libecap & Barbara (2012),
the uid nature of water and the fact that it is used sequentially or simultaneously by
many parties hinder our ability to dene an ecient property rights system. Externalities
and third party eects of water diversion are pervasive. The resource extraction industry
is responsible for large withdrawals of water around the world, and competition for water
supplies may put industry operations into conict with local communities. These conicts
arise when the water demands for resource extraction encroach on the water supplies used
for other human activities or compromise aquatic ecosystems. Protection of the public
interest requires that governments around the world specify limits on water withdrawals
and enforce legal and regulatory requirements regarding water access rights.
Media and industry reports make it clear that competition for water supplies is of
increasing concern for rms involved in resource extraction. Water availability is reported
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as being one of the biggest problems facing mining rms today.1 Similar concerns have been
raised regarding shale gas development.2 Regulatory responses vary across jurisdictions,
depending on the state of water supplies, the nature of other competing uses, as well as
the existing political, legal and regulatory frameworks. Thomashausen et al. (2018) review
the legal framework regulating water use for gold and copper mining in eight dierent
countries. All countries surveyed required mining rms to obtain water licenses or permits
as well as undertake some sort of environmental assessment. The basis for allocating water
shares varies, and is typically some combination of riparian or prior appropriation rights,
as well as rules about the transfer or trading of water rights.
The focus of this chapter is on the assessment of the economics of water regulations
imposed on resource extraction activities. To this end, we examine the regulation of min-
ing operations in the Alberta oil sands limiting fresh water withdrawals from the Lower
Athabasca River. Our modelling approach and conclusions provide insights for public
policy in Alberta's oil sands, as well as in other similar industries throughout the world.
The large ramping up in scale of oil sands activity in the past decade has brought
public attention to the quantity of both surface and groundwater withdrawals, as well as
the many other environmental impacts that have been well documented in the literature.3
Fresh water withdrawals from the Athabasca River by open pit mining operations have
the potential to impact the health of the river ecosystem, particularly during low-ow
periods. In addition, the river sustains the livelihood and culture of First Nations and
Metis communities in the area, and low ow hinders navigation on the river. Predictions
of continued industrial expansion and growing population as well as expectations that
water ows will be reduced in the future due to the eects of a warming climate have
exacerbated concerns. In response to these concerns, the Alberta government drafted a
river management plan for the Lower Athabasca River to limit withdrawals according to
river conditions. The management plan was rst imposed in 2007 and is described in the
Phase 1 Framework (Alberta and Canada 2007). This Phase 1 Framework was intended
to address immediate needs for water protection based on currently available evidence,
with the intention that the regulations would be revised in future based on the results of
further research. Additional research and consultation with stakeholders were done over
the subsequent seven years, resulting in a revision to the water regulations released in 2015
as the Phase 2 Framework (Alberta 2015). The focus of this chapter is on the regulations
1See for example a July 27 2014 Financial Times article Water scarcity and rising energy costs threaten
mining industry; a Moody's Investor Service report Global Mining Industry: Water scarcity could increase
rating pressure on global mining companies, February 14, 2013; and Toledano & Roorda (2014).
2See discussions in Vengosh et al. (2014) and Holding et al. (2017).
3See Griths et al. (2006), Gosselin et al. (2010), Squires et al. (2010), and Bruce (2006) for details.
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specied by the Phase 1 Framework. In the next chapter the impact of the changes made
with the imposition of the Phase 2 Framework are examined.
The Alberta Framework (both Phases 1 and 2) species aggregate permitted water
withdrawals by oil sands mining rms depending on river conditions. When river ows are
below certain specied thresholds cutbacks in water diversions are required. In the Phase
1 Framework, river conditions are categorized as being in any of the red, yellow or green
zone which signies a low, medium and abundant water ows, respectively. The Phase 2
Framework has a ner classication of water ow conditions. Alberta's water management
Framework is layered upon an existing prior allocation (or appropriation) regime whereby
senior licence holders are given priority over more junior water license holders. Oil sands
rms are asked to submit annually a water sharing agreement to the government which
species how cumulative withdrawals will be shared within the terms of existing water
licenses in event of a shortfall. River ows are highly seasonal and the Phase 1 Framework
encourages rms to store water during times of high water availability for use during times
of shortfall.
The stated objective of the Alberta Framework is to manage cumulative water with-
drawals to support both human and ecosystem needs, while balancing social, environmen-
tal, and economics interests" (Alberta 2015, p. 3). An assessment of the eciency of
Alberta's water regulations requires analysis of the marginal benets and costs of the wa-
ter restrictions. The costs will be felt mainly by oil sands rms in terms of lost prots.
The benets of water quantity restrictions are more diverse, reecting the benet of leaving
additional units of water in the river. These may be benets to the ecosystem or benets
to other users of the river. There is considerable scientic uncertainty in how much water
can be safely diverted from the river without harming the aquatic ecosystem4, making it
very dicult to pin down a reasonable estimate of the value of leaving more water in the
river. While the marginal cost of water restrictions to rms is also unknown, it is easier to
assess than the marginal benet of an additional unit of water to the ecosystem. A careful
assessment of the marginal cost is useful in that it provides a lower bound for the marginal
benet in order for the regulation to be judged to be welfare improving.
For eciency, water regulations should ensure equal marginal costs of compliance across
4See for example a CTV news report from March 19 2014, Alberta's plan for Athabasca River
`pathetic,' not science-based: critics." by Bob Weber, The Canadian Press. This article quotes David
Schindler, a University of Alberta ecologist who claims a lack of scientic evidence for the chosen water
restrictions and argues that even a couple of inches less in the river can have a critical impact on
sh habitat, bug populations, water quality, ground water etc. http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/
alberta-s-plan-for-athabasca-river-pathetic-not-science-based-critics-1.1735778 (ac-
cessed on January 11, 2020)
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individual rms in the industry. The Alberta water regulations are `command and con-
trol' with no mechanism to promote an ecient allocation of water across regulated rms.
According to Alberta's current regulations, when water withdrawals are restricted, the lim-
ited available water is allocated equally to all existing oil sands plants, without considering
the needs of new entrants nor the diering eciency of water use of existing rms. Also
noteworthy is that there are no stated nancial penalties for oil sands rms violating water
sharing agreements to distribute the allowed amount of water. According to Braathen &
Johnstone (2003), the eciency of voluntary approaches is generally low.5 However even
with no penalties, the literature suggests that some compliance with voluntary regulations
is expected as a result of rms' caring about their public image and loss of good will if
they are observed as being poor environmental stewards, among other reasons (Arora &
Cason (1995),Arora & Cason (1996), Khanna & Damon (1999)).
The broad purpose of this chapter is to contribute to our understanding of the e-
ciency of `command and control' regulations for the industrial use of water in cases where
the specic restrictions are tied with a stochastic environmental indicator. The specic
contribution is to model the prot maximizing decisions of a typical oil sands project sub-
ject to of Alberta's Phase 1 Framework and from this to construct the rm's marginal
cost curve for a range of water withdrawal restrictions. A further objective is to consider
the eect of the option to invest in water storage facilities on the rm's marginal cost
curve. From the individual project marginal cost curve, a characterization of the industry
marginal cost curve can be obtained and contrasted with possible marginal benet curves.
The modelling of economic cost is challenging because of the particular characteristics
of the rm's decision problem. Water demands by oil sands rms are determined by their
decisions about oil production. A rm chooses optimal production levels in the context
of the optimal timing of depletion of the stock of oil reserves of a particular project. In
the case of Alberta, oil reserves are publicly owned, and rms pay for the right to extract
resources over specied time according to the terms of a license agreement. Firms also face
restrictions on water extraction levels which are stochastic in nature, depending on river
ows. If a rm chooses to install water storage, then the management of water storage
levels is another component of the rm's decisions problem. Finally oil production, and
hence water use, is aected by volatile oil prices determined in world markets. In summary,
the rm's problem involves the optimal choice of oil production and the timing to install
water storage facilities, given stochastic oil prices and water withdrawal restrictions, and
given path dependent state variables - oil reserves and water inventory levels.
5Information is provided on the website of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/
voluntaryapproachesforenvironmentalpolicy.htm)(accessed on January 11, 2020).
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In this chapter, the rm's decision is modelled as an optimal control problem, with oil
prices described by a stochastic dierential equation and water restrictions modelled as a
Poisson process. The rm chooses at each time period over the life of a project whether
to comply with water restrictions or invest in a water storage unit, which relaxes the
constraint imposed by water restrictions. A system of Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equations is specied which describes the rm's optimal decision problem. The system of
HJB equations is solved using a numerical method, as there is no closed form solution.
The solution provides estimates of the value of the a hypothetical oil sands project for a
range of water restrictions, as well as the critical level for oil prices at which it would be
optimal for rms to invest in water storage facilities. By varying water restriction levels
we are able to estimate the marginal cost in terms of the value to the rm of relaxing the
restrictions at the margin. While this model is applied to a specic example in Alberta,
the approach and conclusions are of relevance for other mining projects world-wide, where
water availability is becoming a signicant constraint on development.
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal natural resource use under uncer-
tainty as exemplied by papers such as Brennan & Schwartz (1985), Mason (2001), Slade
(2001), and Chen & Insley (2012). It extends the analysis in these papers by including un-
certain regulatory constraints resulting from natural variability in the environment. It also
contributes to the environmental economics literature addressing water issues specically.
A paper with a similar motivation is Mannix et al. (2014) which examines the eciency of
Alberta's water regulations for the oil sands using a deterministic model. We will contrast
our conclusions to their results. There are also some papers addressing the optimal use of
publicly owned water storage facilities in agricultural operations (Alaouze (1991), Brennan
(2010), Dudley & Hearn (1993)). A more detailed review of the literature is presented in
Section 2.3.
As a preview, some key ndings of the chapter are summarized below.
 Phase 1 water regulations impose only a very small cost on our hypothetical oil
sands rm. Costs only become signicant under drier river conditions and more
strict regulations than specied in the Alberta Framework.
 Oil price volatility aects the decision to invest in water storage facilities in an in-
teresting way, depending on the tightness of water withdrawal restrictions. When
water withdrawals are tightly restricted, an increase in price volatility makes the in-
vestment in storage more likely (i.e. the critical oil price for investment is reduced).
In contrast, when water restrictions are not binding an increase in oil price volatility
makes it optimal to delay investment in water storage.
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 Stricter regulations on water withdrawals may cause a rm to delay the permanent
abandonment of a project.
 The marginal cost of water restrictions is lower when storage is in place and, as
expected, rises as water restrictions are tightened. The shape of the marginal cost
curve is aected by the option to install storage, and is non-monotonic when it
becomes optimal to install storage.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides background infor-
mation related to the oil sands industry and Alberta's oil water use regulations. Section 2.3
conducts a review of the relevant literature. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 develop a model for the
stochastic optimal control problem. Section 2.6 describes the determination of parameters
values in the model. Section 2.7 elaborates on the results. Section 2.8 carries out the sen-
sitivity analysis, while Section 2.9 concludes. Appendices A.1, A.2, and A.3 describe the
details of numerical solution approach. Appendix A.4 provides more details on sensitivity
analyses.
2.2 Regulation of Water Use In the Alberta Oil Sands
Alberta's oil sands comprise the third-largest proven crude oil reserve in the world, next to
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela6. With current extraction techniques, production from the oil
sands depends heavily on water as an input. There are two main methods of producing oil
from oil sands. One is open-pit mining, which is used to develop shallow oil sands reserves.
In an open-pit mining project, oil sands are mined by huge shovels and transported by
trucks to a plant, where oil is extracted from the oil sands by using warm water. The other
one is in-situ (Latin, meaning in place) drilling, which is used to develop deep reserves.
In an in-situ project, steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) technology is employed, i.e.
steam is injected into the reservoir to reduce the viscosity of oil sands so that bitumen
can be pumped out. Due to technical limitations, bitumen mining uses only fresh water,
while SAGD can use saline water as well as fresh water. According to Kuwayama et al.
(2013), the minimum water intensity in open-pit mining for oil sands is 14 gal/MMBtu, i.e.
around 1.94 barrels of water needed for producing one barrel of oil7 (hereinafter referred
6Source: the Government of Alberta, https://www.alberta.ca/oil-sands-facts-and-statistics.
aspx (accessed on January 11, 2020)
7MMBtu stands for million British thermal units. To provide 1 MMBtu of energy, taking distillate no.
2 fuel oil for example, 7.2 gallons of oil are required. 14 gal/MMBtu represents that 14 gallons of water
are needed for producing 7.2 gallons of oil. That is to say, 14/7.2=1.94 gallons of water/gallon of oil, or,
in terms of barrel, 1.94 barrels of water/barrel of oil.
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to using the form of 1.94:1), while the maximum is 47 gal/MMBtu (around 6.53:1), with
an average of 29 gal/MMBtu (around 4.03:1). For in-situ drilling, the range of water
intensity is from 9 gal/MMBtu (around 1.25:1) to 23 gal/MMBtu (around 3.19:1), with
an average of 16 gal/MMBtu (around 2.22:1). It is interesting to note that the maximum
water intensity for oil sands mining operations, classed as an unconventional oil resource,
is less than for conventional oil (primary and secondary) or enhanced oil recovery as is
reported in Kuwayama et al. (2013). This paper focuses on the relevant problems raised
by water management regulations in the context of open-pit mining projects, since it is a
signicant concern for environmental protection in the Lower Athabasca River, which is
the source of the fresh water used in these projects, as well as the Peace-Athabasca Delta,
where ow from the Athabasca River converges with ow from the Peace river.
In Alberta, water rights are granted according to the First in time, rst in right prin-
ciple. Before 1999, licenses to withdraw water were issued without expiry dates according
to the Water Resources Act. Since the Water Act took eect in 1999, new water licenses
have a xed time of validity (usually ten years). In practice, the amount of water permitted
to be withdrawn by the licenses is more than enough to meet current production levels.
Since the water allocated to the oil sands industry greatly exceeds the amount actually
withdrawn, oil sands water users are not bound by licenses. Consequently, there arise some
concerns about the impact of surface fresh water withdrawals on the aquatic ecosystem,
should rms ever decide to make full use of the water they are licensed to use. According
to Lunn et al. (2013), in the Lower Athabasca River, the collective withdrawals constitute
only a tiny percentage of the river ow (less than 0.6% of average total river ows and
about 3% of the lowest weekly winter ows). However, since the river ows vary signi-
cantly between seasons while the oil sands production has less seasonal variation, in water
short seasons, there are risks that the withdrawals will exceed the sustainable level and
irreversibly damage aquatic habitat. Moreover, in view of forecasts for ongoing increases
in oil sands production, there have been signicant concerns about the impacts of water
withdrawals on the aquatic ecosystem (National Energy Board 2006, Griths & Woynil-
lowicz 2003, Jensen 2010, Toman et al. 2008, Woynillowicz et al. 2005, Peters et al. 2013,
Mannix et al. 2010, Ivanhoe Energy Inc. 2012). Combined with the conclusions drawn by
some scholars (Wolfe et al. 2012, Schindler & Donahue 2006, Squires et al. 2010, Wolfe
et al. 2008, Bawden et al. 2014, Rasouli et al. 2013, Peters et al. 2013) that there is a de-
clining trend of the river ow in the Athabasca catchment, the recent focus on impacts on
the aquatic ecosystem is unsurprising. The Peace-Athabasca Delta is a landscape of great
ecological signicance and is located within one of Canada's 15 UNESCO World Heritage
Sites. Its ecosystem is heavily dependent on the river ow level of the Athabasca River
(Wolfe et al. 2012).
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As noted in Section 2.1, in order to assure the sustainability of the Lower Athabasca
River as well as Peace-Athabasca Delta, the Alberta government (Alberta Environment)
and the federal government (Fisheries and Oceans Canada ) developed Alberta's 2007
Water Management Framework8. The Phase 1 Framework was in eect from 2007 to
2015, after which the Phase 2 Framework was implemented. According to the Phase 1
Framework, the river ows are classied into three conditions (green, yellow or red) based
on the weekly river ow measurements. In the green zone, the water ow is regarded
as abundant, and there is negligible impact of withdrawals on the aquatic ecosystem. In
the yellow zone, the river ow is considered as low, and it is assumed that the aquatic
ecosystem may experience stress from a 15% withdrawal. In the red zone, the river ow
is regarded as too low for habitat health. There are dierent withdrawal limits for three
dierent river ow conditions. In the green zone, up to 15% of instantaneous ow is allowed
to be cumulatively withdrawn by the ve oil sands rms. In the yellow zone, the maximum
amount of water allowed to be withdrawn is 10% of the average of HDA80 9 and Q9510.
In the red zone, only a maximum 5.2% of the historical median ow in each week can be
withdrawn.
Figure 2.1 depicts average, minimum and maximum river ows in the Athabasca River
since 1957 compared to the three regimes set by the Phase 1 Framework. It also shows the
frequency with which river ows would be classied in the green, yellow or red zones over
that 60 year period. It will be observed that the river did fall into the yellow or red zones
with a signicant frequency over this period.
After the Framework came into eect, oil sands rms could be asked to curb water usage
in winter, aecting industry protability. In the short term, this could be accomplished
by scaling back production. Over the longer term, if a rm expects more frequent or more
severe restrictions, consideration may be given to investing in water storage or searching for
new technology to conserve water. Imperial Oil's Kearn Lake project was the rst to invest
in water storage in order to eliminate the need to withdraw water from the river during low
ow seasons.11 Constructing an on-site pond is one feasible choice.12 According to Alberta
Energy Regulator (hereinafter referred to as AER)'s Oil Sands and Coal Exploration
8Water Management Framework: Instream Flow Needs and Water Management System for the Lower
Athabasca River. https://open.alberta.ca/publications/3990727(accessed on January 11, 2020)
9HDA80 is the river ow level corresponding to a habitat area level that is equalled or exceeded 80%
of the time.
10Q95 is the ow level that is equalled or exceeded 95% of the time.
11page 19 of Imperial Oils 2012 summary annual report
12According to an on-line article from Suncor Energy Inc. entitled Athabasca
River water use: 5 things you need to know. http://osqar.suncor.com/2014/07/
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Figure 2.1: River Flows at the Athabasca River Gauge below Fort McMurray Station
07DA001 Compared to the Three Regimes Set by Alberta's 2007 Water Management
Framework (The data are recorded from October 1, 1957 to December 31, 2017)
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Application Guide13, operators require permission from the AER if there are changes to
exploration or operation locations. The construction of on-site water storage facilities will
aect the status of the original location, so without the regulator permission, these cannot
be built. However, from the above mentioned article, we can see that there have been
operators who have taken water facilities construction into consideration when applying
for new oil sands operation licenses.
Currently, oil sands companies are complying with the water withdrawal limits via
the implementation of an annually renewed Oil Sands Water Management Agreement for
the Winter Period14 (herein after referred to as the Agreement"), which is a voluntary
agreement among ve main oil rms in the Athabasca oil area. This agreement allocates
the restricted water quantity almost equally among ve oil sands extraction operators
during the yellow and red zones. It stipulates that when the amount withdrawn by any
individual operator exceeds the assigned allotment, the operator should report this to the
relevant Alberta government department. However, there is no punishment specied for
exceeding the agreed to allotment.
To improve the eciency of water usage, the Government of Canada has also introduced
certain rules about the minimum recycle rate. In 2009, the Energy Resources Conservation
Board introduced the mandatory produced-water recycle rate of 90 percent for new SAGD
projects. However, there is no recycle standard for open-pit mining so far.
2.3 Literature Review
There are several strands of literature which are relevant for this paper. One strand
examines natural resource extraction under uncertainty; the second deals with policy and
property rights issues for water; the third is about inter-temporal water storage issues.
2.3.1 Natural Resource Extraction Under Uncertainty
The decision framework used in this paper is based on the seminal papers of Pindyck
(1980) and Brennan & Schwartz (1985), which spawned a long line of literature examining
optimal behaviour of natural resource rms. Some literature focuses on stylized models
13Oil Sands and Coal Exploration Application Guide. https://www.aer.ca/documents/manuals/
Manual008.pdf(accessed on January 11, 2020)
14For example: Oil Sands Water Management Agreement for the 2014-2015 Winter Period. http:
//osip.alberta.ca/library/Dataset/Details/562(accessed on January 11, 2020)
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with closed form solutions (e.g. Miller & Voltaire (1983)), while others analyse more
complex models requiring numerical solutions (e.g. Paddock et al. (1988)). Some of the
literature characterizes these decision problems as real options, drawing on the nance
literature. As noted by Vollert (2012), for real options, whose characteristics are not
necessarily represented by mere isolated options of either European or perpetual American
type, closed form solution is rarely applicable. The model developed in this thesis depicts
both the timing of an investment as well as the optimal production of a non-renewable
resource. A numerical solution is required.
Much of this literature focuses on how various relevant stochastic factors aect invest-
ment decisions. For example, Schwartz (1997) utilised a mean-reverting process to model
output prices, and also added two other uncertain factors into his price model to examine
implications for evaluating investment opportunities. Slade (2001) analysed the respec-
tive impacts on optimal decisions regarding a mining project of choosing either General
Brownian Motion (hereinafter referred to as GBM) process or a mean-reverting process
to approximate the dynamics of output prices. Inspired by Hamilton (1989) who used a
regime switching stochastic process for simulating economic variables, researchers started to
capture the cyclic property of output prices by using regime switching models and address
subsequent impacts on optimal investment timing. Hardy (2001) used a regime-switching
lognormal model to simulate stock prices dynamics and derives the value of nancial instru-
ments. Parallel applications of regime-switching models can also be found in the analysis
of investment in real assets. Chen & Insley (2012) investigated the advantage of a regime
switching model of stochastic lumber prices over single regime models. Insley (2017) exam-
ined the best management and operation decision in the context of multi-stage investment
using a regime-switching stochastic process to simulate the oil prices. Our work is similar
to existing literature in modelling resource output prices as an exogenous stochastic pro-
cess. In Chapter 4 of the thesis we examine several alternative processes to describe oil
prices.
Prior to Brennan & Schwartz (1985) and McDonald & Siegel (1985), there was little
discussion about the impact of managerial options (i.e. to suspend or reopen a project)
on investment decisions. However for a long term project, such as an oil sands extraction
project, it is necessary to take managerial options into consideration when determining
optimal investment behaviour. In our work several managerial options are considered,
including the option to suspend construction of the water storage facility and the option
to abandon the oil sands project.
The non-renewable nature of the oil sands resource requires considering the limitation
of available reserves. Mason (2001) improved predecessors' research regarding stochastic
optimal control of resource extraction projects by introducing a nite resource stock in-
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stead of an innite stock. Slade (2001) modelled reserves as a stochastic process to reect
uncertainty about recoverable reserve stock. In our work, oil sands reserves are assumed
to be nite, and represent a path dependent variable, since the rate of extraction depends
on uncertain oil prices.
Another strand of literature examines the impact of uncertain input costs. Pindyck
(1993) dealt with an investment decision problem with two types of cost uncertainty. Slade
(2001) investigated the impact on the valuation of a copper mine when taking cost uncer-
tainty into account. Almansour & Insley (2016) also took the stochastic property of natural
gas prices into account when examining investments in the oil sands industry. Our work
is unique in introducing a restricted input (i.e. water) to the production process, with the
input restrictions modelled as an uncertain stochastic process.
There are numerous papers in the stochastic optimal control literature addressing the
timing of rms' investments in environmental protection in response to regulations. In some
of these papers, other than building particular facilities, there are no alternative strate-
gies to employ to achieve regulatory compliance while maintaining production capacity.
Cortazar et al. (1998) explored the optimal investment decision when an environmental
regulation restricts a smelter's production capacity from a higher level to a lower level. In
contrast to their work, in this chapter, the restricted production level is not xed. Instead,
it depends on the stochastic variation of natural river ow. In other papers, rms can also
resort to market based strategies to achieve the compliance. Insley (2003) examined the
timing of building a scrubber in an electric power company in the presence of tradable
emissions permits in order to comply with the U.S. Acid Rain Program.
A strand of the literature examines the impact of regulatory uncertainties upon invest-
ment decisions including the papers of Teisberg (1993) and Brennan & Schwartz (1982),
among others. Teisberg (1993) used an Ito process to reect the changes in the value
of a project rate-of-return regulation arising from uncertain outcome of the regulation.
In his model, the variation in regulations was captured by a stochastic regulatory term,
whose value depends on the value of completed project, which is modelled as an exogenous
stochastic process. In contrast, in our work, the uncertainty of the regulation is caused by
natural ow conditions, and the model captures the uncertainty by introducing a stochas-
tic input constraint factor. As an early paper examining the valuation of a regulated rm
in a dynamic regulatory decision context, Brennan & Schwartz uses two variables (the
probability of holding a hearing for deciding the proper rate of return and the outcome
of the hearing, i.e. the allowed rate of return) to capture the uncertainties of the rate-of-
return regulation, where these two variables are dependent on the value of current rate of
return, which is a stochastic variable. Both above papers ascribe regulation uncertainties
to regulators, whereas in this paper, the uncertainty arise from natural forces.
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The methodology for the numerical solution of the optimal decision problem examined
in this thesis are available in the current literature. We model the decision problem as a
stochastic optimal control problem, which is solved numerically using a semi-Lagrangian
approach as described in the works of d'Halluin et al. (2005), Chen & Forsyth (2007), and
Chen & Forsyth (2010).
2.3.2 Ecient Regulatory Design for Water Policy
As noted in Section 2.1, there are many challenges to dening an ecient property rights
scheme for water. Libecap & Barbara (2012) discuss the pervasive externalities and third
party eects of water use. They note that because water supplies are stochastic, the
extent of third party eects will change over time and location along a water course.
Libecap & Barbara (2012) refer to the costs of bounding or partitioning water, the costs
of measurement, and the interconnected private and public good qualities of water as
factors which make ecient usage problematic. Government involvement or some type of
collective agreement, rather than private markets, is the rule rather than the exception in
water allocation.
Ecient water regulations would, in theory, maximize the total value of water use,
which requires equalizing the marginal value of water in its dierent uses. Johnson et al.
(1981) show that an ecient water allocation can be achieved when water rights are dened
in terms of consumptive use (i.e. water diversion less water returned to a water course)
and constraints are imposed to prevent third party eects.
Existing property rights regimes for water based on prior appropriation and/or riparian
rights are known to generate signicant ineciencies in many cases, in particular when the
transfer of water rights from lower to higher valued uses is inhibited by existing regulation.
Prior appropriation allows users to withdraw a specied quantity from a body of water
for use at a location which may be remote from water source. Older claims have priority
over newer claims. In times of insucient water the older claims have rst right to the
water, while new claims may have their allocations cut back or reduced to zero. In contrast
riparian water rights give the water access right to land owners adjacent to the body of
water and in times of drought all parties share equally in any reduced water allocation. The
extent of ineciencies of these systems, in practice, has been the subject of debate (see,
for example, Bennett et al. (2000), Libecap (2011), Libecap & Barbara (2012)). Barring
a mechanism for water transfers, the eciency of prior allocation or riparian schemes
will depend on the extent to which the rule for sharing in any cutback requires the largest
curtailment from those with the lowest marginal value of water use (Weber & Cutlac 2014).
Eciency will also depend critically on the protection given to in-stream river ows.
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Mannix et al. (2014) addresses the eciency of water regulations in the Alberta oil
industry. Mannix et al. (2014) examined the economic costs of the current regulations
and the reduction in costs by applying more ecient allocation policies and technological
improvements. In a deterministic model solved with a linear programming approach, they
nd that the economic costs of water restrictions can be reduced by water storage technol-
ogy, and can be further reduced by policies that allocate water more eciently. The aspect
of the current regulation Mannix et al. focus on is water allocation across rms within
the oil sands industry based on the priority for senior licenses. In particular, the article
estimates the gain that would result if seniority of water licenses was based on eciency
of water use.
Most of the literature on ecient water regulations addresses municipal household water
demand (Olmstead & Stavins 2009, Mansur & Olmstead 2012, Boldt-Van Rooy 2003).
There is great political sensitivity about raising water rates for households to an ecient
level as this is seen as regressive. Imposition of levies for industrial water use has mainly
been suggested for the bottled water industry15. The use of water pricing mechanisms for
industries besides agriculture is rare. Most industries do not pay any fee to extract water
from the environment.
2.3.3 Inter-temporal Water Storage
Water storage has been examined in the literature in the context of water irrigation projects
in agriculture. Agricultural irrigation has an apparent seasonal feature, as a result, con-
sistent with production, there is little demand for water during the water short seasons.
However, irrigation also faces water shortage in some drought years. Inter-yearly water
storage for agriculture has been studied in an Australian context. Since the weather con-
ditions in Australia vary signicantly and droughts occur from time to time, inter-yearly
water storage facilities are already in use. In contrast to our case, those facilities are
publicly owned infrastructure, instead of industry owned facilities. Some of the literature
demonstrates the feasibility of the inter-yearly water storage system for irrigation pur-
pose (Alaouze 1991). Some concludes that to leave the water storage decisions to market
is more ecient than using engineering rules of thumb (Brennan 2010). There are also
studies about how to maximize prots through the annual choice of irrigation area in the
presence of storage facilities (Dudley & Hearn 1993, Dudley 1972, 1988). However, the
15Water-bottling fees to be re-examined, says B.C. Premier Christy Clark. http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/british-columbia/water-bottling-fees-to-be-re-examined-says-b-c-premier-christy-clark-1.
3150529(accessed on January 11, 2020)
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existing relevant literature does not address the investment in construction of such storage
facilities, taking the existence of storage facilities for granted.
2.4 Model description
We analyze the case of a typical oil sands rm in the Lower Athabasca River region. We
assume the operation is large enough that a single water storage pond will serve only one
operation. Our goals are to determine the best timing for this rm to construct a water
storage facility to maximize prots under the water restrictions set by the Framework as
well as to explore the marginal cost of the restrictions for a typical rm.
2.4.1 Oil Production and Water Usage
We assume that the rm is already producing bitumen from its oil sands development and
that there is a xed oil to water ratio. In practice this is a reasonable assumption as, given
a certain technology choice, the ratio is highly stable. For example, net fresh water use in
oil sands production in 2013 averaged about 3.2 barrels of water per barrel of oil produced
by mining operations.16Accordingly, we assume a linear production function:
Q(Wp(t), t) = ηWp(t) η > 0, Wp(t) > 0, 0 ≤ Q(Wp(t), t) ≤ q̄ (2.1)
where Q is output, η is the number of barrels of bitumen that can be produced using one
barrel of fresh water, Wp(t) is the water used in production at time t, and q̄ is a xed upper
limit on the rate of production. We assume that the production technology is stable so
that η is a constant independent of t.
With no water management regulations, the rm can produce up to its full capacity
by using water without any restriction. In the presence of the Framework, in the absence
of water storage capacity, the rm has to cut back production during the yellow and red
zones, in which case prots will be impaired. To maintain its protability, the rm will
consider installing a water storage facility. The inventory of water in storage, I, will be
augmented by water withdrawals from the river, Ww and reduced as water is drawn out
of storage for use in oil production, Wp. The change in water inventory is given by the
following dierential equation:
dI = (Ww(t)−Wp(t))dt (2.2)
16Source: Responsible Canadian Energy 2014 Progress Report, http://www.capp.ca/
publications-and-statistics/publications/(accessed on January 11, 2020)
20
The level of the water inventory in storage is constrained to be a positive number which is
less than the storage capacity Ī:




′)−Wp(t′)) dt′ > 0, I(t0) = I0, 0 ≤ I(t) ≤ Ī (2.3)
2.4.2 Water Withdrawals From the River
According to the Framework, a weekly constraint on fresh water withdrawals is set for the
oil sands industry. Through the examination of the Agreement17, we also nd that the
restricted cumulative withdrawal in the yellow and red conditions is allocated among ve
oil sands rms roughly evenly.
The rate of water withdrawal, Ww, is restricted to be no greater than W̄ where
W̄ ∈ {W̄1, W̄2, W̄3}. The subscripts k = 1, 2, 3, represent the river ow condition or
water zone where k = 1 is the green zone, k = 2 is the yellow zone, and k = 3 is the red
zone. It is assumed that the change of water constraint from the current zone k to another







× dXk→u k = 1, 2, 3 (2.4)
where dXk→u is a Poisson Process:
dXk→u =
{
1 with probability (λk→udt),
0 with probability (1− λk→udt). k = 1, 2, 3 ; u = 1, 2, 3 (2.5)
The Poisson process is intended to reect the natural variability in river ows.
2.4.3 Oil Resource Stock
Production depletes the resource stock S:
dS = −Q(Wp(t), t)dt, S(t0) = s0 (2.6)
given ∫ T
t0
Q(Wp(t), t)dt ≤ S(t0) (2.7)
17Each year the Agreement updates the assignment of water. Only the current year's Agreement is
publicly available. This information was taken from the Agreement for the 2014-2015 winter period.
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where S(t0) is the available oil reserves at t0, t0 is starting time, and T is the lease end
date.
2.4.4 Project Stages
To investigate the investment behaviour of this rm, we consider following 5 project stages.
In the rst stage, there is no water storage facility, and the rm holds the option to suspend
production (stage 2) or to move on to stage 3, in which the water storage facility is installed
and put into use. With the presence of the water storage facility, the rm can choose to
stay in stage 3, or suspend the production temporarily (stage 4). The nal stage, stage 5,
is the permanent abandonment of the project. When in stages 1 to 4, the rm can decide
to abandon (switching to stage 5) by paying an abandonment cost. Let δm be the notation
for each stage, where m stands for the sequence number of stages and m = 1, ...,M . In
our example M = 5. Stages are summarized in the following table:
Stage, δ Description
1 Producing oil, no storage
2 Suspended, no storage
3 Producing oil, storage installed
4 Suspended, storage installed
5 Permanently abandoned
2.4.5 Oil Prices
As noted in Section 2.3.1, there is a substantial existing literature examining alternative
models for stochastic resource prices. The best model choice depends on the context
in which it will be used. For this thesis the goal is to nd a parsimonious model that
provides a reasonable depiction of the behaviour of oil prices, but does not involve addi-
tional stochastic factors which unnecessarily complicate the solution of the HJB equation.
Chapter 4 examines two single-regime mean-reverting process models and a two-regime
mean-reverting process model to explore their performance in capturing the characteris-
tics of oil price dynamics. It turns out that the the two-regime model performs the best
overall, but the single regime logarithmic mean-reverting model also performs well. The
analysis for this chapter was done using both the single and two regime processes and the
results were found to be qualitatively similar. We therefore present the results for the
log mean-reverting model to avoid unnecessary complexity of two price regimes as well as
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three water zones. The log mean-reverting process stochastic dierential equation is given
as follows:
dP = ε(µ− lnP (t))P (t)dt+ σP (t)dz (2.8)
where P (t) is the crude oil spot price at time t, µ is the long run mean log price that
lnP (t) tends to, ε is the speed of the mean reversion, σ is the volatility, and dz is the
increment of a Wiener process. ε(µ− lnP (t))P (t) and σP (t) are called the drift term and
the volatility term respectively. dz and dXk→u (dened in Equation (2.5)) are assumed to
be independent of each other.18
2.4.6 Cash Flows
Annual cash ows are derived from revenue from the production and sale of oil reserves less
xed, variable costs and taxes. Both revenues and costs depend on the stage of operation,
whether the project is operating, temporarily suspended or permanently abandoned. At
time t, the realized prots will be:
π
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P (t), S(t), W̄ (t), I(t), δ(t)
)






· 1{δ=3,4} − Λ(t) · 1{δ=1,2,3,4}
(2.9)
where ρ is the discount of bitumen prices against WTI prices. As will be discussed in
Section 2.5, in our optimal control problem, the value ofWp depends on ve state variables
P , S, W̄ , I, and δ. 1δ=δm is the indicator function which equals one if δ = δm and zero
otherwise. cove is the energy variable operating cost of oil production, c
o
vne is the non-energy
variable operating cost, cof is the xed operating cost, cs is the sustaining capital cost no
matter whether the operating is carried on or suspended, csf is the xed cost of water
storage, csv(I) is the variable cost of water storage, which depends on the water inventory
I, and Λ is the sum of all applicable taxes:
 Carbon tax ($/barrel)19 = Carbon tax rate ($/tonne)× Carbon emissions (Tonnes/barrel);
18This assumption is justied because it is reasonable to treat oil price shocks and river ows as inde-
pendent factors.
19Unless otherwise specied in this thesis, all references to $ or dollars herein refer to United States
(U.S.) dollars.
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 Royalty ($/barrel) = Royalty rate20 × P (t)($/barrel)× ρ;
 Income tax ($/barrel) =max{0, Income tax rate × [P (t)($/barrel) × ρ - Royalty
($/barrel) - Carbon tax ($/barrel) - Operating cost ($/barrel)]}.
That is to say, Λ(t) = carbon tax + royalty + income tax.
In addition to annual cash ows, there are one time costs incurred to move from one
stage to another. To go from an operating stage without storage to one with storage, the
cost of constructing storage facilities must be incurred, which we denote as C. To switch
from an operating stage to a suspending stage, the mothball cost, Cm is incurred. To move
back from a suspending stage to an operating stage, the reactivating cost, Cre is incurred.
Similarly, to move from any stage to permanent abandonment, an abandonment cost, Cr
is incurred. We also assume that it is not possible to move from a stage with water storage
back to a stage without water storage or move from permanent abandonment back to any
other stage. This is implemented by setting the costs to these relevant stage switches as a
very large number Clarge.
Table 2.1 summarizes the costs incurred in or between stages.
Table 2.1: Project Costs
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5
Annual costs
Fixed operating cost cof X X
Sustaining capital cost cs X X X X
Energy variable operating cost cove X X
Non-energy variable operating cost covne X X
The xed cost of water storage csf X X
The variable cost of water storage csv(I) X X
One time costs
Construction cost of water storage C X
Mothball cost Cm X X
Reactivating cost Cre X X
Abandonment costs Cr X
20The royalty rate diers between the pre-payout and the post-payout phases of a project. Before the
point that a project's cumulative revenues start to cover its cumulative costs, it is in the pre-payout phase.
After this point, it is in the post-payout phase. Without altering the qualitative results of our research,
we assume that the studied project is in the pre-payout phase.
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2.5 Specication of the Decision Problem
The rm's objective is to maximize the expected present value of cash ows from its oil
sands operation over T years. There are three control variables: water withdrawals (Ww)
from the river, oil production Q (which determines the water used in production, Wp), and
the decision to switch project stages which we denote (δ+). Control variables depend on
ve state variables: the oil price (P ), the resource stock (S), the water withdrawal limit
(W̄ ), the water inventory in storage (I), and the current project stage (δ).
2.5.1 Admissible Sets for Control Variables
Admissible sets are now specied for the control variables. Let Zδ+ denote the admissible
set for δ+ where
Zδ+ = {δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ5}. (2.10)
The admissible set for oil production, Q, depends on the resource stock, water storage
inventory, project stage, and water withdrawals from the river. Denote this admissible set
as ZQ(S, I, δ,Ww), which is given as follows:












S, q̄, η(Ww + I)
]]
, if S > 0, δ = δ3. (2.11c)
ZQ = 0, if S = 0, δ = δm, m = 1, 3. (2.11d)
ZQ = 0, if δ = δm, m = 2, 4, 5, ∀S. (2.11e)
Equation (2.11b) states that in stage δ1, oil production is constrained by the stock of oil
reserves, the maximum oil production limit, and the amount of water withdrawn from the
river multiplied by the water productivity coecient. In stage 3, described in Equation
(2.11c), water from the existing storage inventory is added to the current water withdrawal
from the river as a constraint on water available for oil production.
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Dene an admissible set for water withdrawals, Ww, denoted ZW (W̄ , δ), as follows:
Ww ∈ ZW (W̄ , δ) (2.12)
ZW = [0, W̄1], if W̄ = W̄1, δ = δ1, δ3
ZW = [0, W̄2], if W̄ = W̄2, δ = δ1, δ3
ZW = [0, W̄3], if W̄ = W̄3, δ = δ1, δ3
ZW = 0, if δ = δ2, δ4, δ5
2.5.2 Optimal Controls and Value Function
It is assumed that at predetermined, xed times, the rm makes a decision about whether
to change to a dierent project stage. These xed times are denoted by Td:
Td ≡ {t0 = 0 < t1 < ... < tm <, ..., tM = T − 1} (2.13)
The rm can switch stages instantaneously at t ∈ Td. At time T , the project must be
terminated and clean up costs are incurred. In the numerical example in this paper, the
time between xed decisions dates is set as a week.
Choices regarding the rate of water withdrawal, Ww, and oil production, Q, are made
in continuous time at time intervals given as follows:
Tc ≡ {(t0, t1), ..., (tm−1, tm), ..., (tM−1, tM)}. (2.14)
Controls are specied as functions of state variables as follows:
Q+(P, S, W̄ , I, δ, t), W+w (P, S, W̄ , I, δ, t), t ∈ Tc
δ+(P, S, W̄ , I, δ, t), t ∈ Td.
Let K denote the set of particular choices for the controls for all tm.
K = {(δ+)t∈Td ; (Q+,W+w )t∈Tc} (2.15)
For any particular K, the value function V (p, s, w̄, δ̄, t), can be written as the expected
discounted value of the integral of future cash ows with the expectation taken over the
controls, given the state variables, where p, s, w̄, ι, δ̄ denote particular realizations of the
state variables P , S, W̄ , I, and δ.
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π(P (t′), S(t′), W̄ (t′), I(t′), (δ(t′)) dt′
+ e−r(T−t)V (P (T ), S(T ), W̄ (T ), I(T ), δ(T ), T )∣∣∣P (t) = p, S(t) = s, W̄ (t) = w̄, I(t) = ι, δ(t) = δ̄].
(2.16)
r is the risk free interest rate, which is assumed to be 0.02, and E[·] is the expectation
operator. Note that the expectation is taken under the risk neutral or Q measure.21 In our
numerical example the value in the nal time period, V (P (T ), S(T ), W̄ (T ), I(T ), δ(T ), T ),
is assumed to be the cost of clean up if the project had not been abandoned before T
(δ = δm, m = 1, 2, 3, 4), or is equal to zero if the rm has already abandoned the project
(δ = δ5).
Equation (2.16) is solved for the optimal controls contained in the admissible sets
(Equations (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12) and subject to Equations for dS, dW̄ , dI, and dP
((2.6), (2.4), (2.2), and (2.8)). A dynamic programming algorithm is implemented solving
backwards in time and proceeding in two phases: (1) the decision to switch stages made
at xed time points, tm, and (2) the choice of water withdrawals and oil production made
in continuous time in the interval t ∈ (t+m, t−m+1), where t+m denotes the instant after tm and
t−m+1 denotes the instant before time tm+1.
2.5.3 Solution at Fixed Decision Dates
At any tm ∈ Td, the decision on the optimal stage from t+m should be the one in which the
project value minus switching cost is the maximum, other things equal.
δ+(p, s, w̄, ι, δ̄, tm) = arg max
δ
(V (p, s, w̄, ι, δ, tm)− Cδ̄→δ) (2.17)
where Cδ̄→δ denotes the cost for switching from stage δ̄ at time tm to stage δ at time
t+m. Table 2.2 species Cδ̄→δ at the intersection of δ̄
th row and the δth column.
21We assume that the risk of uncertain water ows is not correlated with the economy and the stock
market. Therefore, it is a diversiable risk and the P measure can be used.
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Table 2.2: Switching Costs
Stage 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 Cm C Clarge Cr
2 Cre 0 Clarge Clarge Cr
3 Clarge Clarge 0 Cm Cr
4 Clarge Clarge Cre 0 Cr
5 Clarge Clarge Clarge Clarge 0
2.5.4 Solution between Fixed Decision Dates, Going Backward In
Time From t−m+1 to t
+
m.
In this section we describe the solution going backwards in time between decision dates,


















λk→u(V (w̄ = W̄u)− V (w̄ = W̄k))− rV
(2.18)
where a ≡ ε(µ− lnP )P ; and b ≡ σP.
Recall that there is a xed relationship between water used in production, Wp, and the
rate of oil production Wp = Q/η.
Dene a small time interval h where h < (tm+1− tm). For t ∈ (t+m, t−m+1− h), according
to the dynamic programming principle, for small h we know that
V (p, s, w̄, ι, δ̄, t) = e−rhE
[
V (P (t+ h), S(t+ h), W̄ (t+ h), I(t+ h), δ(t), (t+ h))
∣∣∣ (2.19)
P (t) = p, S(t) = s, W̄ (t) = w̄, I(t) = ι, δ(t) = δ̄
]
(2.20)
Letting h→ 0 and applying Ito's Lemma22, the value function can be shown to satisfy the
22See Björk (2009) for a rigorous overview of optimal decisions under uncertainty characterized by an











Equation (2.21) is dened on the domain (p, s, w̄, ι, δ̄, t) ∈ Ω∞, where
Ω∞ ≡ [0,∞] × [0, S0] × ZW̄ × [0, Imax] × Zδ × [0, T ].
ZW̄ = {W̄1, W̄2, W̄3}
Zδ = {δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ5}
T reects the length of the lease to operate the project. For computational purposes the
domain Ω∞ is truncated to Ω where
Ω ≡ [0, pmax] × [0, S0] × ZW̄ × [0, Imax] × Zδ × [0, T ]. (2.22)
pmax is chosen to be large enough to represent a very high oil price in relation to historical
prices.
2.5.5 Boundary Conditions
Boundary conditions must be established for the state variables t, P , S, and I.
 At t = T if the project has not previously been abandoned, reclamation costs will be
paid of amount −Cr. Therefore V = −Cr for δ ∈ [δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4]. For δ = δ5, V = 0
at t = T as reclamation will already have been carried out so that the value will not
change.
 As P → 0, the volatility term of the stochastic dierential equation describing P
(Equation (2.8)), goes to zero. Hence we can just solve the HJB equation along the









λk→u(V (w̄ = W̄u)−V (w̄ = W̄k))−rV (2.23)




= 0. The implicit assumption is that volatility is unimportant at very
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high prices and is commonly assumed in the nance literature (Wilmott 1998). In











λk→u(V (w̄ = W̄u)− V (w̄ = W̄k))− rV
(2.24)
where a ≡ ε(µ− lnP )P ; and b ≡ σP.
Since a = ε(µ − lnP )P ≤ 0, according to the discussion of boundary conditions by
Chen & Forsyth (2007), we know that characteristics are outgoing in the P direction
at P → pmax. Hence no additional information is needed from outside of the domain
of P and we can solve the PDE at the boundary.23
 As S → 0, the oil production converges to zero: Q → 0. At this point, the project
ends, and the land must be reclaimed according to regulations.
 At S = S0, we solve the HJB equation at this boundary, and no special boundary
condition is needed.
 As I = 0, we can not withdraw water from the storage facility, but can only add water
into the facility through water withdrawals from the river. Hence (Ww −Wp) > 0.
Accordingly there are outgoing characteristics in the I direction. We do not need
additional information from outside of the domain of I and can just solve the HJB
equation along the boundary.
 When I = Imax, we cannot add any additional water to storage which means (Ww −
Wp) ≤ 0. Hence there are outgoing characteristics in the I direction. No additional
information is needed from outside of the domain of I.
2.5.6 Numerical Solution Details
As mentioned in the literature review (Section 2.3.1, Page 18), a number of papers (d'Halluin
et al. 2005, Chen & Forsyth 2007, 2010) introduce the standard method for solving stochas-
tic optimal control problems. More details can be found in theses d'Halluin (2004) and
23A detailed discussion about the information propagation direction along characteristics can be found
in Strikwerda (2004).
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Chen (2008). We tailor the standard method to accommodate our particular problem in
MATLAB. The detailed semi-Lagrangian time stepping and fully implicit discretization
scheme are elaborated in Appendices A.1 and A.2. Tests for the accuracy of the numerical
solution are provided in Appendix A.3.
2.6 Specication of the Parameters
2.6.1 Price Dynamic Process Related Parameters
The estimation of the parameters of Equation (2.8) is described in Chapter 4. Specically,
ε = 0.14, µ = 4.59, σ = 0.31. Accordingly, the oil SDE followed by oil prices is given as:
dP = 0.14(4.59− lnP )× Pdt + 0.31Pdz.
According to these estimates, if volatility were zero the time for the log of price to




= 7.14 years. The long run mean for
the benchmark oil price (West Texas Intermediate) is e4.59 = $98/barrel. Recall that these
estimates are risk adjusted under the Q measure.
With regard to the discount of bitumen prices against WTI prices, ρ (see Equa-
tion (2.9)), as in Insley (2017), we x it at the level of 83%. In other words, we x
the oil sands price in Canadian dollars at 83% of the WTI price in US dollars. In reality,
the bitumen price discount is highly variable and could itself be modelled as a second
stochastic factor.
2.6.2 Water Withdrawal Limits
The Framework sets the rules for determining these water withdrawal limits in dierent
zones, and also explicitly lists for each week how many cubic meters of water per second
the oil sands industry is permitted to remove from the Athabasca River in the yellow and
red zones based on the historical ow record up to 2007. The `Alberta Oil Sands Industry
Quarterly Update' (spring 2015) Economic Development and Trade (2015) (hereinafter
referred to as AOSIQU) shows that as of spring 2015 there were 12 surface mining projects
in operation. Assuming the available water during the yellow and red zones is allocated
evenly among those projects, according to the Framework, the resulting specic weekly
water restrictions in the yellow and red zones for the whole industry and the amount
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assigned to each project are listed in Table 2.3. The weekly water limits in the yellow
and red zones for the entire oil sands industry are also depicted in Figure 2.2. According
to the AOSIQU, the total production capacity of the the oil sands mining sector was
9.975 million barrels/week. If production is at full capacity, the weekly water required
is about 33.3 million barrels.24 From Table 2.3, it is shown that even if the river ow
condition is in the yellow or the red zone, the production of the industry would not be
bound by the constraints. That said, we know that projects do dier in terms of their
water licenses so that when the river is in the red or yellow zone, some projects with
less generous license provisions may experience water shortage. From the AOSIQU, the
average production capacity of each of the 12 surface mining projects is about 0.83 million
barrels/week implying the hypothetical project's water intake is not restricted even in the
red zone. However, from AOSIQU we know that in fact there are 4 of those 12 projects
whose production may be restricted in yellow or red zones (2 of which cannot achieve the
full capacity of production in the yellow zone.) In this case the water sharing agreement
would apply so that those rms with more generous licenses would need to give up some of
their water to share with rms in short supply. Although the restrictions do not currently
appear to be binding, they might bind in the future if the industry grows or if river ows
become less abundant over time. For the purposes of this thesis, we assume parameters for a
hypothetical oil sands plant which is constrained by the water restrictions. Specically the
hypothetical project is assumed to have a production capacity of 1.38 million barrels/week.
If there were 12 equally sized projects this implies oil production capacity of 16.62 million
barrels/week. Then the weekly water needed would be about 55.5 million barrels. In this
hypothetical case, the water constraint due to the framework would have an eect in some
dry periods.
The parameter λk→udt in Equation (2.5) refers to the hazard rate of switching from river
ow zone k to u in the period of dt. We examined the historical data of Athabasca river
ows and found that in the recent years the river ows are lower compared to the average
historical level. To show a more obvious eect on the oil sands industry of the Framework,
we adopt the relatively low river ows condition of 2015 for estimating the hazard rates.
According to the 2015 data of Athabasca river ows provided by Alberta Environment, we
estimate average values for λi→j (for all i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3, where 1 corresponds to






24This amount of water required is derived by using the water productivity specied in Section 2.6.3,
page 35: 9.975 million barrels of bitumen/week × 3.34 barrels of water/barrel of bitumen = 33.3 million
barrels of water/week.
32
Table 2.3: Water Withdrawal Limit (million Barrels/week)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Total (yellow zone) 58.1 58.1 53.2 58.1 58.1 53.2 53.2 53.2 53.2 53.2 53.2 58.1 62.9
Total (red zone) 48.4 43.5 43.5 43.5 43.5 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 43.5 43.5
Individual project (yellow zone) 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.8 5.2
Individual project (red zone) 4 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.6
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Total (yellow zone) 62.9 72.6 72.6 106.4 121 135.5 145.2 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5
Total (red zone) 48.4 62.9 72.6 106.4 121 135.5 145.2 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5
Individual project (yellow zone) 5.2 6 6 8.9 10.1 11.3 12.1 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7
Individual project (red zone) 4 5.2 6 8.9 10.1 11.3 12.1 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Total (yellow zone) 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 159.7
Total (red zone) 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 159.7
Individual project (yellow zone) 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.3
Individual project (red zone) 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.3
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Total (yellow zone) 154.8 150 135.5 130.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 67.7 67.7 62.9 62.9 62.9
Total (red zone) 154.8 150 135.5 130.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 58.1 53.2 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
Individual project (yellow zone) 12.9 12.5 11.3 10.9 6 6 6 6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
Individual project (red zone) 12.9 12.5 11.3 10.9 6 6 6 4.8 4.4 4 4 4 4
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Figure 2.2: Weekly water withdrawal limits in the yellow and red zones
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where Ni is the number of weeks in 2015 that are in the zone specied by i, Ni→j is the
number of times that the zone switches from i to j in 2015, and dt is 1
52
of a year or 1
week.
The hazard rate matrix is as follows.40.7 11.3 012.2 36.7 3.1
0 4.3 47.7

where the entry at the ith row and the jth column stands for λi→j.
2.6.3 Production Related Parameters
We assume that the project is already in operation and the remaining lifespan is 10 years.
Water requirements per barrel for each year are provided in the Responsible Canadian En-
ergy 2014 Progress Report25 by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. Herein
we adopt the average level of fresh water withdrawal per barrel of production during the
period of 2003∼2013, i.e. 3.34 barrels of water/barrel of oil. Therefore, η = 1/3.34 ≈ 0.3.
Section 2.6.2 (Table 2.3) shows that in the driest week (the 10th week) of each year,
the limitation in water availability connes a project's production to a maximum of 1.32
million barrels of oil per week26 in the yellow zone and 0.96 million barrels/week27 in the
red zone. As noted in the previous section we choose a hypothetical oil sands project with
a production capacity of 1.38 million barrels/week so that the production is aected by
both the yellow and red zones.28
Information on water storage capacity was obtained from Imperial Oil's description of
their Kearl oil sands project which commenced production on April 27, 201329. Like the
25Source: information provided on the website of Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP)
(http://www.capp.ca/publications-and-statistics/publications) (accessed on January 11, 2020).
26Each week the maximum amount of available water is 4.4 million barrels. Considering that 3.34 barrels
of water can produce one barrel of oil, the weekly oil production is under 4.4/3.34 million barrels.
27Similarly derived by 3.2 million barrels/3.34
28In this hypothetical case, we presume that the oil sands project's production is constrained by the
availability of fresh water. The rationality of this assumption can be supported by Mannix et al. (2010),
where the authors showed that the water constraint is possible to be binding on oil sands production in
the future. As a forward-looking regulation, it is helpful to anticipate the implications in the setting of
future problems occurring.
29Source: information provided on the website of Imperial Oil (http://www.imperialoil.ca/
Canada-English/operations_sands_kearl_environment.aspx) (accessed on January 11, 2020).
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Kearl project it is assumed that storage can sustain 30 day's production during the dry
season, which implies a capacity of about 20 million barrels. A report of Golder Associates
Ltd. (2015) showed that the capital cost for fresh water storage is $16/m3 and the annual
operating costs for the storage is 5% of capital cost plus relevant power costs. Accordingly
we assume that the storage facility in our case costs 39 million dollars and the xed cost
of running the facility is 2.1 million dollars/year. In addition, due to the lack of publicly
available information, the construction duration and variable operating costs for the facility
are arbitrary assumptions. We assume that the construction of the storage pond can be
built immediately (which has little impact on results) and the variable cost of the storage
capacity is $0.0028/barrel.
We require an estimate of the initial reserves of the hypothetical project. From Alberta's
Energy Reserves 2014 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2015-2024 (Alberta Energy Regulator
2015) we know that the remaining established reserves of crude bitumen are 166 billion
barrels in Alberta, and 20% of this is recoverable by surface mining approach. According to
the AOSIQU, there are 33 projects so far (including approved, operating, on hold, cancelled,
and in-application). Based on the above information, we assume that the hypothetical
project has less than 900 million barrels recoverable resource stock. Given the above
assumed production capacity of 1.38 million barrels/week (i.e. 72 million barrels/year),
the upper limit of resource stock that a 10-year life project would extract is 720 million
barrels if operating at full capacity. Therefore we assume the remaining resource stock for
the hypothetical project is 720 million barrels.30
With regard to the various cost values for operation, we used estimates provided by
the Canadian Energy Research Institute (hereinafter referred to as CERI) (Millington &
Murillo (2015)). Table 2.1 details when the various costs are incurred.
Table 2.4 lists all necessary parameter values for the hypothetical project in the base
case.
2.7 Results
We examined four dierent scenarios which reect current regulations and river conditions,
as well as stricter regulations and drier river conditions. We denote these scenarios as
follows.
30In fact, the hypothetical project's scale, in term of its production capacity and the remaining estab-
lished reserves, is quite close to the scale of North Steepbank Extension project of Suncor Energy Inc.
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Table 2.4: Base Case Parameter Values
Parameter Description Reference Assigned Value Source
Extraction method Surface mining ∗ ∗ ∗
T − t0 Remaining lifespan of the project (years) Equation (2.7) 10 ∗
q̄ Production capacity (million barrels/year) Equation (2.1) 72 ∗
s0 Remaining established reserves (million barrels) Equation (2.7) 720 ∗
η Productivity of water (barrels of bitumen/barrel of water) Equation (2.1) 0.3 ∗∗
W̄1
Water withdrawal constraint in the green zone (million
barrels/week)
Equation (2.4) +∞ ∗ ∗ ∗
W̄2, W̄3
Water withdrawal constraint in the yellow zone and
the red zone (million barrels/week)
Equation (2.4) refer to Table 2.3 ∗
ρ Discount of bitumen prices against WTI prices Equation (2.9) 83% ∗
C
The construction cost of the water storage (million
dollars)
Table 2.1 39 ∗
Ī Water storage capacity (million barrels) Equation (2.3) 20 ∗
csf The xed cost of water storage (million $/year) Equation (2.9) 2.1 ∗
csv The variable cost of water storage ($/barrel) Equation (2.9) 0.0028 ∗
Carbon emissions (tonnes/barrel) Equation (2.9) 0.091 ∗∗
cove Energy variable operating cost (% of the WTI price) Equation (2.9) 1.62 ∗∗
covne Non-energy variable operating cost ($/barrel) Equation (2.9) 7.98 ∗∗
cof Fixed operating cost (million $/year) Equation (2.9) 470 ∗∗
cs Sustaining capital cost (million $/year) Equation (2.9) 468 ∗ ∗ ∗
Income tax rate (%) Equation (2.9) 25 ∗ ∗ ∗
Carbon tax ($/tonne) Equation (2.9) 40 ∗ ∗ ∗
Royalty rate (%) Equation (2.9)
1 when P <$55/barrel
9 when P >$120/barrel
(0.12P -5.77) otherwise
∗ ∗ ∗
Cm Mothball cost (million $) Table 2.1 0 ∗
Cre Reactivating cost (million $) Table 2.1 0 ∗
Clarge A large number to prevent stage switching (million $) Page 24 10
9 ∗
Cr Abandonment cost (million $) Table 2.1 278 ∗
ε Speed of reverting to the mean log oil price Equation (2.8) 0.14 ∗ ∗ ∗
µ Long run mean log oil price Equation (2.8) 4.59 ∗ ∗ ∗







Hazard rate of switching
from the green zone to the yellow zone,
from the green zone to the red zone,
from the yellow zone to the green zone,
from the yellow zone to the red zone,
from the red zone to the green zone,









r Risk free interest rate Equation (2.16) 0.02 ∗
The column Reliablility indicates the reliablity of the given parameter values. ∗ ∗ ∗ means these values are publicly available or are
estimated from empirical evidence. ∗∗ means these values are derived according to AOSIQU, Alberta Energy Regulator (2015), or CERI's
report ((Millington & Murillo 2015) . ∗ means these values are assumed by referring to miscellaneous sources, which are specied in the
text.
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 W_L (wet lenient scenario): The river ow is in the current condition (i.e. a fairly
wet condition), as shown by the solid curve in Figure 2.3.31 The water withdrawal
limit is regulated by the Phase 1 Framework, which is relatively lenient compared to
the other case we examine.
 W_S (wet strict scenario): The river ow is in the current condition. The water
withdrawal limit is tightened by 1.35 million barrels/week (i.e. up to 30% and 42%
of the weekly withdrawal limit set by the Phase 1 Framework for the yellow zone and
the red zone respectively)32 based on the Phase 1 Framework.
 D_L (dry lenient scenario): The river ow is in such a dry condition that it falls in
the red zone all the time, as shown by the dash-dot curve in Figure 2.3. The water
withdrawal limit is regulated by the Phase 1 Framework.
 D_S (dry strict scenario): The river ow is in the red zone all the time. The water
withdrawal limit is tightened by 1.35 million barrels/week based on the Phase 1
Framework which amounts to a 30% to 40% reduction in allowed water withdrawals
over the year compared to the more lenient regulations of the Phase 1 Framework.
Figure 2.3 shows the levels of the weekly river ow rates for the wet (represented by W
in the scenario nomenclature) and dry (represented by D in the scenario nomenclature)
river ow conditions compared to the historical river ow rates. The boxplots in Figure 2.3
indicate the rst quartile (represented by the lower edge of each box), the third quartile
(the upper edge of each box), the median (the short red horizontal bar cutting through
each box), the maximum level (the highest tip of the dashed whisker), the minimum level
(the lowest tip of the dashed whisker), and outliers (the plus signs) of the historical weekly
river ow rate.
2.7.1 Economic Impact of Water Restrictions for the Firm
In this section we examine the impact of the regulation on the oil sands project if no
action can be taken to alleviate the water shortage pressure, i.e. there is no storage option
available. This case indicates the maximum eect of the water restrictions. Note also that
31We call this scenario wet because it is relatively wet compared to other scenarios listed herein. It
does not mean that it is in the wet spectrum of the historical river ow record. In fact, from Figure 2.3,
we can see that this scenario is fairly dry if we use the historical record as a reference.
32The reason we choose 1.35 million barrels/week is that this number is suitable for our numerical
analysis while is appropriate for the policy analysis.
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Different Weekly River Flow Scenarios Compared to the Historical River Flow
Wet condition
Permanently in the red zone
Figure 2.3: Curves Showing the Assumed Wet and Dry Weekly River Flow Rates versus
the Box Plots of Historical Weekly River Flow Rates.
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a reliance on water storage to alleviate water shortfall has been the subject of controversy
in certain cases due to potential negative consequences as discussed in Di Baldassarre et al.
(2018).
2.7.1.1 Solution Surface for the Value of the Project
Figure 2.4 depicts the solution surface for W_L, which shows the project's values corre-
sponding to dierent combinations of the oil sands resource stock and crude oil price when
the present river ow condition is in the green zone. Note that these graphs depict the
value of the project at time zero for dierent values of the state variables, assuming the
project owner acts optimally in the choice of controls until the lease end date at time T . As
expected, other things equal, the project's value rises with an increase in oil price as well
as with an increase in resource stock. When the present river ow condition is in either of
the other zones, the shape of the solution surface is very similar to that in Figure 2.4, and
hence is not shown. For any specic combination of oil price and stock, the project value if
currently in the red zone is slightly less than that in the yellow zone, which is slightly less
than that in the green zone. The current river zone is not a large determinant of project
value since the applied water constraint is not very tight. Therefore, even if the river ow
condition is in the yellow or the red zone, there will not be a major impact on production.
2.7.1.2 Project Value Comparison between the Four Scenarios
To compare the project values across the four scenarios, we adopt one particular value for
the resource stock dimension and examine how the project present value varies with the
current oil price. We select 720 million barrels, where the resource stock is at its highest
level but it can be shown that if any other spot is selected, the comparison result also
holds. Since for D_L and D_S, the river ow is always in the red zone, our comparison
is done for the current river ow in the red zone. Figure 2.5 exhibits the comparison
result. As expected, the stricter the water withdrawal restriction or the drier the river
ow condition, the lower the project's value. In the scenarios with dry river conditions, a
signicant dierence is now observed between the scenarios. At an oil price of $100/barrel,
the project's value is lower by 11.1% in the D_S scenario compared to D_L.
2.7.1.3 Critical Prices To Abandon the Project
In general project abandonment will occur when reserves run out, when the lease ends, or
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Figure 2.4: W_L: Project present value versus present price and resource stock if the
current river ow condition is in the green zone and there is no option to install a water
storage facility
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Figure 2.5: Comparison between scenarios: Project present value versus present price if
the present resource stock level is 720 million barrels, the current river ow condition is in
the red zone, and there is no option to install a water storage facility
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an active project. Abandonment requires the rm to pay rehabilitation costs, but the rm
thereby avoids the xed costs of the oil sands operation. Fixed costs at $470 million per
year exceed rehabilitation costs of $278 million. Rather than abandoning the rm has also
has the option to suspend production but still incurs xed costs of $468 million per year.
We might expect that stricter water withdrawal restrictions will aect a rm's decision
about when to permanently abandon a project. Intuitively, stricter limitations on water
withdrawals will require reduced production in dry periods which the rm will try to make
it up in wetter periods. As a result the expected abandonment time would be delayed
if restrictions become tighter. We investigate this eect for our hypothetical project by
examining critical prices to abandon the project. If the oil price is greater than the critical
price, the rm's optimal choice is to continue the project. Otherwise, it should shut down
the project permanently. Table 2.5 lists the critical prices to abandon the project for
the four scenarios for dierent levels of oil reserves. It shows that the crude oil prices
for abandonment are fairly low ($45 per barrel and less) and are lower for higher reserve
levels. Across scenarios, the change in critical prices is quite slight implying that stricter
regulations and drier river conditions are having insignicant impact on the decision to
abandon the hypothetical project examined here. In our example, the river ow is quite
abundant even in the red zone. The water withdrawal limit is high enough for the oil sands
project to produce at close to its full capacity. To be specic, without using a water storage
facility to shift available water between weeks, in scenario W_L, there are 51 out 52 weeks
that the project can produce at its full capacity, in D_L, 33 out of 52, in W_S, 47 out
of 52, and in D_S, 31 out of 52 weeks. We do observe some higher critical prices in the
W_S, D_L, or D_S cases compared to W_L when the resource stock is below 500 million
barrels. When the resource stock is higher than 500 million barrels, it is not optimal to
abandon the project except for at oil prices less than $5/barrel.
The critical prices to suspend the project are shown in Table 2.6. It will be observed
that, except for low reserve levels (below 140 million barrels), critical prices to suspend are
always higher than those to abandon the project. This implies that the project will always
be suspended before it is abandoned. For low reserves, the project will not move from the
operating stage to the suspended stage. Instead, it is just permanently abandoned.
2.7.1.4 Main Findings
Water is a crucial input for an oil sands operation. Concerns have been expressed in
the public discourse about the eect of oil sands water withdrawals on the Athabasca
River ecosystem as well as the eect of water restrictions on the protability of oil sands
operations. The results in this section show that the Phase 1 Water Restrictions would
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Table 2.5: Critical Prices To Abandon the Project While There Is No Option To Install
Water Storage To Mitigate the Impacts of Water Restriction Regulation
From operating stages to abandonment
W_L W_S D_L D_S
Resource stock green yellow red green yellow red red red
(million barrels) stage stage stage stage stage stage stage stage
1→5 1→5 1→5 1→5 1→5 1→5 1→5 1→5
0 H H H H H H H H
20 35 35 35 35 35 40 35 45
40 30 30 35 35 35 35 35 40
60 30 30 30 30 30 35 35 35
80 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35
120 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
140 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 30
180 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
200 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 25
240 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20
300 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 15
350 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10
450 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
500 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
600 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
660 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
720 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
From suspending stages to abandonment
W_L W_S D_L D_S
Resource stock green yellow red green yellow red red red
(million barrels) stage stage stage stage stage stage stage stage
2→5 2→5 2→5 2→5 2→5 2→5 2→5 2→5
0 H H H H H H H H
20 35 35 35 35 40 40 40 45
40 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 40
60 30 30 30 30 35 35 35 35
80 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35
120 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
140 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 30
180 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
200 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 25
240 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20
300 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 15
350 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10
450 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
500 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
600 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
660 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
720 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
H means that the critical prices is higher than $500/barrel. Since in the history the
oil price never exceeded $500/barrel, it implies that it is never optimal to abandon the
project.
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Table 2.6: Critical Prices To Suspend the Project While There Is No Option To Install
Water Storage To Mitigate the Impacts of Water Restriction Regulation
From operating stages to suspending stages
W_L W_S D_L D_S
Resource stock green yellow red green yellow red red red
(million barrels) stage stage stage stage stage stage stage stage
1→2 1→2 1→2 1→2 1→2 1→2 1→2 1→2
0 H H H H H H H H
20 25 25 30 25 30 35 30 35
40 25 25 30 25 30 35 30 35
60 25 25 30 25 30 40 30 35
80 25 25 30 25 30 45 30 40
100 25 25 30 25 35 45 30 45
120 25 25 35 25 35 50 35 45
140 35 35 40 30 40 50 35 45
160 40 40 40 35 45 50 40 50
180 45 45 45 40 45 55 45 50
200 45 45 50 45 50 55 50 50
220 50 50 55 50 50 60 50 55
240 55 55 55 50 55 60 55 55
270 55 55 55 55 55 60 55 55
300 55 55 60 55 60 60 55 60
350 55 55 60 55 55 60 55 55
400 55 55 55 50 55 60 55 55
450 50 50 55 50 55 60 50 50
500 50 50 50 45 50 55 50 50
550 45 45 45 40 45 50 45 45
600 40 40 45 40 40 45 40 40
630 40 40 40 35 40 45 40 40
660 35 35 40 35 40 45 35 40
690 35 35 35 35 35 40 35 40
720 35 35 35 30 35 40 35 35
H means that the critical prices is higher than $500/barrel. Since in the history the
oil price never exceeded $500/barrel, it implies that it is never optimal to abandon the
project.
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not have a signicant detrimental eect on our hypothetical oil sands operation. This is
reinforced by comparing the project values when no water constraints at all are imposed
to those for scenario W_L in Figure 2.5. It will be observed that the two curves are very
close together. The impact of the regulations only becomes signicant under drier river
conditions or stricter regulations.
2.7.2 Option To Install a Water Storage Facility
When confronted with restrictions on water usage, rms may seek some technological
option to reduce the impact of the restrictions. Among the possible options, the installation
of a water storage facility is currently feasible and has been recommended by Alberta
regulatory authorities. This section introduces the option to install a water storage facility
to the model and we examine its eects on the behaviour of the rm and project value.
2.7.2.1 Project Values With and Without the Storage Option
Figure 2.6 shows the project`s values for the four scenarios with and without the option to
install a water storage facility. As expected when the option to install storage is present,
the project becomes more valuable. However we see that the dierence in values with and
without the storage option becomes signicant only for the D_S case where values dier
by 15.1% at an oil price of $90/barrel. (The dierences are 2.1%, 7.5%, 8.2% respectively
for W_L, W_S, and D_L.)
To ground-truth our result about the project value, we compare the sector's total
value hereby derived to that derived from 2014 ∼ 2016 nancial statements of the ve
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existing oil sands mining operators.33 This will provide a rough comparison of the orders
of magnitude. The annual total prot from the oil sands mining business reected by
the nancial statements is about 7.4 billion dollars. Treating it as an annuity lasting for
10 years, the present value is about 66 billion dollars. The total value derived from our
model is about 147 billion dollars, which is calculated by 12.239 billion dollars/project
× 12 projects. Recall that the hypothetical project's production capacity is 1.38 million
barrels/week rather than the actual 0.83 million barrels/week. This increase in production
capacity can explain part of the dierence between the above values derived from the
nancial statements and from our model. In addition the project value calculated is this
thesis is an expected value based on an assumption about the future price path of oil,
which we are comparing to an annuity base on historical prot levels.
2.7.2.2 Critical Prices To Install Water Storage
Considering the stochastic features of the market and the river ow conditions, the rm
chooses the timing of installing the water storage facility to optimize the present value
of the project. The critical prices to switch from operating stage 1 to stage 3 indicate
the optimal strategy for the decision to invest in water storage. If the crude oil price on
the decision day is greater than the critical price, it is optimal to invest, otherwise the
investment should be delayed. The critical prices depend on the state variables including
present river ow condition as well as the resource stock level. Assuming that the resource
stock is at its full level (i.e. 720 million barrels), gure 2.7 shows for the four scenarios, the
value of switching from operating stage 1 to stage 3 (i.e. stage 3 value less stage 1 value,
hereinafter referred to as switching values) for dierent oil prices at time zero. When the
33Because for each operator, the ownership of mining blocks can vary over time, we choose 2014 to 2016
to calculate the average annual total prot in order to keep a relative stable prole of blocks, which could
be comparable to the hypothetical case that we examine. The ve companies are: Canadian Natural
Resources Limited, Imperial Oil Limited, Shell Albian Sands, Suncor Energy Inc., and Syncrude Canada
























































































Without the storage option With the storage option
Figure 2.6: Comparing the project values in dierent scenarios between two cases: there
is an option to install a water storage facility & there is no such an option (the present
resource stock level is 720 million barrels, the current river ow condition is in the red
zone)
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switching values are positive, it is optimal to switch to stage 3 by installing storage. The
oil price at which the switching value changes from negative to positive is the critical price.
For instance, in the top left panel of Figure 2.7, when the current river ow condition is
in the green zone, as long as the oil price is higher than $50/barrel, it is optimal to begin
the construction of the water storage facility. So $50/barrel is the critical price. Similarly,
in this scenario, when the present river ow condition is in the yellow or the red zone, the
critical prices are $40/barrel and $35/barrel respectively.
Table 2.7 (depicted in Figure 2.8) provides a complete reference of the critical prices
to proceed to operating stage 3 at dierent resource stock levels for the four scenarios.
It is notable that the critical prices rise quite quickly as the resource stock is depleted,
increasing from around $40 per barrel at full reserves in the W_L case in the green zone
to $140 per barrel when reserves are at 350 million barrels. We also observe critical prices
falling signicantly when river conditions are drier and water restrictions are more severe.
2.7.2.3 Critical Prices To Abandon the Project
In Section 2.7.1.3 we claim that even without the option to install storage, the critical prices
for abandoning the project are fairly low and are not very sensitive to dierent scenarios.
When the option to install storage is available it will be even less likely that the project
will be abandoned before the end of the lease at time T . Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 conrms
this showing critical prices for abandonment that are the same or lower than when there
is no storage option. As in the no storage option case, except for reserve levels below 140
million barrels, the project will always be suspended before it is abandoned.
2.7.2.4 Main Findings
The above results indicate that the application of a water storage facility can generally
increase the project's value. The drier the river ow condition or the tighter the water
restriction, the more valuable the investment in a water storage facility. However, in the
four scenarios, the abandonment decision is not aected much by the installation of a
water storage facility. We also investigate some scenarios where the project's production
is further limited by the water constraints. It turns out that only when annual production
is cut back to much less than the maximum production capacity does the installation of
a water storage facility have a signicant impact on the critical prices of abandonment.
Given the assumed oil price process, the project is generally protable when producing
oil. Stricter water restrictions imply the project may need to stay in operation longer in
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Figure 2.7: Values of switching from stage 1 to stage 3 by installing storage when the
resource stock is at the full level (i.e. 720 million barrels)
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Table 2.7: Critical Prices To Proceed To Operating Stage 3 While There Is
an Option To Install a Water Storage Facility
Resource stock W_L W_S D_L D_S
(million barrels) green yellow red green yellow red red red
0 H H H H H H H 0
20 H H 300 400 200 40 160 40
40 H H 160 180 85 35 40 35
60 H 400 130 100 45 35 35 35
80 400 275 105 50 35 35 35 30
100 300 225 90 40 35 35 35 35
120 225 190 80 40 35 35 35 35
140 190 160 70 40 35 35 35 35
160 160 130 65 40 40 35 40 35
180 140 120 65 45 45 40 40 35
200 120 105 60 45 45 45 45 40
220 110 95 60 50 50 45 45 40
240 100 90 60 55 50 50 50 45
270 90 80 60 55 50 50 50 45
300 85 75 60 55 55 50 50 45
350 75 70 60 55 55 50 50 45
400 70 65 55 55 50 50 50 40
450 65 60 55 50 50 45 45 35
500 60 55 50 50 45 40 45 30
550 55 50 45 45 40 35 40 25
600 50 45 40 40 35 35 35 25
630 50 45 40 35 35 30 30 25
660 45 40 35 35 30 30 30 20
690 40 40 35 35 30 30 30 20
720 40 35 30 30 30 25 25 20
H means that the critical prices is higher than $500/barrel. Since in the history
the oil price never exceeded $500/barrel, it implies that it is never optimal to proceed
from operating stage 1 to stage 2.
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Figure 2.8: Critical prices to proceed from operating stage 1 to stage 3 for dierent present
resource stock levels in the four scenarios
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Table 2.8: Critical Prices To Abandon the Project While There Is an Option To Install
Water Storage To Mitigate the Impacts of the Water Restriction Regulation
From operating stages to abandonment
W_L W_S D_L D_S
Resource stock green yellow red green yellow red red red
(million barrels) stage stage stage stage stage stage stage stage
1→5 3→5 1→5 3→5 1→5 3→5 1→5 3→5 1→5 3→5 1→5 3→5 1→5 3→5 1→5 3→5
0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
20 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 40 35 35 35 45 35
40 30 30 30 30 35 30 35 30 35 30 35 35 35 30 40 35
60 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35 30 35 30 35 30
80 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35 30
120 30 25 30 25 30 25 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
140 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 30 25
180 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
200 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
240 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 20
300 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
350 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 10 10
450 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
500 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
600 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
660 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
720 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
From suspending stages to abandonment
W_L W_S D_L D_S
Resource stock green yellow red green yellow red red red
(million barrels) stage stage stage stage stage stage stage stage
2→5 4→5 2→5 4→5 2→5 4→5 2→5 4→5 2→5 4→5 2→5 4→5 2→5 4→5 2→5 4→5
0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
20 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 40 35 40 35 40 35 45 35
40 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 40 35
60 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35 30 35 30 35 30 35 30
80 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35 30
120 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
140 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 30 25
180 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
200 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
240 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 20
300 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
350 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10
450 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
500 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
600 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
660 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
720 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 5 5
H means that the critical prices is higher than $500/barrel. Since in the history the oil price never exceeded $500/barrel, it implies that it
is never optimal to abandon the project.
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Table 2.9: Critical Prices To Suspend the Project While There Is an Option To Install
Water Storage To Mitigate the Impacts of Water Restriction Regulation
From operating stages to suspending stages
W_L W_S D_L D_S
Resource stock green yellow red green yellow red red red
(million barrels) stage stage stage stage stage stage stage stage
1→2 3→4 1→2 3→4 1→2 3→4 1→2 3→4 1→2 3→4 1→2 3→4 1→2 3→4 1→2 3→4
0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
20 25 25 25 25 30 25 25 25 30 25 35 25 30 25 35 25
40 25 25 25 25 30 25 25 25 30 25 35 25 30 25 35 25
60 25 25 25 25 30 25 25 25 30 25 40 25 30 25 40 25
80 25 25 25 25 30 25 25 25 30 25 45 25 30 25 40 25
100 25 25 25 25 30 25 25 25 35 25 45 25 30 25 45 25
120 25 25 25 25 35 25 25 25 40 25 50 25 35 25 50 25
140 35 35 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35 50 35 40 35 50 35
160 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 35 45 35 55 40 40 40 50 40
180 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 40 45 45 55 45 45 45 55 45
200 45 45 45 45 50 45 45 45 50 45 60 50 50 45 55 50
220 50 50 50 50 55 50 50 50 55 50 60 50 55 50 60 50
240 55 55 55 55 55 55 50 50 55 55 60 55 55 55 60 55
270 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 60 55 65 55 55 55 60 55
300 55 55 55 55 60 55 55 55 60 55 65 60 60 55 60 55
350 55 55 55 55 60 55 55 55 60 55 65 60 60 55 60 55
400 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 60 55 65 55 55 55 60 55
450 55 55 55 55 55 55 50 50 55 55 60 55 55 55 55 50
500 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 55 50 50 50 50 50
550 45 45 45 45 50 45 45 45 50 45 55 45 50 45 50 45
600 45 45 45 45 45 45 40 40 45 40 50 45 45 45 45 40
630 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 45 40 50 40 40 40 45 40
660 40 40 40 40 40 40 35 35 40 35 45 40 40 40 45 35
690 35 35 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35 45 35 40 35 40 35
720 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 45 35 35 35 40 35
H means that the critical prices is higher than $500/barrel. Since in the history the oil price never exceeded $500/barrel, it implies that it
is never optimal to abandon the project.
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order to extract the resource. Hence even when the oil price drops to very low levels, the
project will be temporarily suspended but not abandoned. For instance, if the resource
stock is at the current level, when the project is forced to produce at the level of 20% of
the maximum capacity, the critical price to abandon falls from $15/barrel to $5/barrel.
When the project is forced to produce at a lower level of 10% of the maximum capacity,
the critical price to abandon is reduced from around $25/barrel to $10/barrel. And when
the project's production is further cut back to 5% of the maximum capacity, the critical
price to abandon is reduced from around $30/barrel to $15/barrel.
2.7.3 The Marginal Eect of the Phase 1 Water Management
Framework and Eciency of Water Withdrawal Constraints
In this section we calculate the marginal costs of water withdrawal restrictions in order to
consider the eciency of the regulation. We dene marginal cost to be the change in the
expected value of the project to the rm, at time zero, caused by a marginal reduction
in allowed water withdrawals in all future time periods (i.e. a marginal increase in water
restrictions). This is a dynamic denition of marginal cost, in that it is assumed the rm
will respond optimally to the change in water restrictions, and may adopt new technology
through the installation of storage.
In theory, the goal of government policy is to set an ecient level of water restrictions
that maximizes the total benets of the regulation, which will be at a point that equates
marginal costs and marginal benets. The marginal benets reect the value to society of
increased water ows in the Athabasca River. Although we have no monetary estimate of
the benet of increase river ows, the marginal cost estimate provides a lower limit for the
marginal benets in order for the regulation to be welfare enhancing. The marginal cost
also indicates a rm's willingness to pay for water, and hence would be the price expected
if water trading were permitted.
2.7.3.1 The Marginal Costs Under the Phase 1 Water Management Frame-
work
The water withdrawal limits are dened over 52 weeks of the year and in three dierent
water zones. For the purposes of this chapter, we dene an increase in water withdrawal
restrictions to be a reduction of permitted water withdrawal rates of 70 million barrels per
year in all weeks of the year when the river is in the yellow and red water zones over the
lifetime of the project. We denote the reduction of withdrawal rates as ∆w̄.
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The marginal cost of increased restrictions depends on the current value of the state
variables. We estimate the marginal cost of the Phase 1 Water Management Frame-
work to the hypothetical rm, MC, by taking the present value of the hypothetical rm
V (p, s, w̄, ι, δ̄, t), in a given river zone where W̄ = w̄, at a specic oil price level, P = p, at
a certain oil stock level, S = s, and nding the change in V (p, s, w̄, ι, δ̄, t), when the annual
constraints on water withdrawal rates in the yellow and red zones are further restricted by
∆w̄34 over the lifespan of the project, i.e. T − t0. That is to say, MC = ∆V (p,s,w̄,ι,δ̄,t)∆w̄·(T−t0) .
A list of the marginal costs corresponding to dierent current oil prices in the four
scenarios when there is an option to build a water storage facility are reported in Table 2.10
and depicted in the panels on the left hand side of Figure 2.9. The marginal costs for the
cases where there is no storage option to mitigate the impact of the water constraints are
reported in Table 2.11 and depicted in the panels on the right hand side of Figure 2.9.
We observe that the marginal cost of increasing the water restrictions is very low in the
W_L scenario when there is an option to install storage - no more than 21 cents for oil
prices lower than $150 per barrel. Without a storage option the marginal cost in this case
is higher, ranging from 27 cents for the lowest oil prices to $1.35 in the red zone at $150
per barrel for the price of oil. The marginal costs of the regulation are substantially higher
when the river is assumed to be in drier conditions and when the base case regulations are
stricter - that is in W_S, D_L and D_S.
2.7.3.2 The Marginal Costs Under the Dierent Water Withdrawal Con-
straints and the Ecient Level of Constraints
In this section we map out the marginal cost of increased restrictions for a range of initial
water restrictions. If all rms in the industry were like this typical rm depicted in our
example, we could map out the marginal cost of water restrictions for the oil sands industry.
In reality oil sands rms have dierent eciencies and cost curves. The calculation of an
aggregate marginal cost curve must be viewed as illustrative.
Figure 2.10 below shows the marginal cost curve for the industry composed of 12 same
scale projects (as is the number of operating projects in 2015). The gure is shown for
an initial oil price of $50 per barrel and assuming the oil stock is at its maximum level
for each rm. The horizontal axis shows the adjustment of the level of year-round water
withdrawal restrictions (i.e. the annually available water for oil industry), with water
34Due to the accuracy of the numerical method the smallest marginal change that can be examined is 1
million barrels of water per week over the lifespan of the project. The change in the rm's present value
is in millions of dollars.
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Table 2.10: Marginal Cost To the Project While There Is an Option To Build Storage
($/barrel)
Oil price W_L W_S D_L D_S
($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Green Yellow Red Red Red
10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.67
15 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.50 1.06
20 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.59 1.33
25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.64 1.50
30 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.68 1.63
35 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.70 1.74
40 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.72 1.88
45 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.75 2.02
50 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.79 2.16
55 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.83 2.30
60 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.87 2.41
65 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.61 0.62 0.69 0.91 2.52
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.63 0.65 0.72 0.95 2.63
75 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.66 0.67 0.75 0.99 2.74
80 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.68 0.70 0.78 1.03 2.83
85 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.71 0.73 0.81 1.07 2.94
90 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.73 0.75 0.85 1.11 3.02
95 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.75 0.78 0.88 1.14 3.13
100 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.78 0.80 0.91 1.18 3.23
105 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.80 0.82 0.94 1.22 3.31
110 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.82 0.85 0.97 1.25 3.41
115 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.84 0.87 1.00 1.29 3.52
120 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.86 0.90 1.03 1.32 3.58
130 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.91 0.94 1.09 1.39 3.78
140 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.95 0.99 1.15 1.46 3.93
150 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.99 1.03 1.21 1.52 4.13
160 0.17 0.18 0.22 1.03 1.08 1.27 1.59 4.26
170 0.18 0.19 0.23 1.07 1.12 1.33 1.65 4.46
180 0.19 0.19 0.24 1.11 1.16 1.39 1.71 4.62
190 0.19 0.20 0.25 1.15 1.20 1.45 1.77 4.77
200 0.20 0.21 0.26 1.19 1.24 1.50 1.83 4.94
225 0.22 0.22 0.29 1.28 1.35 1.64 1.98 5.33
250 0.23 0.24 0.31 1.37 1.44 1.78 2.13 5.71
275 0.24 0.25 0.34 1.45 1.54 1.91 2.26 6.09
300 0.26 0.27 0.36 1.54 1.63 2.04 2.40 6.44
350 0.28 0.29 0.41 1.70 1.81 2.29 2.66 7.14
400 0.31 0.32 0.45 1.85 1.98 2.54 2.91 7.80
450 0.33 0.35 0.49 2.00 2.15 2.78 3.15 8.45
500 0.36 0.37 0.54 2.15 2.31 3.02 3.39 9.09
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels.
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Table 2.11: Marginal Cost To the Project While There Is No Option To Build Storage
($/barrel)
Oil price W_L W_S D_L D_S
($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Green Yellow Red Red Red
10 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.64 0.36
15 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.95 1.04
20 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.16 1.44
25 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.28 1.67
30 0.51 0.51 0.51 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.37 1.87
35 0.53 0.53 0.54 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.45 2.06
40 0.55 0.56 0.57 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.55 2.24
45 0.58 0.58 0.62 1.24 1.26 1.27 1.65 2.44
50 0.61 0.61 0.65 1.31 1.33 1.37 1.73 2.62
55 0.64 0.65 0.68 1.38 1.41 1.46 1.82 2.78
60 0.67 0.68 0.72 1.45 1.48 1.54 1.91 2.92
65 0.70 0.71 0.76 1.51 1.54 1.60 2.00 3.04
70 0.73 0.74 0.80 1.58 1.61 1.67 2.09 3.16
75 0.76 0.78 0.83 1.64 1.67 1.73 2.17 3.27
80 0.79 0.81 0.87 1.70 1.74 1.80 2.26 3.38
85 0.82 0.84 0.91 1.75 1.80 1.86 2.34 3.49
90 0.85 0.87 0.94 1.81 1.86 1.92 2.42 3.59
95 0.88 0.90 0.98 1.87 1.92 1.99 2.50 3.70
100 0.91 0.93 1.01 1.92 1.97 2.05 2.58 3.80
105 0.93 0.96 1.05 1.98 2.03 2.11 2.65 3.90
110 0.96 0.99 1.08 2.03 2.09 2.17 2.73 4.00
115 0.99 1.02 1.12 2.09 2.14 2.23 2.80 4.10
120 1.02 1.04 1.15 2.14 2.20 2.29 2.88 4.19
130 1.07 1.10 1.22 2.24 2.31 2.41 3.03 4.39
140 1.12 1.16 1.29 2.34 2.42 2.52 3.17 4.58
150 1.17 1.21 1.35 2.44 2.52 2.64 3.31 4.76
160 1.22 1.27 1.42 2.54 2.63 2.75 3.45 4.94
170 1.27 1.32 1.48 2.64 2.73 2.86 3.59 5.12
180 1.32 1.37 1.55 2.73 2.83 2.97 3.73 5.30
190 1.37 1.42 1.61 2.83 2.93 3.08 3.86 5.47
200 1.42 1.48 1.68 2.92 3.03 3.19 4.00 5.64
225 1.54 1.60 1.83 3.15 3.27 3.45 4.32 6.06
250 1.65 1.72 1.98 3.37 3.51 3.71 4.63 6.46
275 1.76 1.84 2.13 3.58 3.74 3.96 4.94 6.85
300 1.87 1.96 2.28 3.78 3.96 4.20 5.24 7.23
350 2.08 2.18 2.56 4.18 4.39 4.67 5.82 7.97
400 2.28 2.40 2.84 4.56 4.80 5.12 6.37 8.67
450 2.48 2.61 3.11 4.94 5.20 5.57 6.91 9.35
500 2.67 2.82 3.38 5.30 5.60 6.00 7.45 10.02
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels.
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of marginal cost between the cases of being with and without a
storage option
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constraint regulations becoming less strict moving from left to right, in all future time
periods. For example, -168 means that the water withdrawal limits in the red and yellow
zones have been reduced by 168 million barrels per year for all future time periods. We do
not follow the regular way of depicting marginal cost curves using the quantity of available
water as the horizontal axis. The reason is that the available water varies across weeks
while depending on the river ow zones. For each point on the horizontal axis, there is
not a single number that can represent the available water quantity. Instead, there is a
specic combination of available water quantities for dierent weeks and dierent river
ow zones mapping each point on the horizontal axis. One of those points represents the
combination set by the Phase 1 Framework. We specify this point as a reference, labeled
as 0. The labels of other points reect the changes of available water quantity of the
corresponding regulated combination compared to that of the Phase 1 Framework, which
are aforementioned ∆w̄. For a given stage of operation we would expect the marginal
cost of water restrictions to decline as restrictions become less onerous, moving from left
to right on the graph. However this marginal cost curve depicts the situation of a rm
initially in stage 1 and assuming optimal decisions are made regarding the installation of
storage technology. We see that starting from a point of lenient restrictions on the right the
marginal cost curve initially rises, then between +672 and +168 the cost curve falls. For
restrictions of +672 and more lenient (going right) it is not optimal to install storage at any
critical price. For restrictions of +672 and more stringent (going to the left), it is optimal to
install storage in the future for some critical prices. When storage is installed the marginal
cost of restrictions drops, hence we see a portion of the marginal cost curve which falls
and then starts rising again to the left of +168. This curve traces out a long run dynamic
marginal cost curve35 which captures a change in technology happening between +168 and
+672. For further intuition we plot on the same graph the marginal cost curves for when
there is no storage available (blue dashed curve) and when storage is freely available (red
dashed curve) (and hence is a free option which will always be exercised.) It can be seen
that the marginal cost curve in stage 1 falls between these two other cases.
We are unable to determine the ecient level of water restrictions as we do not have an
estimate of the benets to the ecosystem of an additional unit of water owing in the river.
Three hypothetical marginal benet curves are shown in Figure 2.10 - one (# 1) in which w̄
(reecting the Framework's restrictions) is the ecient level where marginal benet equals
marginal cost and the other two where w̄ is above or below the socially optimal point (#
2 and # 3 respectively). The eciency loss when the restrictions are not at the optimal
levels depends on the slopes and locations of the marginal benet curve and the marginal
35This is a long run marginal cost curve in the sense that technology is allowed to change through the
addition of storage.
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Efficient Constraints on Water Withdrawal
When the River Flow is in the Current Condition
 MC
MB 
Marginal cost with the storage option (P=$50)
Marginal cost without the storage option
Marginal cost with the free storage option
Assumed marginal benefit #1
Assumed marginal benefit #2
Assumed marginal benefit #3
Efficiency loss for case #3
Efficiency loss for case #2
Figure 2.10: Marginal cost vs. water constraint levels when the present oil price is $50/bar-




Note that if the marginal benet curve crossed the rising portion of the marginal cost
curve, then there would be no unique point where MB=MC. In this case, the total benets
and total costs would need to be examined for a range of restrictions to nd the optimum.
The marginal benet curve will not change with the variation of oil price or resource
stock. However the marginal cost of restrictions will depend on the state variables, i.e. the
oil price P and the oil reserve S, in particular. In Figure 2.11, we assume that the current
constraint level is ecient, that is to say, when the oil price is $50/barrel, the resource
stock is at the full level, and the river condition is in the green zone, the marginal benet
equals the marginal cost. From this gure, we can see that dierent levels of the current
oil price imply a dierent ecient water constraint. It is clearly impractical to change
the level of water restrictions based on changing economic conditions in the oil industry
which shift the marginal cost curve. However this highlights the fact that quantitative
restrictions such as these have a highly variable cost for rms, depending on the value of
key state variables such as the price of oil.
2.7.3.3 Comparison With Previous Estimates
The marginal costs due to the water withdrawal constraints imply the marginal values of
water to the rm (i.e. the marginal willingness to pay for water, or the implied shadow price
of water). Mannix et al. (2014) measured the willingness to pay for water by oil sands rms
including both in-situ and surface mining projects. In addition to some specic assumptions
for projects regarding productivity, costs, and project life-cycle, their assumptions about
the oil price and the river ow condition are somewhat dierent from ours. Specically, they
assume that the oil price is at a constant level: $70/barrel. And their assumed river ow
condition is 10% drier than the historic condition. Under their assumptions, when water
is assigned according to license priorities, they found the highest marginal willingness to
pay is $180/m3 ($22.5/barrel). Then they derive an ecient water distribution mechanism
among oil sands rms by solving a linear programming problem and nd in this case the
highest marginal willingness to pay among rms with a shortfall of water decreases to a
maximum of $78/m3 ($9.75/barrel) and on average $6.7/m3 ($0.84/barrel). Furthermore,
when a consolidated tailings technology is in use together with the ecient allocation
policy, the average willingness to pay decreases to $4.15/m3 ($0.52/barrel). Instead, if a
storage technology is in use under an ecient allocation policy, the average willingness
to pay will further decrease, although the paper does not provide an estimate. In our
analysis, since we focus on an industry where every rm can share the available water
evenly, there is no less senior rm that is allocated less water coming in. It implies that
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Efficient Constraints on Water Withdrawal for Different River Flow Zones
when the Present Crude Oil Price is Different
Marginal cost (P=$30, Green regime) Marginal cost (P=$30, Yellow regime) Marginal cost (P=$30, Red regime)
Marginal cost (P=$50, Green regime) Marginal cost (P=$50, Yellow regime) Marginal cost (P=$50, Red regime)
Marginal cost (P=$100, Green regime) Marginal cost (P=$100, Yellow regime) Marginal cost (P=$100, Red regime)
Assumed marginal benefit
Figure 2.11: Marginal cost vs. water constraint levels for dierent present oil prices when
the resource stock is at the full level and the present river ow condition is in the green
zone
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we are examining the cost due to the water constraint regulations without the added
complication of inecient allocation across rms. When there is no water compensating
technology applied, given the present oil price is $70/barrel, the implied shadow price of
water is from $0.73/barrel to $0.80/barrel depending on the specic river ow zone it is
in. To compare more closely to Mannix et al.'s result, we undertake a sensitivity analysis
in which adopt their assumption regarding river ow condition. The marginal cost when
the present oil price is $70/barrel (which is the assumed constant oil price in Mannix et al.
(2014)) is from $0.28/barrel to $0.29/barrel, depending on which river ow zone it is in.
The result is still lower than that of Mannix et al. (2014), which is $0.84/barrel, when they
eliminate the impact of inecient allocation due to the prior allocation (by applying an
ecient allocation policy). Furthermore, in our study, when there is an option to build a
water storage facility, the implied shadow price of water decreases to a very insignicant
level that less than $0.12/barrel. This is much lower than the results given by Mannix
et al. (2014).
The approaches and main purposes of Mannix et al. (2014) and our study are quite
dierent. Mannix et al. (2014) investigates several rms with dierent assumed water
productivities and water seniority, giving them a constant oil price and xed water avail-
abilities throughout their life-cycle. Its main purpose is to examine the allocation eciency
and recommend auxiliary policies (e.g. an ecient allocation policy) and technologies. Our
study examines one typical rm, assuming that it has the seniority like those existing com-
panies who can obtain an equal share from the available water supply. We also allow the oil
price to be a stochastic process and river ow condition vary according to its historic pat-
tern and inspect the costs to the rm due to the water constraint policy under a dynamic
background. Our purpose is to examine the average impact of phase 1 water management
framework on the current oil sands industry and try to improve the water management
regulation per se.
2.8 Sensitivity Analyses
The stochastic process assumed for crude oil prices plays an critical role in the optimal
decision about investment in a water storage facility. In this section, we check how the
outcomes are aected by dierent assumptions for the mean log crude oil price, water
productivity, and volatility. More detailed tables and graphs for the following subsections
can be found in Appendix A.4.
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2.8.1 The Eects of Price Volatility
Figures 2.12 - 2.14 plot critical prices to install storage versus volatility for several cases.
Looking rst at the D_S scenario (Figure 2.12), the critical prices are observed to fall
as volatility increases. This is interesting as for simple investment options, an increase
in volatility results in the delay of an investment (Majd & Pindyck (1987)). However in
this case, when water ows are reduced and water withdrawals are heavily constrained
an increase in price volatility makes storage more valuable to the rm. Without storage,
and under strict water constraints the rm may not be able to take advantage of a sudden
upswing in prices. Hence the more volatile prices increase the desirability of storage. We see
a similar eect under base case water restrictions - W_L (Figures 2.13 and 2.14). However
in both the diagrams showing the W_L case, we observe an increase in critical prices for
some reserve levels as volatility reaches levels higher than 0.47. In this case where water
withdrawals are only mildly constrained, once volatility reaches a certain level, further
increases tend to delay investment, as per the normal eect of uncertainty. Table A.9 and
Figure A.5 in the appendix provide more details.
In the wet scenarios, the marginal and total costs of the regulations do not change
substantially under dierent volatility assumptions. This can be seen in Tables A.10,
A.11, Figures A.6, A.7, and A.8 in Appendix A.4. The reason is that the option to
install a water storage facility reduces the impact of price volatility. Storage allows the
rm to respond as desired to changing prices. However, for D_S, the economic costs (total
costs and marginal costs) do increase signicantly when oil price volatility increases. This
is because even in the presence of water storage, with the more limited water availability in
the D_S scenario the rm is unable to take advantage of high oil prices that might occur
with a more volatile oil price.
2.8.2 The Mean Log Crude Oil Price Eects, µ
In Figure 2.15 below and Table A.3 in Appendix D, we compare the optimal timing to
switch between operating stages for dierent mean oil prices. Figure 2.15 exhibits the
critical prices under dierent mean log oil prices for all possible resource stock levels when
the current river ow is in the green zone. Here we see the familiar pattern of critical
prices to install storage increasing for smaller oil reserves. For the cases where the current
state is in the yellow or red zone, the patterns are similar and are not included here. The
relationship between the mean log oil price and critical prices to install storage is easier
to see in Figure 2.16 which is drawn for a particular reserve level. In this graph we see
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Critical Prices to Switch from Stage 1 to 3 versus Volatility
Scenario D_S, Red Zone
When the remaining resource stock is 550 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 600 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 630 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 660 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 690 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels
Figure 2.12: Critical prices to install storage versus volatility for scenario D_S in the red
zone
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Critical Prices to Switch from Stage 1 to 3 versus Volatility
Scenario W_L, Red Zone
When the remaining resource stock is 550 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 600 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 630 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 660 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 690 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels
Figure 2.13: Critical prices to install storage versus volatility for scenario W_L in the red
zone
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Critical Prices to Switch from Stage 1 to 3 versus Volatility
Scenario W_L, Green Zone
When the remaining resource stock is 550 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 600 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 630 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 660 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 690 million barrels
When the remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels
Figure 2.14: Critical prices to install storage versus volatility for scenario W_L in the
green zone
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that critical prices have a U-shaped relationship with the mean oil price. Recall that the
speed of mean reversion is ε = 0.14 which implies the expected time to revert to the long
run mean is 7.14 years. At values of µ below about 3.5 ($33 per barrel for WTI), the
critical price to install storage is inversely related to µ. Since price will be pulled down to a
low level in future, it is worthwhile waiting for a relatively higher price before making the
investment to install storage. At levels of µ above 4 (or $55 per barrel for WTI) critical
prices are positively related to µ. In this case prices are expected to be pulled up to a
relatively high level in future, and there is an option value to waiting for higher prices
before beginning installation.
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The Critical Prices to build a water storage facility
when the river flow is in the green zone
Mean log oil price = 0.5
Mean log oil price = 0.6
Mean log oil price = 0.7
Mean log oil price = 0.8
Mean log oil price = 0.9
Mean log oil price = 
Mean log oil price = 1.1
Figure 2.15: Critical prices to build a water storage facility when the current river ow is
in the green zone under dierent mean log oil prices. Base case mean log oil price is 4.59.
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The Critical Prices for Varying Mean Log Prices




Figure 2.16: The critical prices for varying mean log oil prices when the remaining estab-
lished oil reserves are 720 million barrels
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By examining values of the project in dierent cases where the mean oil prices vary,
we can compare the total economic cost, the relative economic loss, and the marginal
cost, which is the shadow price of water to the rm. The results are listed in Table A.4,
Table A.5, Figure A.1 and A.2. The assumed long run mean oil price level aects the
marginal cost and the total cost signicantly. The marginal cost to the rm of increasing
water restrictions is higher for a higher long run mean price. On a $ per barrel basis
the marginal cost is less than $0.2 for all cases except D_S, which is dry river conditions
under very strict water withdrawal limits. The total cost of the regulations, dened as the
dierence in the project value with and without any water restrictions is also higher for a
higher long run mean price. When the current oil price is $100 per barrel, it ranges from
$47 to $72 million in all cases except for D_S, when the cost is up to $1.9 billion. These
amount to 2.7%, 4%, and 10.3% of total project value, respectively.
2.8.3 The Eects of Water Productivity
Table A.6 in Appendix A.4 details the eects of water productivity on the critical prices
for switching from one stage to another. The table shows that with the enhancement of
water productivity, the desirability of installing a water storage facility declines. Figure A.3
in Appendix A.4 also shows the critical prices under dierent water productivity levels.
Due to the limited space, we skip critical prices for water productivity levels between
0.3 and 0.4. These critical prices rise steadily, rather than jump, with increasing water
productivity. Our main purpose is to show the water productivity threshold over which
the water constraints are not binding. When the water productivity is greater than 0.5
barrels of bitumen/barrel of water, (i.e. one barrel of oil needs less than two barrels of
water), for W_L scenario, there is no need to invest in a water storage facility no matter
which river ow zone it is in. The reason is straight forward: when the water productivity
is high, even in dry seasons, the allowed withdrawal amount can satisfy the production
demands. Therefore, the water constraint regulation does not make the rm short of
water. The water productivity we used in previous sections is the average level for oil
sands industry. For individual projects, there are a range of water productivity levels.
Figures 2.17, and 2.18 show how economic costs of water restrictions are aected
by the dierent water productivity levels. Further details are given in Appendix A.4,
Tables A.7, A.8, and Figure A.4. When the water productivity is greater than 0.5 barrels
of bitumen/barrel of water, there will be no economic cost caused by the water constraint
regulation.
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Water productivity = 0.1
Water productivity = 0.2
Water productivity = 0.3
Water productivity = 0.4
Water productivity = 0.5
Water productivity = 0.6
Figure 2.17: The percentage loss to the oil sands project due to the water constraints when
the river ow is in the green zone under various water productivity levels for scenario W_L
(water productivity is in barrels of bitumen/barrel of water. The percentage loss refers to
the reduction in total project value when restrictions are imposed.)
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Water productivity = 0.1
Water productivity = 0.2
Water productivity = 0.3
Water productivity = 0.4
Water productivity = 0.5
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Figure 2.18: The marginal costs when the river ow is in the green zone under dierent wa-
ter productivity levels for scenario W_L (Water productivity is in barrels of bitumen/barrel
of water. The marginal cost refers to the loss in value to the project on a $/barrel basis of
an increase in water withdrawal restrictions as outlined in Section 2.6.2, page 33.)
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2.9 Conclusions
An ecient policy is one which maximizes the total net benets from the resource in
question, which in this case is water in the Athabasca River. While the estimation of the
environmental benets of restrictions on water withdrawals is beyond the scope of this
thesis, it is possible to get a handle on the costs of these restrictions to rms. Currently
there is not much relevant research about the estimation of the costs. We ll this gap by
estimating costs of water limits on the oil sands industry in Alberta.
The estimated marginal costs can be also seen as implied shadow prices of water for
the rm and may be considered a minimum values required for the environmental benets
to justify the regulation. These estimates also provide a reference for further research
about market based water conservation instruments, e.g. water pricing. The methodology
and conclusions from this analysis can inform the regulation of other resource extraction
projects.
Some key ndings of this chapter are summarized below.
 Low cost of the regulations. The Phase 1 Water Management Framework does not
impose a large cost on rms. But if changing climate resulted in drier conditions
and/or if the Phase 1 regulations were made stricter, there would be a larger cost
for rms. Nevertheless there appears to be scope for adopting stricter regulations if
future research determines there is signicant ecological benet or benet to other
stakeholders in the area from doing so.
 Non-monotonic impact of increasing price volatility. It is well known in the literature
that for a simple investment option, increased price volatility is likely to delay an in-
vestment. However with strict water regulations increased volatility initially reduces
the critical price required to install storage, implying that the expected time for the
investment is sooner. With high volatility the restrictions are more costly to the rm,
making storage more valuable. In contrast, when water restrictions are lenient and
are not binding on the rm, an increase in oil price volatility delays investment in
water storage as per the normal eect.
 Delay in project abandonment. Stricter regulations on water withdrawals may cause
a rm to delay the permanent abandonment of a project. This follows because water
restrictions means it may take longer to extract the resource. For the hypotheti-
cal project examined in this chapter, there is no strong eect on the abandonment
decision.
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 Long run dynamic marginal cost curve. A long run dynamic marginal cost curve
shows the impact of making water restrictions more restrictive when the rm has
the option to install technology that limits the impact of the restrictions. Marginal
cost is generally increasing with tighter restrictions, but the marginal cost falls as
restrictions are relaxed over a particular range. This indicates the importance of
examining a range of restrictions to allow for changing technology.
 Marginal cost depends on state variables. The marginal cost of stricter regulations
depends on the values of key state such as the price of oil and the resource stock. The
higher is the price of oil the higher is the marginal cost of restrictions. The marginal
cost is higher for larger resource levels.
Due to the heterogeneity of individual oil sands project, which in this thesis is re-
ected by dierent production capacities and remaining resource stocks, the marginal costs
(shadow prices) for dierent projects are not the same. In addition according to Mannix
et al. (2014), there is heterogeneity in the eciency of water usage. Using a deterministic
model Mannix et al. found that by allocating water preferentially to the rms with the
highest productivity of water use, a higher level of eciency is obtained. Hence an even
allocation of water resources is not cost-ecient. It may be of interest to investigate op-
timal allocation mechanisms. Command and control regulations are not ecient in terms
of allocating limited resources. A tradable permits scheme is a more promising approach
for addressing this problem.
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Chapter 3
Assessing the Trade o between
Environmental Objectives and
Economic Cost: a Study of the Phase 2
Water Management Rules for Oil Sands
Mining
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we examined the economic implications of the water constraint rules im-
posed by the Phase 1 Framework (Alberta and Canada 2007). In 2015, this framework
was updated to the Phase 2 Framework as is described in Alberta (2015). The Phase
2 Framework was intended to improve upon the Phase 1 Framework through the use of
more sound scientic evidence than had been possible for Phase 1. In developing the new
regulations, the Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC) compared a number of dierent
regulations in terms of a number of indicators of environmental and economic impact. In
the end, the environmental indicator chosen for their analysis was the percentage reduction
in wetted area around the Athabasca River. The chosen economic indicator was the cost
of water storage required to maintain full production throughout the year, despite water
withdrawal restrictions. The P2FC evaluated a number of alternative regulations based on
the trade o between these two indicators. The P2FC presented its report to the Alberta
government in 2010. After a few corrections were made to some of the technical analysis,
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a preferred regulatory option was chosen. The new regulations took eect in 2015.
Signicant time and eort were put into developing the Phase 2 regulations, including
detailed scientic research to determine the change in wetted area that would result from
dierent regulations (Alberta 2015). However, the use of storage costs as the measure of
economic cost is quite narrow, although easy to calculate. The full cost of the regulations to
the industry is determined by the cost to oil sands rms of having to change their behaviour
in response to the regulations. The need to install storage (or any other type of capital) is
just one of those costs. Additional costs are incurred if rms have to cut back production
in response to water restrictions, even in the presence of storage. As already discussed in
Chapter 2, an estimate of the true cost of restrictions requires a detailed economic model
of rm behavior. Whether the cost of storage is an adequate proxy for the true economic
cost will depend on economic factors aecting the industry such as oil prices and costs,
as well as environmental factors such as future river ow conditions. The P2FC report is
based on deterministic projections of future river ows which ignores optimal decisions of
oil sands rms in the face of uncertain river ows.
This chapter applies a fully dynamic stochastic optimal control model to investigate the
economic costs due to the water management rules taking into consideration the optimal
reaction by oil sands rms to changes in oil prices and expected river ows. When oil sands
rms have the exibility to determine production levels and the timing of investment in
water storage, the economic cost will not be purely determined by the storage volume,
but rather by the full cost of changes made by rms in response to water restrictions. In
this chapter, we contribute the current literature by investigating this economic cost in a
more rigorous manner and consider whether this will result in dierent recommendations
than those of the P2FC report. In a broader context we seek to draw some conclusions
about those factors which have an important eect on economic cost of regulations. The
remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a detailed overview
of the Phase 2 Framework and compares it to Phase 1. Section 3.3 describes the key
assumptions for the analysis as well as parameter estimates. Section 3.4 characterizes
alternative river ow states. Section 3.5 presents the environmental benets of dierent
water restriction rules. Section 3.6 presents the results and Section 3.7 provides concluding
comments.
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3.2 Overview of the Phase 2 Framework management
rule
3.2.1 Phase 2 Framework Description and ComparisonWith Phase
1
We can recall from Chapter 2 that in the Phase 1 Framework, the river ow condition was
classied into three zones based on water ow levels. The criterion for being in each zone
varied depending on the week. Similarly, in the Phase 2 Framework, in dierent seasons,
the river ow condition is classied into dierent numbers of zones according to dierent
thresholds or triggers in river ows. A specic water withdrawal limit is stipulated for
each zone as dened by the river ow triggers which vary by season. The division of zones
according to river ow triggers and the corresponding water withdrawal limits for Phase 2
are exhibited in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Weekly Flow Triggers and Cumulative Water Use Limits On the Lower
Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations
Mid Winter Early Spring Late Spring Summer/Fall Early Winter
(Weeks 1-15) (Weeks 16-18) (Weeks 19-23) (Weeks 24-43) (Weeks 44-52)
RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits
>270 16 >200 16
150∼270 6% of RF >98.6 16 >102.6 20 >111.6 29 150∼200 8% of RF
91.6∼150 9 94.6∼150 12
87∼91.6 RF-82.6 87∼98.6 RF-82.6 87∼102.6 RF-82.6 87∼111.6 RF-82.6 87∼94.6 RF-82.6
<87 4.4 <87 4.4 <87 4.4 <87 4.4 <87 4.4
1. RF stands for the river's ow;
2. Limits means cumulative water withdrawal limits;
3. RF Triggers and Limits are both measured in cubic metres per second.
The river ow triggers specied in Table 3.1 for 5 seasons can be summarized by den-
ing 10 dierent zones as specied in Table 3.2. Zone 1 represents the driest condition
while zone 10 corresponds to the wettest. The weekly water withdrawal limits for dierent
zones are listed in Table B.3 in Appendix. Table B.3 fully characterizes the constraints
of Table 3.1. Dierent from the 3 zones in Chapter 2, the denition of each river ow
zone is constant over time. For example, regardless of the season, according to the Phase
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2 Framework, as long as the river ow rate is in the interval of [200,270), the zone is de-
ned as 9. While in the Phase 1 Framework, when the river ow falls in the interval of
[200,270), its zone classication depends on the particular week of the year. Figure 3.1
exhibits the mapping relationship between the 10 zones of the Phase 2 Framework and
the 3 zones of the Phase 1 Framework by representing each of the 10 zones in terms of
the 3 zones. We also graph the weekly water withdrawal limits triggered by dierent river
ow thresholds stipulated in the two frameworks in a single picture in Figure 3.2. Fig-
ure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 jointly reect the following changes made in the updated framework.
 Generally speaking, the constraints on water withdrawals in all seasons become
tighter.
 For some extremely dry situations in winter, which is rare, the constraints turn out
to be eased.
 There is a maximum withdrawal limit (29m3/s)1 as assumed by the P2FC in its
report2 even in the water abundant seasons.
Table 3.2: The Ranges of Weekly Flow for 10 River Flow Zones of the Phase 2 Framework
Zone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Weekly ow
(m3/s)
(-∞,87) [87,91.6) [91.6,94.6) [94.6,98.6) [98.6,102.6) [102.6,111.6) [111.6,150) [150,200) [200,270) [270,+∞)
3.2.2 The Development of the Phase 2 Framework
The rule set specied in the Phase 2 Framework was an update of a prototype rule set
recommended by the Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC) as described in Ohlson et al.
(2010). The update corrects some mistakes in the original recommendations. Ohlson et al.
(2010) provides the detailed process for deciding on the recommended rule set. The P2FC
began with a collection of hundreds of candidate rule sets. Those rule sets laid down dif-
ferent combinations of constraint trigger thresholds and the corresponding triggered water
1It is reected in Figure 3.2 by imposing a withdrawal limit of 147 million barrels per week from the
24th week to the 43rd week. It follows from the fact that weekly withdrawal limit = 7 days/week × 24
hours/day × 3600 seconds/hour × 29 m3/second × 8.3864 barrels/m3 = 147 million barrels/week.
2The P2FC assumed that the withdrawal amount has an upper limit determined by the physical, or
technical, limit of intake capacity, such as the diameters of the water pump pipes and delivery pipes.
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between the Phase 2 Ten Zones and the Phase 1 Three Zones
Corresponds to the green zone Correspond to the yellow zone Corresponds to the red zone
Figure 3.1: The corresponding relationship between the Phase 2 ten zones and the Phase
1 three zones
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Comparison of the Phase 1 and 2 Frameworks
in Terms of the Cumulative Weekly Water Withdrawal Limits
Phase 1: yellow zone
Phase 1: red zone
Phase 2: zone 1
Phase 2: zone 2
Phase 2: zone 3
Phase 2: zone 4
Phase 2: zone 5
Phase 2: zone 6
Phase 2: zone 7
Phase 2: zone 8
Phase 2: zone 9
Phase 2: zone 10
Figure 3.2: Comparison of the Phase 1 and 2 Frameworks in terms of the cumulative weekly
water withdrawal limits on the Lower Athabasca River for oil sands operations
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withdrawal limits. To select among all competing rule sets, the P2FC developed a spread-
sheet tool named Flow Calculator to examine the environmental and economic impacts
of each rule set. Using each of the rule sets, the predicted water required by the oil sands
mining projects and the projected river ow condition as the inputs to the Flow Calculator,
the P2FC obtained the impacts on a series of environmental criteria as well as the water
storage required for the oil sands industry to maintain water availability at 16m3/s. This
represents water demands by the oil sands mining industry at a projected production level
240% higher than the current level. In the end the chosen environmental criterion was
the percentage reduction in wetted area under the dierent possible regulations. Then the
P2FC created what they referred to as an ecient frontier to compare the impacts of all
the alternative rule sets. The environmental and economic criteria were examined for three
dierent (deterministic) river ow scenarios (hereinafter referred to as P2FC scenarios to
dierentiate them from the river ow scenarios that we will analyze in this chapter) shown
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: The P2FC Scenarios of the Athabasca River Flows
Scenarios Description
P2FC scenario 1A
50 year historical case: The historical river ows of the 1958 to
2007 period were projected to recur over the next 50 years.
P2FC scenario 1B
1 in 100 year low ow case: The historical river ows from 1958
to 2007 are used, except that the winter river ows in the driest
year are replaced by river ow data for a 1 in 100 year low ow
rate.
P2FC scenario 1C
1 in 200 year low ow case: The historical river ows from 1958
to 2007 are used, except that the winter river ows in the driest
year are replaced by river ow data for a 1 in 200 year low ow
rate.
There were several outstanding alternatives judged to be superior to the others exam-
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ined, denoted as Alt 19, `'Alt 20, Alt 21, Alt 22, Option A, and Option H3, for
which the eciencies are plotted in Figure 3.34. The dierent alternatives vary in terms
of the maximum withdrawal rates and the prole of restrictions over a year, as presented
in Table B.3 through B.9 in Appendix B.
Each of the diagrams in Figure 3.3 shows an ecient frontier reecting the trade o
relationship between two impacts: percentage reduction in wetted area as the indicator of
environmental cost and water storage cost as an indicator of economic cost. The horizontal
axis measures the water storage capacity required to be built and the corresponding cost.
The rst row of the horizontal axis label shows the water storage capacity. The second row
shows the economic cost. The vertical axis measures the reduction in winter wetted area
after water withdrawals compared to before withdrawals. Ohlson et al. (2010) argues that
the reduction in winter wetted area is a good proxy for other environmental criteria so that
it is a proper measure of ecosystem response. From either direction, the closer the point is
to the origin, the better the rules set is, because it reects less impact on the environment
and less economic cost to the oil sands sector. However because the horizontal and vertical
axes are not measured in comparable units, there is no obvious way to choose the best rule
set amongst the six alternatives. In the end, the P2FC committee recommended Option H
because it represented a smoother path for restrictions from week to week. However, the
nal Phase 2 regulation that was adopted was a variant of Option H, as some adjustments
and corrections were made to the nal report.
3.2.3 Challenges To the Phase 2 Framework
Unsurprisingly, not all interested parties were happy with the recommendations in the
P2FC report. Due to the time constraint for the report's completion, when it was sub-
mitted to Alberta Government, there were still some controversies about the extent of
environmental protection and the rights of First Nations, to name just two examples. Fur-
thermore, one of the dry climate conditions used by P2FC for climate change sensitivity
analysis had some errors and some corrections had to be made. The Phase 2 Framework,
including corrections made, is described in Alberta (2015). One year after the Phase 2
3The weekly ow triggers and cumulative water use limits, the ranges of weekly ow for river ow zones,
the water withdrawal limits for each week corresponding to dierent zones, the corresponding relationship
between the Phase 2 zones and the three zones of the Phase 1 Framework, and a comparison to the Phase 1
Framework in terms of the cumulative weekly water withdrawal limits for Alt 19, `'Alt 20, Alt 21, Alt
22, Option A, and Option H (their counterparts in the Phase 2 Framework are Table 3.1, Table 3.2,
Table B.3, Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.) can be found in Appendix B.
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1 in 200 Year Low Flow Case
Efficient Frontier Reported by the P2FC
 (Consisting of Phase 1, Alt 19~22, Option A, and Option H)
Figure 3.3: The ecient frontier according to the P2FC's study about Alternative Water
Management rule sets
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Framework took eect, Leong & Donner (2016) used dierent climate forecasting mod-
els for simulating the river ows and obtained dierent river ow simulation paths which
changed the trade o relationship between environmental impacts and storage costs.
Most of the controversies surrounding the Phase 2 Framework came from an environ-
mental perspective. The P2FC also mainly focused on the environment impacts of the
alternative rule sets. When the P2FC evaluated the alternatives, it assumed that the oil
sands industry had a total water demand of 16 m3/s, which implies a high rate of oil sands
production based on a forecast of peak oil sands production between 2015 and 2025. In
addition, P2FC's study was based on the belief that the oil sands industry would build
the water storage needed to maintain the 16 m3/s water supply. Leong & Donner (2016)
raised the concern about the P2FC's assumption of a constant high rate of the oil sands
production over time. In response they reexamined the environmental and industry cost
trade o adopting several exogenously picked levels of the production.
Taking the P2FC's assumed production capacity as given, actual production will be
aected by available water as well as the oil price. The P2FC assumed that the cost of
reducing production due to water restrictions is always greater than the cost of building
necessary water storage facilities. In fact, the loss due to the water constraint rules has two
components: the cost to install and maintain the water storage facility and the loss because
of any possible production cutbacks. Both these components should be taken into account
when analyzing the trade o between environmental constraints and economic cost.
Leong & Donner (2016) used the 2012 WTI oil price to estimate the costs of reducing
production and compare to the costs of establishing specic capacities for water storage.
They conclude that when the water management rule prioritizes the environment by ap-
plying stricter water withdrawal rules during times of water short age, the cost of adding
water storage capacity will be greater than the cost of reducing production; while when
the rule prioritizes industry, the cost of water storage will be less than the cost of reducing
production.
3.3 Key Assumptions and Parameter Estimates
In Chapter 2 Section 2.4, we fully described a stochastic optimal control model to evaluate
the expected value of an oil sands operation under various water restrictions. In this chapter
we use the same model to determine optimal decisions and valuation of oil sands operations
for the suite of regulations proposed in the P2FC report. We adopt the assumptions of
the P2FC report and then vary key assumptions one by one to isolate which factors have
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the largest impact on the optimal choice of water regulations. Below we describe the
assumptions which are the focus of our analysis.
 Assumption 1: Stochastic or deterministic oil prices. In using storage cost as
the economic indicator, the P2FC ignored the impact of dierent water restrictions
on rm revenues. The possible impact of oil prices on the cost of water restrictions
was not considered. As is well known in the literature, volatile output prices provide
an incentive to delay investments, reecting a positive option value of waiting to
make a decision. This option value will aect decisions about storage investment.
In addition, volatile output prices may aect the economic cost of water restrictions
which reduce a rm's exibility to respond quickly to changing oil prices. Introducing
the stochastic oil price model might change the relative ranking of dierent regulatory
rules.
 Assumption 2: Oil sands production. Regardless of which alternative rule set
is applied, the P2FC analysis assumes that the total annual water demand by the oil
sands industry is 16 m3/s. This represented a plateau in mean water demand pro-
jected in the P2FC's Growth Case Scenario. The reasoning by the P2FC committee
was that the alternative rules should be tested against the largest projected demand
from the industry (Alberta 2015). Given the P2FC's forecast about average water
productivity, the production of one barrel of bitumen requires 2.4 barrels of water.
This water demand is consistent with industry production capacity of 1764 million
barrels of oil per year.5 The assumed production level is at a very high rate compared
to current levels as is indicated in Table 3.4. To understand the economic cost of the
regulations, optimal rm production responses to changing water restrictions needs
to be considered. In addition, it is of interest to consider the cost of restrictions given
current productive capacity of the industry.
The constant high rate of annual production requires current remaining established
reserves of 88 billion barrels (see Table 3.4). This is much higher than current esti-
mates of remaining reserves. These reserves are depleted at the end of the 50 year
period of analysis. To be consistent with the P2FC report we also assume a 50 life-
time of production. However, in the optimal control model, operations may be shut
in temporarily if oil prices are unfavourable. Hence in our modelling exercise there
is a possibility that not all reserves will be used up, if future oil prices turn out to be
5The annual water demand can be derived as 16 m3/s × 3600 s/hour × 24 hours/day × 365 days/year
= 504 576 000 m3/year. Given 1 m3 = 8.3864 barrels for water, the demand of water is converted to
4 231 576 166 barrels per year. This amount of water can be used for producing 4 231 576 166/2.4 = 1764
million barrels of bitumen.
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Table 3.4: The Actual and Projected Levels of Cumulative Remaining Reserves and Pro-





Actual level in 2015 19 197 521
Projected level by P2FC 88 200 1 764
Note:
 The projected production capacity is derived from the water demand of 16 m3/s. The projected remaining
established reserves are derived by multiplying the projected production capacity with 50, which is the time
span that is examined by the P2FC.
 Source of the actual level of the remaining established reserves: Alberta's Energy Reserves 2014 and Sup-
ply/Demand Outlook 2015-2024 (Alberta Energy Regulator 2015)
 Source of the actual level of the production capacity: Alberta Oil Sands Industry Quarterly Update (spring
2015) (Economic Development and Trade 2015)
depressed for long periods of time. This is one source of any dierences in the P2FC
report and our own analysis.
 Assumption 3: Operating costs for the water storage facilities. The P2FC
report considered only the capital costs of storage. Annual operating costs for storage
maintenance can be signicant and are aected by decisions about storage usage.
Hence we consider storage operating costs in our analysis.
 Assumption 4: Forecast river ow conditions. The P2FC report examined
three deterministic river ow scenarios for the next 50 years, as is described in Ta-
ble 3.3. When examining optimal decisions it may be more realistic to consider un-
certain future river conditions by modelling river ow as a stochastic process, which
oil sands operators take into account in making investment and operating decisions.
In our analysis, we examine several possibilities for river ow conditions which are
summarized below.
◦ Scenario 1A: Deterministic river ows according to the P2FC report, using his-
torical data for the 1958 to 2007 period.
◦ River ows modelled as a Poisson process, as described in Equations 2.5 in
Chapter 2. Several dierent hazard rate matrices are examined based on:
 Scenario 2A: river ow data from 1958 to 2007
 Scenario 2B: river ow data of 2015
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 Scenario 2C: river ow rate stays at the lowest weekly level during the
period of 1957 to 2017
 Scenario 2D: river ow rate is always in the driest zones.
Scenarios 2A through 2D allow us to portray the impact on economic cost of extreme
river ow conditions. This is of interest since with changing climate, we do not expect
a repeat of the past ve decades of river ow conditions. Recall Figure 2.3, in which
the solid dark curve reects the 2015 river ow condition. Other than some late
winter and early spring weeks (from week 5 to week 19), the ow rate is generally
lower than the historical average condition. The specic hazard rate matrices can be
found in Table B.10 of Appendix B.
A problem with this step of the analysis is that the environmental benet from apply-
ing the alternative rules sets was calculated by the P2FC based on historical river ow
data as described in Table 3.3. By using new river ow assumptions (scenarios 2A
through 2D), the environmental benets will not be the same as the P2FC estimates.
Although we have no environmental benet estimates that are precisely consistent
with our scenarios 2A through 2D, we presume that the environmental benet esti-
mates for the P2FC scenario 1A provide a lower bound. We can compare this with
the environmental benets from P2FC scenarios 1B and 1C, which represent drier
conditions. However, the P2FC did not provide data to dene these scenarios so we
have no way of knowing how these compare with our scenarios 2A through 2D. In
summary, we will use the P2FC environmental benets estimates in our analysis but
we acknowledge these are not entirely consistent with river ow conditions assumed
in scenarios 2A through 2D.
 Assumption 5: Water storage capacity. The P2FC report assumed a very high
rate of storage capacity would be installed by rms, so that production could always
be maintained at full capacity even in the face of water restrictions. Table 3.5 lists
the water storage capacities required under dierent competing rule sets for the cases
used by the P2FC, which were described in Table 3.3. In our analysis we examine
the following alternatives:
◦ the P2FC storage assumption
◦ storage capacity that can maintain four weeks of production
◦ an optimal level of storage capacity.
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Table 3.5: Water Storage Capacity Assumed by P2FC (in Million Barrels)
Alternative rule sets Phase 1 Alt 19 Alt 20 Alt 21 Alt 22 Option A Option H
P2FC scenario 1A: 50 year historical ow 604 335 713 1032 1359 906 671
P2FC scenario 1B: 1 in 100 year low ow case 704 436 805 1090 1384 906 763
P2FC scenario 1C: 1 in 200 year low ow case 704 503 864 1141 1417 906 872
 Assumption 6: Remaining reserves level. The P2FC report analysis assumes
the whole oil sands mining industry will last 50 years with an annual production
capacity of 1 764 million barrels. This implies 88.2 billion barrels of recoverable re-
serves. However, the actual recoverable reserves are less than half of this level.6 This
overestimation of reserves will aect the optimal operations including the decision to
install water storage, and will thus aect the economic cost of the regulation. In our
analysis we apply the actual remaining established reserves to examine the problem.
Our goal is to determine whether the conclusions of the stochastic optimal control model
will dier from those of the P2FC report and to determine the cause of any dierence. To
accomplish this we examine the above assumptions one-by-one in a systematic manner
and compare with the P2FC results. This results in 8 dierent cases. A summary of the
assumptions used in each of the eight cases is provided in Table 3.6. For each case, the
table highlights the particular assumptions used. Other than these six assumptions listed
above, all other assumptions are based on the P2FC report.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 summarize relevant parameter values for those cases which use the
P2FC assumption regarding storage capacity (cases 1 through 4 in Table 3.6), reserves and
productive capacity. Parameter values relevant for cases with diering project reserves and
storage capacity (cases 5 through 8) are provided in Table B.11 and B.12 in Appendix B.
The shaded rows in these tables are the parameters that remain unchanged across all cases.
6According to Alberta Energy Regulator (2015), the remaining established reserves for the Alberta
oil sands is 166 billion barrels, 20% of which is recoverable by mining. (In Alberta Energy Regulator
(2015), the denition of established reserves is: those reserves recoverable under current technology and
present and anticipated economic conditions, specically proved by drilling, testing, or production, plus
that judgement portion of contiguous recoverable reserves that are interpreted to exist, from geological,
geophysical or similar information, with reasonable certainty. Initial established reserves are dened as
established reserves prior to the deduction of any production. Remaining established reserves are dened
as initial established reserves less cumulative production. The currently estimated remaining established
reserves could well be revised upward and move closer to what the P2FC committee assumed.)
88
Table 3.6: The Comparison of the Assumptions Adopted by the P2FC and This Chapter
Assumption 1 Assumption 2 Assumption 3 Assumption 4 Assumption 5 Assumption 6
P2FC
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Extraction method Surface mining ∗ ∗ ∗
T − t0 Remaining lifespan of the project (years) Equation (2.7) 50 ∗ 1,2,3,4
q̄ Production capacity (million barrels/year) Equation (2.1) 1764 ∗ 1,2,3,4
s0 Remaining established reserves (million barrels) Equation (2.7) 88 200 ∗ 1,2,3,4
η
Productivity of water (barrels of bitumen/barrel of
water)





It is equal to W̄c
that is specied in Table 3.8
1,2,3,4
C
The construction cost of the water storage
(million dollar)
Equation (2.9) Specied in Table 3.8 ∗ 1,2,3,4
Ī Water storage capacity (million barrels) Equation (2.3) Specied in Table 3.8 ∗ 1,2,3,4
csf The xed cost of water storage (million $/year) Equation (2.9) Specied in Table 3.8 ∗ 2,3,4
csv The variable cost of water storage ($/barrel) Equation (2.9) 0.0028 ∗ 2,3,4
Carbon emissions (tonnes/barrel) Equation (2.9) 0.091 ∗∗
cove Energy variable operating cost (% of the WTI price) Equation (2.9) 1.62 ∗∗
covne Non-energy variable operating cost ($/barrel) Equation (2.9) 7.98 ∗∗
cof Fixed operating cost (million $/year) Equation (2.9) 11515 ∗∗ 1,2,3,4
cs Sustaining capital cost (million $/year) Equation (2.9) 11466 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1,2,3,4
Income tax rate (%) Equation (2.9) 25 ∗ ∗ ∗
Carbon tax ($/tonne) Equation (2.9) 40 ∗ ∗ ∗
Cm Mothball cost (million $) Table 2.1 0 ∗
Cre Reactivating cost (million $) Table 2.1 0 ∗
Clarge A large number to prevent stage switching (million $) Page 24 10
9 ∗
Cr Abandonment cost (million $) Equation (2.9) 6811 ∗ 1,2,3,4
ε Speed of reverting to the mean log oil price Equation (2.8) 0.14 ∗ ∗ ∗
µ Long run mean log oil price Equation (2.8) 4.59 ∗ ∗ ∗










r Risk free interest rate Equation (2.16) 0.02 ∗
The column Reliablility indicates the reliablity of the given parameter values. ∗ ∗ ∗ means these values are publicly available or are estimated
from empirical evidence. ∗∗ means these values are derived according to AOSIQU, Alberta Energy Regulator (2015), or CERI's report ((Millington
& Murillo 2015) . ∗ means these values are assumed by referring to miscellaneous sources which are documented in the text.
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Table 3.8: Parameter Values for Alternative Rule Sets
Parameter k W̄c
P2FC scenario 1A:
50 year historical ow
P2FC scenario 1B:
1 in 100 year low ow case
P2FC scenario 1C:
1 in 200 year low ow case
C Ī csf C Ī c
s



































1766 906 95 1766 906 95 1766 906 95
Option H 1,2,. . .,5
Refer to
Table B.9
1308 671 70 1488 763 80 1701 872.19 92
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3.4 Specication of River Flow States
Since we need to compare the costs of dierent rule sets, we dene a collection of river ow
states ranging from 1 to 15, with state 15 having the most abundant water ows and state
1 the least abundant water ows. The term state is used in order to dierentiate it from
zones dened for each rule set. Recall that for a given rule set, zones dene the weekly
water withdrawal limitation for each river ow state. For a specic rule set, each river ow
state maps to one zone. The mapping between states and zones is shown in Table 3.9.
Note that this table shows the Phase 1 rule set, the main alternatives considered in the
P2FC report as well as the nal regulations adopted for Phase 2, which was a corrected
version of Alternative H. This denition of states serves to unify the classication of river
ow conditions across alternative rule sets, except for the Phase 1 rule set. This denition
applies to the Phase 1 rule set only when the decision time is in the rst week of a year.
To devise a classication system so that the Phase 1 and Phase 2 rules sets are fully
comparable requires 106 states. We have not done so as the computational complexity is
increased considerably, for not a large reward in terms of our analysis. For a comparison
of Phase 1 and Phase 2 regulations we therefore set the time to evaluate the economic
costs at the rst week of a year so that the three zones dened in the Phase 1 Framework
approximately t into the 15-state system. It turns out that if other weeks of a year
is considered to be the decision making time, the result won't change signicantly. Note
however that the zones for each rule set alternative apply dierent water withdrawal limits.
So although zone 1 always refers to the strictest limitation, the denition of each zone varies
across the alternative rule sets and across the weeks of the year. The specic weekly water
withdrawal limits are laid out in Table B.4 through Table B.9.
3.5 Environmental Benets
According to the P2FC report, when no water management rules are applied, the per-
centage reduction in wetted area is 4.5% compared to the case when there are zero water
withdrawals by the oil sand industry. The benet to the environment for each alternative
rule set can therefore be reected by the dierence between the percentage reduction in
wetted area due to the rule set and 4.5%. The benet to the environment in terms of saved
wetted area for three river ow scenarios as dened by the P2FC and for each alternative
rule set is shown in Table 3.10.
We note that except for cases 1 through 3, these P2FC scenarios are not the same as
those used in our analysis of economic cost, but these environmental benets estimates are
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Table 3.9: The Mapping between River Flow States and River Flow Zones
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State 12 185∼200





Zone 7State 9 133∼140
State 8 111.6∼133 Yellow Zone 2
Zone 1










State 3 91.6∼94.6 Zone 3
State 2 87∼91.6 Zone 2
State 1 <87 Zone 1 Zone 1
1. RF stands for the river's ow;
2. RF Triggers are measured in cubic metres per second.
the only ones available. We use the environmental benets for the P2FC scenarios with the
full economic cost estimated in the subsequent sections for our cost-eectiveness analysis.
However we must acknowledge that the environmental benets of the scenarios we have
dened may dier from the P2FC estimates. For the purposes of the cost-eectiveness
analysis, we compare the P2FC scenario 1A with our scenario 2B, the P2FC scenario 1B
with our scenario 2C and the P2FC scenario 1C with our scenario 2D. In general, starting
from case 4, the scenarios we have dened are drier than the ones used by the P2FC, so
we would expect these benet estimates to be a lower bound.
3.6 Results
The economic cost of a particular rule set is dened as the dierence in expected value of
the oil sands operations under that rule set compared to the case of no water restrictions.
Given a specic rule set and a river ow scenario, the economic costs will vary with the
model state variables which are the current oil price, the current reserves, and the current
river ow condition. To keep the discussion concise, we present results for current reserves
at the full level. It turns out that at other levels of the reserves, the results are not
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Table 3.10: Environmental Benets of Alternative Rule Sets (Percentage of Increase In
Wetted Area)
Alternative rule sets Phase 1 Alt 19 Alt 20 Alt 21 Alt 22 Option A Option H
Percentage of increase in wetted area
(P2FC scenario 1A: 50 year historical river ow)
1.6 0.8 1.7 2.5 3 2 1.8
Percentage of increase in wetted area
(P2FC scenario 1B: 1 in 100 year low ow case)
1.9 1.2 2.1 2.8 3.2 2.1 2.1
Percentage of increase in wetted area
(P2FC scenario 1C: 1 in 200 year low ow case)
1.7 1.2 2.1 2.8 3.2 1.9 2.5
Data from the P2FC report.
signicantly dierent. We present results for a selection of dierent oil prices and current
river ow conditions.
We can compare the cost-eectiveness of each alternative using the full costs to the oil
sand industry and the data in Table 3.10. We will plot the environmental benet of each
alternative (vertical axis) versus the economic cost (horizontal axis). (Note that this diers
from the presentation in Figure 3.3 in which the vertical axis showed the environmental
cost of each alternative.)
3.6.1 Cases 1 To 3: Varying Price, Storage Cost, and River Flow
Assumptions
To examine the impacts of introducing an optimal control approach on the selection of the
optimal water management rule set, we consider the case where the river ow condition
is the same as that assumed by the P2FC, i.e. the river ow condition in the future 50
years will reproduce the historical levels from 1958 to 2007. In cases 1 to 3, as in the
P2FC report storage levels accommodate full production levels so that there is no cost
from production cut backs. The P2FC considered only the capital costs for building the
water storage facilities and did not consider the water maintenance cost for water storage.
In Case 1 we consider optimal decisions of the rm given stochastic oil prices, but other
assumptions are as in the P2FC report. In case 2 we add in the maintenance costs to see
the eect on economic cost of restrictions. Then in case 3, we use the hazard rate matrices
to replace the deterministic river ow data to see the eect of capturing uncertainty of
river ow by a Poisson process.
The economic costs comparison for these three cases for dierent current reserves and
current oil prices are depicted in Figure 3.4. All three graphs show a steep rise in economic
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cost as the oil prices rises from 0 to about $35 per barrel; above $35 costs are much less
sensitive to oil prices. In all three diagrams Alt 19 appears to be the least costly while Alt
22 is the most costly. In Figure 3.5 we pick a combination of the current river ow state
(i.e. state 10) and oil price (i.e. $90/barrel) to create the cost-eectiveness graph. Other
combinations of the current river ow state and oil price turn out to create very similar
shapes of the cost-eectiveness graph. It is clear that any point in the environmental
benet - economic cost plane (or cost-eectiveness plane) is dominated by points which
fall north-west of that point. All north-west points are more cost eective in that they
achieve greater environmental benet for the same or lower cost.
The results of case 1 can be seen by comparing the upper graphs in both Figure 3.3
and Figure 3.5. We see that Alt 19 is judged to be the least cost in both the P2FC report
and in case 1 with an economic cost of close to $700 million. Note that Alt 19 has the
highest environmental cost (Figure 3.3), which implies the lowest environmental benet
(Figure 3.5). The ranking and magnitude of economic costs for the other rule sets is the
same in the two gures. The results of case 1 show that introducing the stochastic oil price
model does not change relative cost-eectiveness performance of the alternative rule sets.
Option H, the preferred option in the P2FC report, is not rejected as a desirable alternative
in the case 1 analysis. The main reason for this is that the assumed storage level is large
enough that the water constraints are never binding, and with zero maintenance costs for
storage, it is costless to use the storage. In this case, the only costs imposed by the water
restrictions are the costs to build storage. Note that in the optimal control model, storage
is installed only once prices is above a particular critical value. Our analysis shows that the
critical price to install storage is below $90 when reserve levels are still abundant. Hence
at $90 per barrel as the time zero price of oil in Figure 3.5, storage would be installed
immediately. The magnitude of the costs vary to some extent when the current oil price
changes. When the current oil price is less than $35/barrel, the costs of the alternative
rule sets range from between 500 and 2200 million dollars at low oil prices to between 650
and 2650 million dollars at $35 per barrel. When the current oil price is over $35/barrel,
the costs of the alternatives do not change much as price increases further, and remain in
the range roughly between 650 and 2650 million dollars. The reason why costs are lower
at lower oil prices is that for some very low oil prices it is not economic to install storage
and oil production may be shut in for signicant periods of time.
When water storage maintenance costs are included in case 2, the economic costs of
restrictions are increased. When the current oil price is less than $35/barrel, the costs
of all the alternatives range from between 1600 and 6650 million dollars to between 2000
and 8500 million dollars. When the current oil price is greater than $35/barrel, the costs
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Figure 3.4: The economic cost of the oil sands industry due to the alternative rule sets for
Cases 1 to 3. (Note that in this river ow condition, the river is always in states 8 to 15.)
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Historical stochatic river flows, State 10, Oil Price: $90/bbl
with water storage maintenance costs
Figure 3.5: Representative cost-eectiveness graphs when the current river ow is in state
10 and the current oil price is $90/barrel for Cases 1 to 3
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dollars. Nevertheless this amplication in the magnitude does not alter the relative cost-
eectiveness performances of the alternatives. The selection of Option H cannot be rejected.
In case 3, when we use a Poisson process to describe the river ow condition, the result
is very close to the result derived from using the deterministic river ow data set. The
degree of uncertainty reected in historical river ows, as described by the Poisson process,
is not sucient to signicantly alter the economics of installing storage.
3.6.2 Case 4: Using the Hazard Rate Matrices Derived From Drier
River Flow Data
In this case, we start to examine the problem under the 2015 river ow condition (referred
to as Scenario 2B). We also investigate two drier scenarios: the weekly river ows are
always at the historical lowest levels during the period 1957 to 2017 (referred to as Scenario
2C); the weekly river ow rate is always at the level of 86 m3/s (which means always in
state 1) (referred to as Scenario 2D).
As mentioned before, the environmental benets of the alternative rules sets given by
the P2FC are based on the river ow inputs of the P2FC scenarios: the historical 50 years
river ow condition, the 1 in 100 year dry case, and the 1 in 200 year dry case. For the three
scenarios we examine, there is no available information about the environmental benets.
To proceed with our research, we just use the environmental benet corresponding to the
P2FC scenario 1A to approximate those for our scenario 2B. For the other two scenarios
of our research, we use the environmental benets corresponding to the P2FC scenarios
1B and 1C respectively. However, we acknowledge that since the three scenarios in our
research are all drier than the three in the P2FC's research, the environmental benets we
apply this way are most probably the lower bound of the true benets, especially for the
scenarios 2C and 2D since these two scenarios in our research are much drier compared to
corresponding P2FC scenarios.
We depict the costs for various combinations of the current oil price and the river
ow state for the alternative rule sets in Figure 3.6. The gure shows that in general the
economic cost of any given rule set increases steeply with price of oil when the current
oil price is less than $5/barrel. In scenario 2B, at a price of $5/barrel, the costs range
between 1600 (Alt 19) and 6500 (Alt 22) million dollars. The costs increase gradually
when the oil price rises from $5 to $35 per barrel. Over $35/barrel, the costs are quite
at in relation to the price of oil, ranging between 2000 (Alt 19) and 8500 (Alt 22) million
dollars. The economic costs decrease only slightly as the current river ow state becomes
more abundant although this is dicult to see give the scale of the diagrams. In scenario
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2C, the costs of the alternative rules sets range from 2100 to 6800 million dollars at a price
of $5/barrel. Over $35 per barrel the range is from 2700 to 8600 million dollars. As with
scenario 2B, the current river ow state almost does not change the costs signicantly. In
scenario 2D, the costs of the alternative rules sets increase, ranging between 2500 and 7000
million dollars for the current oil price of $5/barrel. Costs range between 3100 and 8800
million dollars when the current oil price is over $35/barrel.
To provide a better perspective of the magnitudes involved, Table 3.11 shows expected
costs at a current oil price of $90 per barrel as well as the ratio of each alternative's costs to
Alt 19 costs across the three scenarios. Recall that scenario 2B reects river conditions in
2015, scenario 2C reects the lowest weekly ow rates over the past 60 years and scenario
2D reects extremely dry conditions not seen historically.)
Table 3.11: Base Case Economic Cost Comparison for P=$90/barrel
Phase 1 Alt 19 Alt 20 Alt 21 Alt 22 Option A Option H
Costs in million dollars
Scenario 2B 3 755 2 085 4 433 6 413 8 446 5 631 4 171
Scenario 2C 4 379 2 711 5 005 6 778 8 603 5 631 4 745
Scenario 2D 4 379 3 129 5 371 7 091 8 812 5 631 5 423
Ratio of costs to Alt 19 cost
Scenario 2B 1.80 1 2.13 3.08 4.05 2.70 2.00
Scenario 2C 1.62 1 1.85 2.50 3.17 2.08 1.75
Scenario 2D 1.40 1 1.72 2.27 2.82 1.80 1.73
Note: Scenario 2B costs are for current river ow state 10, scenario 2C costs are for current river
ow state 5, while scenario 2D costs are for current river ow state 1.
By comparing the lowest panel of Figure 3.5 and the upmost panel of Figure 3.7, we
can see that by using 2015 river ow condition, the economic costs of the alternative rule
sets do not change a lot compared to case 3 when we use historical hazard rate matrices
to reect the river ow condition. When the river ow condition is in scenario 2C and
2D, the economic costs are greater than or equal to the wetter scenario. The relative cost-
eectiveness performances of the alternatives when the current oil price is $90/barrel are
shown in Figure 3.7. From the gure, it shows that Option H is not dominated by other
alternatives. We cannot reject the P2FC's conclusion of choosing Option H. It turns out
that for other combinations of current river ow states and oil prices, the shapes of the











Scenario 2B, River Flow State: 8 to 15
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Figure 3.6: The economic cost of the oil sands industry due to the alternative rule sets for
dierent river ow scenarios for Case 4. Note that in scenario 2B the river is always in
states 8 to 15, while in scenario 2C the river may be in states 2 to 6 while in scenario 2D
the river is always in state 1.
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Scenario 2B, River Flow State: 10, Oil Price: $90/bbl
Phase 1 Alt 19 Alt 20 Alt 21
Alt 22 Option A Option H

































Scenario 2C, River Flow State: 5, Oil Price: $90/bbl
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Scenario 2D, River Flow State: 1, Oil Price: $90/bbl
Figure 3.7: The cost-eectiveness for three scenarios given the specic current oil prices
and river ow states for Case 4
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3.6.3 Case 5: Lower Reserve Levels
The previous cases show that given the assumed capacity of storage and production ca-
pacity of the oil sands operations, introducing a stochastic oil price and the river ow
conditions does not change the relative performances of the water management rule sets.
Nevertheless, the object studied in the previous cases is the entire oil sands industry with a
constant production capacity as high as 1 764 million barrels per year lasting for 50 years.
This requires a reserve amount to 88 200 million barrels, which is much higher than cur-
rently estimated remaining established reserves. As noted earlier, remaining established
reserves for the Alberta oil sands is 166 billion barrels but only 20% of that (33.2 billion
barrels) is considered recoverable by mining (Alberta Energy Regulator 2015). In this sec-
tion we conduct our analysis assuming remaining reserves are equal to those reported for
current individual projects in the Athabasca region.
Our analysis assumes that the lifetime of an oil sands operation is just sucient so
that remaining reserves will be depleted if annual production is always at full capacity.
Given this assumption, the larger the level of reserves the higher is the cost of water
constraints. This is because in a stochastic setting (for price and river ow conditions),
rms may not always produce at full capacity, implying that some reserves would be left
unexploited at the end of the project. The larger the reserves, the more may be left
unexploited. The length of a mining project also has an eect on the costs of water
constraints. The length of the mining project may be determined by the terms of a rm's
lease agreement with the resource owner. Given a specic level of remaining reserves and
a specic production capacity, the longer a project lifespan, the higher the costs of water
constraints. The intuition behind this phenomenon can be explained as follows. The
present value of a project increases with its lifespan but the rate of increase for the project
with and without water constraints diers. The increase of the present value for the project
without water constraints is faster than that for the project with water constraints. Hence,
their dierence, which is exactly the costs due to the water constraints, increases with the
lifespan. Figure 3.8 depicts the project values for two reserves levels with and without
water constraints when the project's life varies. One reserves level is 88 200 million barrels,
which is applied in cases 1 to 4. The other reserves level is the actual reserves level for active
mining projects in 2015, i.e. 19 197 million barrels. Here the entire industry is treated as a
single project. The current oil price adopted to create this gure is $90/barrel, the set of
water constraint rules is Option H, the river ow scenario is 2B, and the current river ow
state is assumed to be 10. For other levels of the oil price, other rule sets, other river ow
scenarios, and other river ow states, the same phenomenon also exists. Figure 3.8 shows
the increase in the cost of the constraints as project lifespan is increased for the given level
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of reserves and productive capacity. We also found that if productive capacity scales up
on its own, the cost of restrictions decreases. The reason of this is that the higher the
productive capacity, the less reserves may be left unexploited at the end of the project.
In addition, the higher the productive capacity, the less water is needed for production,
so that the less binding is the water restriction. While when the productivity capacity
increases and the reserves scales up at the same time, other things being equal, the cost
scales up. This combined eect implies that the eect of more reserves dominate the eect
of higher productive capacity.
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Costs of Water Constraints
for Projects with Different Lives
88 200 million barrels reserves
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Figure 3.8: The present values and costs due to the water constraints vs. lifespans of the
project for the entire oil sands mining industry with 88200 and 19197 million barrels of
reserves without and with the water constraints imposed by Option H when the current
oil Price is $90/barrel, the current river ow state is 10 for scenario 2B
Up to this point the analysis has ignored the diering projects in the oil sands, and
treated the entire reserve base as one large project. The oil sands industry in the Lower
Athabasca River Region is composed of multiple projects run by several companies. Ac-
cording to Alberta's Energy Reserves 2014 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2015-2024 (Al-
berta Energy Regulator 2015) and `Alberta Oil Sands Industry Quarterly Update' (spring
2015) (Economic Development and Trade 2015), in 2015, there were 5 oil sands rms run-
ning 6 projects. Table 3.12 outlines dierent projects in the industry. These projects have
dierent production capacities and remaining established reserves. The upper portion of
the table shows the actual reserves and production capacities in 2015 for those projects
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and the derived water demands and lifespans accordingly. (These values will be adopted
to study case 8 in Section 3.6.6.) The lower portion of the table lists the values that are
applied to this case (Case 5). The remaining established reserves are at 2015 actual levels
of 19 197 million barrels, in contrast with Cases 1 through 4 in which remaining reserves are
assumed to be at the much higher level of 88 200 million barrels. We maintain the water
demand assumed in the P2FC report associated with the high productive capacity, but
distribute that demand across dierent projects in the proportions indicated in Table 3.12.
The production capacity for each project is derived from its water demand. Considering
the possibility of renewing oil sands projects licenses, we assume that the lifespan of an oil
sands project is sucient so that the remaining established reserves will be depleted if the
production is at the full capacity. Consistent with the assumption of lower total reserves,
we observe in the lower portion of Table 3.12 that all projects have shorter lifespans than
the 50 years considered in previous cases. We expect that the costs of the restrictions in
this case would fall accordingly, which will be shortly shown to be the case. As mentioned
in the above paragraph, the production capacity also aects the cost. In this case, we also
explore whether dierent production capacity and lifespans of projects alter the optimal
selection of the alternative rule sets.
The parameters specications for this case are shown in Table B.11 in Appendix B. The
water storage capacities for dierent projects in dierent river ow scenarios are shown in
Table B.12 in Appendix B. One thing of note is that since the water sharing agreement
allows water to be shared almost evenly across rms while allowing water exchanges as
needed, we distribute the available water when the withdrawal is limited pro rata to all
projects in accordance with their respective production capacities. The water storage
capacity is also allocated to projects according to their production capacities.
The loss surfaces for the alternative rule sets are shown in Figure 3.9. The cost-
eectiveness planes are depicted in Figure 3.10. Compared to Figure 3.7 (i.e. the cost-
eectiveness planes for case 4), we can see that the magnitude of the total costs of all
alternative rule sets is almost halved. Nevertheless, the relative performances of the cost-
eectiveness of the alternatives are almost unchanged. We observe that the cost goes down
signicantly while the total productive capacity for the industry is still the same. The
reason is that the projects are no longer as protable with lower reserves. So restrictions
now cause a smaller loss in value.
Figure 3.11 depicts a break down of the total costs of water constraints into dierent
projects for Case 4, Case 5, and another case which modies Case 4 by shrinking the
lifespan to 11 years so that the remaining reserves conform to the 2015 true level, i.e.
19197 million barrels. From the gure, we can see that the reduced lifespan of the projects
implies signicantly lower costs of restrictions. In addition, we see that reecting actual
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Table 3.12: The Operating Projects' Remained Established Reserves and Production Ca-
pacities In the Lower Athabasca River Region In 2015










CNRL Horizon 3164 55 132 57
Imperial Kearl 5447 40 96 136
Shell Muskeg River 2044 57 137 36
Shell Jackpine 1245 37 89 34
Suncor 2139 183 439 12
Syncrude 5158 149 358 35










CNRL Horizon 3164 188 451 17
Imperial Kearl 5447 136 327 40
Shell Muskeg River 2044 192 460 11
Shell Jackpine 1245 124 297 10
Suncor 2139 620 1488 3
Syncrude 5158 504 1209 10
Note:
 For the actual water demand, the water required is calculated by multiplying the corresponding production capacity with 2.4,
which is the number of barrels of water required to produce one barrel of bitumen.
 For the higher water demand, the water required for each projects is a pro rata distribution from the total available 16 m3/s
according to their 2015 production capacities. The production capacities are derived by dividing the available water by 2.4.
The time to expiry is derived by dividing the remaining established reserves by the corresponding production capacity.
* Source: Alberta's Energy Reserves 2014 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2015-2024 (Alberta Energy Regulator 2015)










Scenario 2B, River Flow State: 8 to 15
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Figure 3.9: The economic cost of the oil sands industry due to the alternative rule sets for
dierent river ow scenarios for Case 5, when the dierences in the production capacity
and the remaining reserves across oil sands mining projects are considered
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Scenario 2B, River Flow State: 10, Oil Price: $90/bbl
Phase 1 Alt 19 Alt 20 Alt 21
Alt 22 Option A Option H

































Scenario 2C, River Flow State: 5, Oil Price: $90/bbl
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Scenario 2D, River Flow State: 1, Oil Price: $90/bbl
Figure 3.10: Three representative cost-eectiveness graphs in three river ow scenarios for
Case 5, when the dierences in the production capacity and the remaining reserves across
oil sands mining projects are considered
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reserves of individual projects as is done in case 5 aects the distribution of costs across
projects and has a small eect on the total cost.























CNRL Imperial Shell Jackpine Shell Muskeg Suncor Syncrude
Figure 3.11: The breakdown costs imposed by Option H for each project in Case 5, modied
Case 4, and Case 4 when the current oil price is $90/barrel, the current river ow state is 10
for scenario 2B (Case 5 is to examine the heterogeneous projects with dierent production
capacities and lifespans, Case 4 is to examine the entire oil sands mining industry with
88,200 million barrels of reserves, and modied Case 4 is to examine the entire oil sands
mining industry with 19197 million barrels of reserves)
3.6.4 Case 6: Using a Fixed Water Storage Capacity Across the
Alternative Rule Sets
As noted in the previous cases, it is assumed that enough storage capacity will be built
so that water restrictions will never require rms to reduce production levels due to water
restrictions. The only cause of reduced production would be low oil prices. We note that
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this assumed storage capacity is derived based on the assumption of a full production rate.
Construction of such large storage capacity may not be feasible or optimal for the rms.
In this case and the next we examine if the selection of the water management rule set
will change under dierent choices for water storage. In Case 6 we assume water storage
can support four weeks of production. This is the amount of storage chosen by the Kearl
project. In the next case, the optimal water storage and its eects will be investigated.
Figure 3.12 shows the economic costs for the alternative rules sets in three river ow
scenarios. Note that for the rst time we include that rule set that was nally implemented
by the Alberta government (hereinafter referred to as the Phase 2 Choice) into the gures
because from this case to Case 8, the information about the water storage volume for the
Phase 2 Choice is available. We do not have an estimate of environmental benets for the
Phase 2 Choice. It can be seen from the gure that when the current oil price is over a
specic level, other than the Alt 19 in scenario 2B, the costs for all of alternative rule sets'
costs are almost identical. Figure 3.13, Figure 3.14, and Figure 3.15 show when the current
oil price is at dierent levels, in dierent scenarios, how the cost-eectiveness performances
of the alternative rule sets vary. We see in Figure 3.13 that when the river ow condition
is scenario 2B, and the current oil price is below $35/barrel, Option H appears to be on
the ecient frontier. When the current oil price is over $45/barrel, all alternatives' costs,
excluding Alt 19, are identical. Now the Option H is dominated by all other alternatives
that have higher environmental benets than it (i.e. Alt 22, Alt 21 and Option A). When
the current oil price is greater than $45/barrel the only cost of the restrictions is the cost
of building storage. There are no additional costs due to production cutbacks. This is
why the economic costs are identical for six of the seven rule sets. Rule set 19 has lower
cost because it imposes generally weaker restrictions7, and hence the optimal timing for
building storage is delayed. For scenario 2C, when the current oil price is over $45/barrel,
all the alternative rule sets, including Alt 19, have identical economics costs. So Option
H is not the optimal one because it is dominated by Alt 22 and Alt 21. For scenario 3, it
shows that Option H and Phase 2 rule set are always dominated by Alt 21 and Alt 22.
It turns out that other than for extremely dry conditions as in scenario 2D, when the
current oil price is less than $35/barrel, Option H can be the optimal choice. However,
when the current oil price is higher than $35/barrel, the advantage of Option H in terms of
7From Figure B.2 in Appendix B, it looks to be the case that the constraints put by Alt 19 are weaker
than those of other alternatives proposed by the P2FC. It can be observed that from week 17 to week 40,
(except for weeks 19 and 20), the water withdrawal constraints imposed by Alt 19 are stricter than those
imposed by the Phase 1 Framework. Nevertheless, during this period, the river ow level is fairly high so
that the constraints are not binding. Therefore, we can still say that overall the Alt 19 restrictions are
weaker than those of the Phase 1 Framework.
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economic costs will disappear and it will be dominated by other alternative rule sets. When
the river ow condition is extremely dry (scenario 2D), Option H will have no advantage
over others regardless of the current oil price.
3.6.5 Case 7: Adopting the Optimal Water Storage Capacities
We derive the economic costs due to each alternative rule set given a sequence of capacities
for the water storage facility. The capacity that make the costs the least is the optimal
one. Limited by the computational capability, we use a fairly sparse sequence: the storage
capacity that can supply water required by 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5 weeks' oil sands production. Nevertheless, we get an indication of the approximate
range of the optimal water storage capacity for each alternative rule set.
Figures B.3, B.4, and B.5 in Appendix B depict the economic total costs corresponding
to various water storage capacities for the alternative water management rule sets in three
river ow scenarios. The optimal water storage capacities for all alternative rules sets in
dierent river ow scenarios are also shown in Table 3.13. This table shows the storage
capacity in terms of how many weeks' production it can maintain. The specic volumes
for water storage by project are derived from this and shown in Table B.12 in Appendix B.
Table 3.13: Without Any Withdrawal From the Athabasca River, the Number of Weeks
That the Production Can Continue With the Water Supply From the Water Storage Fa-
cility
Phase 1 Alt 19 Alt 20 Alt 21 Alt 22 Option A Option H Phase 2
Scenario 2B
case 5 7 4 8 12 15 10 8 n/a
case 6, case 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
case 7 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
Scenario 2C
case 5 8 5 9 12 16 10 9 n/a
case 6, case 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
case 7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
Scenario 2D
case 5 8 6 10 13 16 10 10 n/a
case 6, case 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
case 7 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 1 0.5 1 1
It turns out that in all river ow scenarios, the optimal water storage capacities for the
alternative rules sets are much less than the levels that the P2FC proposed. This is due,











Scenario 2B, River Flow State: 8 to 15
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Figure 3.12: The economic cost of the oil sands industry due to the alternative rule sets
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Figure 3.13: Cost-eectiveness graphs under dierent present oil prices for Case 6, where
the water storage is xed at the level capable of sustaining 4 weeks production, when the
river ow condition is in scenario 2B
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Figure 3.14: Cost-eectiveness graphs under dierent present oil prices for Case 6, where
the water storage is xed at the level capable of sustaining 4 weeks production, when the
river ow condition is in scenario 2C
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Figure 3.15: Cost-eectiveness graphs under dierent present oil prices for case 6, where
the water storage is xed at the level capable of sustaining 4 weeks production, when the
river ow condition is in scenario 2D
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Assuming the optimal water storage capacities are adopted, we depict the economic
costs for the alternative rule sets shown in Figure 3.16 and investigate their cost-eectiveness
when the current oil price is $90/barrel in Figure 3.17. With dierent current river ows
and oil prices, the layout of the alternative rule sets in the cost-eectiveness plane is similar
to that in Figure 3.17.
The gure shows that in scenario 2B, Option H is dominated by Alt 21. In scenario 2C,
Option H is indierent with Alt 20 and Option A. In scenario 2D, Option H is dominated
by Alt 22 and Alt 21. This indicates that the relative cost-eectiveness performances of
the alternative rule sets can be aected by the river ow scenarios. Even considering only
the current river ow condition, Option H is not the optimal choice.
3.6.6 Case 8: the Performance of the Rule Sets Under the Current
Productive Capacity and Reserves
Another question that might be of interest is how the performances of the cost-eectiveness
of the alternative rule sets will be based on the current oil sands industry production
capacity. We assume that the water storage is able to supply four weeks water required
by the industry. The investigation shows that in the scenario 2B river ow condition,
the economic costs due to all alternatives are zero. It means that there are no expected
cutbacks in production because the water constraints are not binding.
A comparison of economic costs for the alternative rule sets is shown in Figure 3.18.
It is shown that when the river ow condition is in scenario 2C, Alt 21, Alt 22, and
the Phase 2 Choice incur some costs, while other alternatives have no costs because the
water constraints are not binding and it is not necessary to build water storage. When
the river ow condition is in scenario 2D, Option H, Phase 2 Choice, Alt 21, and Alt 22
incur identical costs while other alternatives have no costs. The cost-eectiveness plane
is exhibited in Figure 3.19. Note that when the costs of the relevant rule sets are zero,
it implies that it is not necessary to build water storage. Hence the relevant rule sets
will not cause any eects on the oil sands production compared to the case where there
are no water management rules. Therefore, the environmental benets are also zero. For
those rule sets that have some economic costs, since the production levels are less than
the levels forecasted in the P2FC report, the loss in winter wetted area is less than that
under the forecasted high production levels. However, we are unable to determine the
environmental benet because the loss in winter wetted area when there are no water
constraints decreases as well. For the purpose of illustration, we use the environmental
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Figure 3.16: The economic cost of the oil sands industry due to the alternative rule sets
for dierent river ow scenarios for Case 7, where the optimal water storage capacities are
adopted
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Scenario 2B, River Flow State: 10, Oil Price: $90/bbl

































Scenario 2C, River Flow State: 5, Oil Price: $90/bbl
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Scenario 2D, River Flow State: 1, Oil Price: $90/bbl
Figure 3.17: Representative cost-eectiveness graphs for dierent river ow scenarios for
Case 7, where the optimal water storage capacities are adopted
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benets might cause the relative performance of the alternative rule sets dierent from
what is shown in Figure 3.19. Nevertheless, regardless of the environmental benets of the
alternative rule sets, it is obvious that with the current oil sand production level, it is not
optimal to apply Option H to manage water withdrawal by the oil sands industry.
3.6.7 Summary of the Results and Findings
Table 3.14 summarizes the results for all cases investigated in previous sections.
Table 3.14: Summary of Results of Cases
Wet
(50 year historical river ow
or 2015 condition)
Drier
(river ow is at the historical
weekly lowest levels)
Driest
(river ow is at the driest state)
Case 1
The magnitude of costs unchanged




The magnitude of costs increased
The relative C-E unchanged
P2FC results hold
- -
Case 3 Almost unchanged compared to Case 2
P2FC results hold
- -
Case 4 Almost unchanged compared to Case 3
P2FC results hold
Compared to the wet scenario,
the magnitude unchanged
the relative C-E do not change signicantly
P2FC results hold
Compared to the wet scenario,
the magnitude unchanged
the relative C-E do not change signicantly
P2FC results hold
Case 5
Compared to Case 4,
the magnitude is halved
the relative C-E does not change signicantly
P2FC results hold
Compared to Case 4,
the magnitude is halved
the relative C-E does not change signicantly
P2FC results hold
Compared to Case 4,
the magnitude is halved
the relative C-E does not change signicantly
P2FC results hold
Case 6
Compared to Case 5,
the magnitude shrinks further
when P<35, the P2FC results can still hold
when P>35, Option H is dominated
P2FC results do not always hold
Compared to Case 5,
the magnitude shrinks further
when P<35, the P2FC results can still hold
when P>35, Option H is dominated
P2FC results do not always hold
Compared to Case 5,
the magnitude shrinks further
Option H is always dominated
P2FC results do not hold
Case 7
The magnitude of costs is around 100 million
Option H is dominated by Alt 21
P2FC results do not hold
The magnitude of costs is around 100 million
P2FC results hold
The magnitude of costs is around 100 million
Option H is dominated
P2FC results do not hold
Case 8 All rule sets costs zero
P2FC results do not hold
Option H can be the optimal since it costs
zero
Phase 2 cannot be the optimal because it
costs more than 500 million
P2FC results do not always hold
Option H and Phase 2 cannot be optimal
because they cost more than 700 million
while Phase 1, Alt 19,20, Option A cost zero
P2FC results do not always hold
∗ C-E refers to cost eectiveness.
From the results, we have some main ndings about the alternative rule sets studied
by the P2FC to develop the Phase 2 Framework.
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Figure 3.18: The economic cost of the oil sands industry due to the alternative rule sets for
Case 8, i.e. when the oil sands production is at 2015 status, for three river ow scenarios
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Scenario 2B, River Flow State: 10, Oil Price: $90/bbl


































Scenario 2C, River Flow State: 5, Oil Price: $90/bbl
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Scenario 2D, River Flow State: 1, Oil Price: $90/bbl
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Figure 3.19: The representative cost-eectiveness graphs for Case 8, i.e. when the oil sands
production is at 2015 status, for three river ow scenarios
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When the water storage is at the full volume proposed by the P2FC, when introducing
stochasticity to the oil price or river ows, the relative cost-eectiveness for the alternative
rule sets does not change much. Furthermore, the addition of the water storage main-
tenance costs or the consideration of the dierent reserve levels across dierent oil sands
projects does not change the relative cost-eectiveness of the dierent rule sets. The re-
sults are robust under extremely dry scenarios. However the magnitude of economic costs
do change signicantly when remaining established reserves are reduced to reect actual
reserve estimates of the individual oil sands projects.
Once the water storage capacities are changed to other values, the relative performances
of cost-eectiveness for the alternative rule sets are dierent from those given in the P2FC's
report. Two cases are examined. One is with a storage level that can supply four weeks of
water demanded by the oil sands mining projects. This is much smaller than that assumed
by the P2FC report. For this case, for scenario 2B and 2C, when the current oil price is
less than the critical price to install water storage, Option H and the Phase 2 Choice are
on the ecient frontier (referred to by the P2FC). When the current oil price is over the
critical price to install the water storage, all the alternative rule sets, except for Alt 19,
have identical economic costs which reect the installation and maintenance of the water
storage.8 Therefore, Option H and the Phase 2 Choice are not optimal choices. When the
river ow is in scenario 2D, even when the current oil price is below the critical price for
building the water storage immediately, Option H and Phase 2 Choice are dominated by
other alternative rule sets.
Our study shows that the water storage capacity applied plays an important role in the
relative performances of the cost-eectiveness of the alternative rule sets. The assumption
that rms will always produce at full capacity implies a storage capacity that is ineciently
large. Firms acting optimally in response to oil prices and river ows will choose to invest
in less storage. The optimal water storage that accommodates the optimal production
turns out to be much lower than the level proposed by the P2FC. The ordering of the
economic costs of the alternative rule sets are consistent with the ordering of the costs to
build and maintain the optimal water storage. When the projected river scenario is the
same as the condition in 2015 (scenario 2B), or is always as low as the rate of 86 m3/s
(scenario 2D) (an extremely dry condition that has never happened historically), Option
H and the Phase 2 Choice are not the optimal choices. When the river ow is always at
the lowest level recorded over the last 50 years (scenario 2C), Option H is on the ecient
frontier (referred to by the P2FC) and cannot be rejected. Alt 21 and Alt 22 are always
on the ecient frontier regardless of the river ow scenarios.
8For Alt 19 it is not optimal to build storage at any oil price when in scenario 2D.
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Alt 22 is found to never be dominated by any other rule sets throughout our research,
although its economic cost is never less than the others either. Nevertheless, when the
optimal water storage is adopted, the amount by which Alt 22's costs is more than others
is less than $100 million. When the optimal water storage is applied, another competing
rule set that is not dominated is Alt 21, the cost of which is at around the middle of all
alternative rule sets.
If the oil sands industry's production level is at the 2015 level, none of the alternative
rule sets will be binding under the wet river ow scenario so that no rule set is necessary.
Under scenario 2C, other than Alt 21, no rule sets are dominated by others so that all can
be selected depending on the preference with regard to the environment-economic trade
o. Under scenario 3, Alt 21, Option H, Phase 2 Choice are dominated by Alt 22 so that
should be ruled out. However, since in the near future from 2015, it is not likely to be in
scenario 3, this case would not be used as the basis for the decision.
3.7 Conclusions
Water regulations that restrict water usage are costly to an oil sands rm to the extent
that they change a rm's production or investment decisions compared to when there are
no water regulations.
The full economic cost can be estimated through an optimal control model that de-
scribes the rm's decision problem in a dynamic setting, taking into account the main
factors that will aect the cost of the regulations. These factors include anything that
aects the extent or cost of the rm's response to the regulation.
In the case of oil sands operations, these factors include:
 Expected future river ow levels: With the lower expected river ow levels,
the water regulations will more frequently be binding on the rm and will reduce
production levels.
 Uncertainty in future river ow patterns: Volatile, uncertain future river ow
patterns can aect a rm's optimal decisions about the timing of investment in
water storage. Even if average expected river ow ows are plentiful, if there is a
signicant probability of very dry conditions, it may be optimal for rms to invest
in storage. Hence modelling the stochasticity of river conditions is potentially an
important component of the analysis. However in our analysis we did not nd a
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signicant dierence between the results using deterministic water availability based
on the past 50 years versus modelling stochastic river ows using a hazard matrix
based on the data from the past 50 years. This is understandable since the last 50
years was a time of plentiful water supply.
 The expected price of oil: The higher the expected price of oil, the more costly
the regulations as the opportunity cost of lost production is higher. Note that the
same holds for any major operating cost, with higher costs reducing the cost of the
regulation.
 Uncertainty in oil prices: Water restrictions reduce a rm's ability to respond to
volatile prices. Volatile prices imply that a rm may shut in production in periods
when prices are low and produce as much as possible when price are higher. Water
restrictions reduce the rm's exibility to respond optimally to changing prices or
costs. In this analysis we focused on stochastic prices and found that price uncertainty
did not have a signicant eect on the results. This follows because the assumed price
process implies that rms should produce at full capacity most of the time. However
in general it would be important to consider the impact of stochastic prices (or costs)
in an analysis of the economic cost of regulations.
 The cost of investment in storage: The cost of capital investments such as for
storage helps alleviate the impact of restrictions. We have seen that this factor is a
key determinant of the costs of the P2FC study.
 Productive capacity of the oil sands: The larger is productive capacity the more
often the water regulations will be binding and the greater the cost of the regulations.
This was also a key determinant of the magnitude and ranking of costs in the P2FC
study.
 The size of reserves and the remaining life of the project: Binding water
restrictions imply that the rm cannot exploit the oil eld as quickly as desired.
Production is therefore pushed out to the future, which imposes a cost in that revenue
is received later. If there is a xed end date for a particular project, perhaps because
of an oil lease, it is possible that binding water regulations would result in a particular
rm having to leave some reserves in the ground. What happens in reality will depend
on polices regarding lease renewals. In our study it was assumed that all reserves
could be produced within the assumed lifetime of the project, if production is at full
capacity. Water restrictions may imply that not all reserves can be produced during
the life of the project.
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All of the above points may be inuential in any particular analysis of the costs of
water restrictions on the industry. In the particular case examined in this chapter
the most important factors were the storage capacity, cost of storage, river ow
conditions, productive capacity and reserves. In general, this study points to the
importance of considering multiple factors that might aect the cost to industry of
regulations, and not just the directly related capital expenditures.
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Chapter 4
Estimation of the Stochastic Process of
Crude Oil Prices
4.1 Introduction
As has been shown in Chapter 2, the specication of the dynamic process of crude oil
prices has an important eect on the decision making problem. In this chapter we use a
Kalman lter methodology to estimate the parameters of three alternative models of crude
oil prices. This analysis provides the background for the choice of model used in Chapter 2.
The chapter makes a contribution to the literature on modelling oil price dynamics in two
ways. Firstly the chapter provides updated estimates for a model previously studied in the
literature. Secondly, the chapter demonstrates the use of two extensions of the Kalman
lter to estimate alternative oil price models.
In the literature, there is much research investigating the dynamic behaviour of crude
oil prices. There is no general agreement about what constitutes the best model, in part
because the choice of model depends on the context in which it will be used. Further,
what is deemed to be the appropriate model may change as key features of oil markets
shift over time. In what follows we mention some past research which is relevant for our
analysis. A focus of several key papers from the 1990s was the modelling of crude oil
prices for the purpose of valuing oil-related contingent claims. Gibson & Schwartz (1990)
propose a model for crude oil prices with two stochastic factors. The spot price of oil
follows a GBM process correlated with the convenience yield which follows an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (OU) process. They nd it seemingly reliable for valuing short term nancial
instruments. Schwartz (1997) extends Gibson & Schwartz (1990)'s model by examining
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three alternative models of crude oil prices. His rst model is an Ito process whereby the log
oil price is mean-reverting. His second model includes a stochastic convenience yield in the
drift term of the oil price model. Finally, he examines a three-factor model by including
a stochastic interest rate which is correlated with the price of oil and the convenience
yield. Schwartz's conclusion is that the two and three-factor models outperform the one-
factor model. Schwartz & Smith (2000) suggest a two-factor model combining a long-
run equilibrium and a short-run deviation from equilibrium, which follow a GBM and an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process respectively. Chen (2010) proposes a regime-switching model
based on Schwartz (1997)'s log mean-reverting model. Al Mansour (2012) applies an
extended model of Brennan & Schwartz (1985). In this extension, the logarithm of the
spot price follows a Brownian motion process with drift. He concludes that this model
performs better than Gibson & Schwartz (1990)'s two factor model in the long-run. Insley
(2017) applies a regime switching model based on the level mean-reverting process to
capture the dynamics of crude oil prices which is used as an input to a stochastic optimal
control problem.
There is a large number of papers in the nancial econometrics literature which study
the estimation of oil price models. Campbell et al. (1997), Schorfheide (2003), Panik
(2017) introduce econometrics approaches such as the maximum likelihood method, method
of moments, and the Shoji-Ozaki routine to estimate the parameters of various oil price
models. The data used in this strand of literature are spot prices, which are neither directly
observable (as will be explained shortly) nor able to reect the arbitrage free feature in
contingent claims markets. Those approaches result in crude oil price model estimates
in the physical measure (P measure). However, for pricing contingent claims, since the
pricing process is based on the assumption of arbitrage free markets, it is a norm to apply
the prices process in the martingale equivalent measure (Q measure) in order to get a
correct estimate of asset value. Prices of futures contracts allow for the estimation of price
models for the underlying asset in the Q-measure.
As noted, the observability of crude oil spot prices data is also a concern raised in
the literature such as in Gibson (1991), Gibson & Schwartz (1990), Schwartz (1997). The
spot price is dened as the price of a good for immediate delivery. For crude oil the
demand for immediate delivery is small relative to the demand for future delivery, due in
part to the logistics of transporting oil. Hence futures contracts are more commonly used
to purchase oil.1 For the purposes of estimating price model parameters, spot prices of
crude oil have typically been represented by the corresponding one month futures contract
(Gibson & Schwartz (1990)) or estimated from futures prices data by applying the Kalman
1See information at Investopedia.com. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/crude-oil.asp
(accessed on January 11, 2020)
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lter (Schwartz (1997)), or through calibration (Chen (2010)).
Fattouh (2011) provides helpful background information about the development of
crude oil markets and pricing practices. Along with the collapse between 1986 and 1988
of the pricing system dominated by OPEC, spot markets for crude oil have emerged and
matured. Since spot contracts are made between parties and cannot be observed by out-
siders, to identify the value of each barrel of crude oil in spot markets, oil pricing reporting
agencies (PRAs), such as S&P Global Platts and Argus Media, assess the benchmark
spot prices on a daily basis based on specic methodologies described on their websites.
Although there has been some concern about the accuracy and integrity of the assessed
spot prices for crude oil (see Fattouh (2011)), the assessed spot price is applied worldwide
as the benchmark price for futures and spot oil transactions. These spot prices of crude
oil are quoted on a daily basis by EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration). From
Figure 4.1, we can see that the quoted spot prices by PRAs and the proxy of the corre-
sponding rst month futures contract prices are very close to each other. Nevertheless, in
papers most closely related to our research, quoted oil spot prices are not used directly
for model estimation. Gibson & Schwartz (1990) used the price of the closest maturity
crude oil futures contract as the proxy of the spot price. Schwartz (1997), Schwartz &
Smith (2000), Chen (2010), Insley (2017), and Al Mansour (2012) all used futures prices
for estimating the dynamic of oil prices. No spot price data was needed.
With regard to the estimating methodologies, Gibson & Schwartz (1990) applied a
seemingly unrelated regression and a guess and check approach to estimate a GBM
process of crude oil prices and an OU process of convenience yields. Schwartz (1997)
applied a Kalman Filter to estimate a GBM process for crude oil prices and an OU process
for convenience yields. Schwartz & Smith (2000) applied a Kalman lter to estimate a
process for crude oil combining a long-term Brownian Motion trend and a short-term
OU oscillation. Chen (2010) and Insley (2017) conducted calibration for estimating the
crude oil prices following regime switching mean-reverting processes. Al Mansour (2012)
estimated the parameters of a regime switching Brownian Motion process for crude oil
prices by applying a Kim lter. In all of these papers, spot prices are assumed to be
unobservable and are estimated from futures prices.
To support the analysis in Chapter 2, in this chapter, we examine three alternative
models of oil prices and compare their performance at tting historical data. The parame-
ters of the three models are estimated via either a Kalman or Kim lter. The rst process
will be referred to as a level mean-reverting process. Insley (2017) adopted this process in
their analysis, but use a calibration procedure rather than the Kalman lter. The second
model is a log mean-reverting process, which has been used by others such Schwartz (1997)
and Chen (2010). As in Schwartz (1997) we adopt a Kalman lter for estimation. The
127
















PRA assessed state variable and log of closest maturity futures contract prices (Jan 95 to Dec 16)
log of PRA assessed spot prices Log of closest futures contract prices
Figure 4.1: Comparison of PRA assessed crude oil spot prices and the front month futures
contract prices (The data source: U.S. EIA https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_
spt_s1_w.htm(accessed on January 11, 2020))
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third model features regime switching and is the same model proposed by Chen (2010).
Dierent from Chen (2010), we use the Kim lter, which is an extension of Kalman lter.
4.2 Models Specication
4.2.1 Model 1: Level Mean-reverting Process
This process is introduced in Brennan & Schwartz (1980) to model the dynamics of the
interest rate and the value of the studied rm. Some applications of this model can be
found in Insley & Rollins (2005) for modelling timber prices, in Chen & Forsyth (2007) for
modelling natural gas prices, and in Insley (2017) for modelling the specic regime of crude
oil price. According to this process, the spot prices of crude oil follow a mean-reverting
process given by
dP = ε(P̄ − Pt)dt+ σPtdz (4.1)
where Pt is the spot price at time t, ε>0 is the speed of reversion, P̄ is the spot price
level to which P tends to revert, σ is the volatility, and dz is the increment of a Wiener
process.
4.2.2 Model 2: Log Mean-reverting Process
As noted, the log mean-reverting process is estimated by Schwartz (1997) using data from
1985 to 1995. We update his analysis using more recent data (i.e. from 1995 to 2016).
The model is given as follows:
dP = ε(µ− lnPt)Ptdt+ σPtdz (4.2)
where Pt is the spot price at time t, ε>0 is the speed of reversion, µ is a parameter that
reects the long run mean log spot price, σ is the volatility, and dz is the increment of a
Wiener process.
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4.2.3 Model 3: Regime Switching Log Mean-reverting Process
In the third model, we allow the µ and σ in the second model to switch between two
regimes 1 and 2. That is to say, the spot price of crude oil follows a regime switching log
mean-reverting process given by
dP = ε(µst − lnPt)Ptdt+ σstPtdz. (4.3)
where Pt is the crude oil spot price at time t, ε is the mean-reverting speed, µ is the long
run mean log spot price, σ is the volatility, and st = 1, 2 is the regime status at time t. st




where pP denotes the probability of staying in regime 1 under the P measure and
qP denotes the probability of staying regime 2 under the P measure. ε is assumed con-
stant across dierent regimes to ensure that the estimation is tractable, as is explained in
Section 4.4.3, page 143.
4.3 Methodology
The development and application of the Kalman lter is well documented in the literature.
In this section, we just provide a brief introduction of it. The Kalman lter (Kalman 1960,
Kalman & Bucy 1961, Kalman 1963) was developed for estimation and control of aerospace
systems during the Cold War period from around 1950s to 1960s. Its rst application is to
track the spacecraft trajectory in Apollo Moon Project. It was also soon be used in radar
tracking of other aircraft such as missiles and satellites. (Mohinder & Angus 2001, Grewal
& Andrews 2010) After several decades' development, the Kalman lter was applied in more
areas, including physics, engineering, nance, health, and economics. The main idea of the
Kalman lter is to estimate an unobservable state variable by using another observable
measurement which can be expressed as a function of the unobservable one. A state-
space is created composed of the modelled stochastic process of the unobservable state
variable and the relationship between the unobservable state variable and the observable
measurement. For example, in the aerospace area, the unobservable variable could the
real trace of the spacecraft, and the observable measurement is the echo signal received by
receiving facilities. In our research, the unobserved variable is the spot price of crude oil
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while the observed measurement is the futures price. Since the measurement is updated
over time, which brings new information (innovation) over time, this provides information
to determine the dynamic of the unobserved variable of interest. By applying the Kalman
lter, the dynamic model specifying the unobserved variable can be estimated and the time
series of the unobserved variable can be derived. The three models examined have dierent
features. This fact requires the use of dierent lters in the family of Kalman Filter.
The regular Kalman lter is suitable for the cases where there is only one regime and
the relationship between the state variable and measurable variable is linear. The second
model has this feature. However, as will be shown later, the rst model cannot been written
as a linear state-space - the relationship between the state variable and the measurement
variable is nonlinear - and the third model has two regimes. To cope with these two special
features, we apply two extensions of the regular Kalman lter. The extended Kalman
lter (described in Jazwinski (2007) and Sorenson (1985)) can be applied to models with
a nonlinear state-space. The Kim lter (proposed by Kim (1994)), another extension of
regular Kalman lter, is appropriate for the regime switching model.
4.4 Estimation of the Models
Kalman lters are used to estimate unobserved state variables' values whenever new infor-
mation about the observable variable becomes available. In other words, a Kalman lter
estimates the values of the state variables at time t when observable information is updated
from time t−1 to t. To carry out this process, a so-called state-space form is created. The
state-space includes a transition equation and a measurement equation. The transition
equation predicts the state variables' values at time t given their values at time t − 1.
The measurement equation updates the state variables' values given the latest measurable
variables' values. With the state-space specied, the ltering process can be carried out by
conducting prediction and updating repeatedly as time goes by. In this section we briey
describe the process of obtaining the measurement and transition equations for each model.
For more details on the Kalman lter, extended Kalman lter and Kim lter the reader is




The level mean-reverting process cannot be expressed in a linear discrete form. Hence we
transform it into a nonlinear local volatility form which is used as the transition equation
for composing the state-space system.
Dene Xt = lnPt, then applying Ito's Lemma,
dX =
(





Applying the Euler Maruyama approximation, we can write the above process as the fol-
lowing discrete form:
Xt = Xt−1 +
(





where vt ∼ N (0, σ2∆t). Therefore, the transition equation is of the following form:
Xt = g(Xt−1) + vt
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
where
g(Xt) = Xt +
(




∆t, vt ∼ N (0, σ2∆t) (4.4)
To derive the relationship between spot prices and futures prices, we transform the stochas-
tic process for the spot price, expressed as Equation (4.1), to the risk-neutral form:
dP = ε(P̄ − λ− Pt)dt+ σPtdZ∗t
where λ is the market price of risk, and dZ∗t is the increment of a Wiener process under
the Q measure.
Let FT,t denote the futures price at time t with time to maturity of T . It can be shown
that the futures price FT,t is the expected spot price at time T , in the risk neutral world.
The following relationship can be derived. (The details of the derivation are shown in
Appedix C.)
FT,t = Et(Pt+T ) = (P̄ − λ)(1− e−εT ) + Pte−εT
Hence the measurement equation, for a vector of N futures prices, is
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Yt =h(Xt) + wt








 , h(Xt) =

(P̄ − λ)(1− e−εT1) + eXt−εT1
(P̄ − λ)(1− e−εT2) + eXt−εT2
...
(P̄ − λ)(1− e−εTN ) + eXt−εTN







where N is the number of futures contracts. wt is the vector of measurement errors with
the mean of E [wt] = 0 and the covariance matrix of Σ(wt) = R. In addition, we assume
that wt follows a multivariate normal distribution.
Therefore, the state-space system of model 1 can be written as:
Transition equation: Xt+1 = g(Xt) + vt+1
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
Measurement equation: Yt = h(Xt) + wt
(N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1)
where g(Xt) is dened in Equation (4.4) and h(Xt) is dened in Equation (4.5).
E(vtv′τ ) =















The ltering process applying the extended Kalman lter is conducted in following two
steps (refer to Haykin (2004) for details).
 Updating step
Start with a initial value for the unobservable state variable X̂1|0, where 1|0 in the subscript
means that this initial value is the predicted value at time 1 given the available information
up to time 0 (i.e. there are not any observed values for the measurement variables. (We
use the logarithm price of the futures contract closest to maturity at the beginning of the
examined period as the initial value.). The state variable X is updated by the following
formula given the new information provided by measurement Yt:
X̂t|t = X̂t|t−1 + Γt|t−1 · Jht
′ ·MSE(Ŷt|t−1)
−1
· ( Yt − Ŷt|t−1 )
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1×N) (N ×N) (N × 1) (N × 1)
where the estimate of the measurement Y1|0 can be obtained by using the measurement
equation in the state-space system:
Ŷt|t−1 =h(X̂t|t−1)
(N × 1) (N × 1)
(4.6)
Γt|t−1 is the mean squared error (MSE) of the state variable's forecast andMSE(Ŷt|t−1)
is the MSE of the measurement variable's forecast:
Γt|t−1≡ E[( Xt − X̂t|t−1 )2]
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
MSE(Ŷt|t−1)≡ E
[
( Yt − Ŷt|t−1 )( Yt − Ŷt|t−1 )′
]
= Jht ·Γt|t−1 · Jht
′
+ R
(N ×N) (N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1) (1× 1) (1×N) (N ×N)







For the initial value of Γ1|0, we tried various values and choose the one that leads to the
highest likelihood.
Then the MSE of X̂t|t can be obtained as follows:




(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1×N) (N ×N) (N × 1) (1× 1)
 Prediction step
Having obtained the updated state variable and its MSE embodying the information up
to the current time t, the predicted state variable X for time t + 1 can be obtained by
applying the transition equation in the state-space system:
X̂t+1|t = g(X̂t|t)
(1× 1) (1× 1)
The MSE of predicted X for time t+ 1 can be derived applying the following formula:
Γt+1|t = J
g




(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)






By applying above lters, the predicted Y , which is produced from updated estimates for
the state variable, and the corresponding MSE can be produced iteratively for each time
step t, where t = 1, 2, · · · , T . Sincewt follows a multivariate normal distribution, according
to the measurement equation and Equation (4.6), Yt − Ŷt|t−1 also follows a multivariate
normal distribution N (0,MSE). Then the density function of Yt − Ŷt|t−1 for each time
step is as follows:










For the whole period that is examined, the likelihood is:
T∏
t=1




























The estimates of the parameters, i.e. P̄ , ε, σ, and λ, are the parameter values that
maximize the log-likelihood function. This log-likelihood function cannot be maximized
analytically. Instead, the unknown parameters are estimated numerically.
4.4.2 Model 2
4.4.2.1 State-space Construction




















+ e−ε∆tXt−1 + vt














∆t+ (1− ε∆t)Xt−1 + vt
where E [vt] = 0 and V ar [vt] = σ2∆t.
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Following Schwartz (1997), we choose the approximate version for the subsequent dis-
cussion.
Therefore, the transition equation can be written as
Xt = C + G ·Xt−1 + vt













To acquire the measurement equation, rst, convert the stochastic process to a risk-













∗ is the increment of a Wiener process under the Q measure. According to Dixit
& Pindyck (1994), the mean and variance of XT at time t can be derived as:















As in Schwartz (1997), by taking expectation of PT from the perspective of time t in
the risk-neutral environment, the price of a futures contract with a time to maturity of T
can be expressed as follows.
FT,t = EQt [PT ] = exp
(
EQt [lnPT ] +
1
2
V arQ [lnPT ]
)
where the superscript Q means that the expectation and variance are taken with regard
to the risk neutral process.
The second equal sign comes from the fact that PT follows a log normal distribution.
Taking logarithm on both sides of the above equation, we can get:
lnFT,t = EQt [lnPT ] +
1
2
· V arQ [lnPT ]
= Et [XT ] +
1
2

















The measurement equation can be constructed accordingly:
Yt = d + H
′ · Xt + wt





















(1− e−εTN )(µ− σ2
2ε
− λ) + σ2
4ε
(1− e−2εTN )














and N is the number of futures contracts.
Therefore, the state-space system representing Model 2 is as follows:
Transition equation: Xt+1 = C + G · Xt + vt+1
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
Measurement equation: Yt = d + H
′ · Xt + wt
(N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1) (1× 1) (N × 1)
where C and G are dened in Equations 4.7 and d and H ′ are dened in Equations 4.8.
E(vtv′τ ) =











Since the state-space system is composed of linear equations, the regular Kalman lter is
capable of estimating this model.
4.4.2.2 Filtering Process




We set the logarithm price of the futures contract closest to maturity as the initial value
for X̂t|t−1 for t = 1: X̂1|0. In addition we choose the initial value of the MSE of the initial
state variable prediction Γt|t−1 when t = 1 that makes the log-likelihood highest: Γ1|0. The
following formula is adopted to update the value of the state variable X and the MSE Γ
of updated X when the measurement at time t (i.e. the new information) is available.
Xt|t = X̂t|t−1 + Γt|t−1 · H ·MSE(Ŷt|t−1)
−1
· ( Yt − Ŷt|t−1 )
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1×N) (N ×N) (N × 1) (N × 1)
Γt|t = Γt|t−1−Γt|t−1 · H ·MSE(Ŷt|t−1)
−1
· H ′ ·Γt|t−1
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (N × 1) (N ×N) (N × 1) (1× 1)
where Yt can be obtained from the actual futures prices. Ŷt|t−1 can be obtained by using
the measurement equation:
Ŷt|t−1 = d + H
′ · X̂t|t−1
(N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1) (1× 1)
MSE(Ŷt|t−1) can be obtained by applying the following formula:
MSE(Ŷt|t−1) = H
′ ·Γt|t−1 · H + R
(N ×N) (N × 1) (1× 1) (1×N) (N ×N)
 Prediction step:
Given Xt|t and Γt|t by the updating step, the prediction of the value of X at time t + 1
based on all information up to time t can be obtained by applying the transition equation:
X̂t+1|t = C + G · Xt|t
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
The MSE of X̂t+1|t can be calculated using the following formula:
Γt+1|t = G · Γt|t · G′ + Q
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
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By the above ltering process, in each time step, Ŷt|t−1 and MSE(Ŷt|t−1) can be ob-
tained. Since wt is normally distributed, similarly as the inferring in Model 1, the log-
















The estimates of the parameters, i.e. µ, ε, σ, and λ, are the parameter values that
maximize the log-likelihood function.
4.4.3 Model 3
4.4.3.1 State-space Construction














= ln P̄st , where P̄ is the long run mean crude oil price.)










∆t+ (1− ε∆t)Xt−1 + vt
where E [vt] = 0 and V ar [vt] = σ2st∆t.
X
(st)
t represents the logarithm of price at time t if the regime is st.




(st) + β(st) Xt−1 + vt
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)













To infer the measurement equation, we relate the logarithm of futures prices lnF
(st)
T,t (where
T is the time to expiry of the futures contract at time t, when the futures price is calculated,
and the superscript (st) denotes the regime at time t) to the logarithm of spot prices X
(st)
t .
To this end, we need to use the expression of X
(st)




(st)∗+ β(st) Xt−1 + vt
















where λst is the risk premium for regime st under the Q measure. The transition










Where πij refers to the probability of switching from regime i to regime j under the Q
























The superscript (st) of AT and BT reects the fact that both coecients vary over time,
depending on the realization of st. Therefore we need to express AT and BT in terms of
the set of parameters (i.e. ε, µ, λ, and σ) corresponding to the regime at time t.




T , we use the following comparing coe-
cients method as is used in Al Mansour (2012).
As explained in Al Mansour (2012), in an arbitrage free market, we can get the rela-
tionship between two consecutive futures prices shown in Equation (4.13). This follows
141
from the following derivation. A futures contract entered at time t has a price of F
(st)
T,t
at time t and has a price of F
(st+1)





T,t at time t + 1. Under the martingale measurement, the discounted value
of the expected payo must equal the cost of entering the futures contract, which is zero.










, where r is the risk free interest rate. Re-














The left hand side of Equation (4.13) can be expressed as Equation (4.12). The right





















































































































where πstst+1 denotes the element on row st and column st+1 of the Q measure transition
matrix (4.10).
Since the left hand sides of Equations (4.12) and (4.14) are equal according to Equa-











































Our task is to derive expressions for AT and BT in terms of AT−1, BT−1, and parameters
for the specic regime at time t. We hope we can reformulate the right hand side of
Equation (4.15) so that it can be expressed as a summation of a constant term and a term
with X
(st)
t . Then by directly comparing the constant term and the coecient of X
(st)
t of
both sides, we can derive the expression of AT and BT .





in Section 4.2.2 (page 130) we assume the speed of mean-reverting ε is regime independent.
The intention of this assumption is also for the mathematical derivation of AT and BT .


















































Comparing the coecients of Xt, we obtain:
BT = BT−1(1− ε∆t)






according to Equation (4.11), we can obtain
A
st+T
0 = 0, B0 = 1
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Then given specic sets of parameters (i.e. ε, µst , λst , σst , p
Q, and qQ), A
(st+T−i)
i and
Bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , T ) can be obtained.
We acknowledge that the assumptions of regime independent Bi and ε are at the prob-
able cost of the accuracy of the estimation if they actually vary across regimes. It is a
problem that has a potential to be improved in the future research. Nevertheless, it turns
out, which will be shown in the subsequent sections, that the performance of Model 3 in
forecasting futures prices is an improvement compared to Models 1 and Model 2.




(st) + B ·X(st)t + wt

































and wt ∼ N (0, R), N is the number of futures contracts, and T1, T2, . . . , Tn are the
times to maturity of N futures contracts respectively.




(st) + β(st) Xt−1 + vt




(st) + B ·X(st)t + wt















where Q = σ2∆t is the variance of vt and R is an (N × N) covariance matrix of the
(N × 1) random vector wt.
4.4.3.2 Filtering Process
According to Kim (1994), the ltering algorithm is as follows.
For both regimes s0 = 1, 2, the initial values of the state variable X
(s0)
0|0 and the MSE
of it Γ
(s0)
0|0 are set to be the logarithm of the price of futures contract closest to maturity
at the beginning of the examined period and the value that makes the log-likelihood the
highest respectively.
 Prediction step
By applying the transition equation, we obtain the predicted value of the state variable




(st+1) + β(st+1) ·X(st)t|t
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
(4.16)
The reason we use (st, st+1) rather than (st+1) as the superscript of the term on the left
hand side and add a superscript (st) to Xt|t on the right hand side is that other than when
t = 0, Xt|t will be dierent for two regimes based on the prediction that the lter made in






The MSE of the predicted state variable X̂
(st,st+1)




(st+1) ·Γ(st+1)t|t · β(st+1)
′
+ Q
(1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1) (1× 1)
(4.17)
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bodying the information up to time t+ 1 (i.e. by using the measurement at time t+ 1):
To compute the updated values, we need to compute the forecast error for the mea-
surement variable and Kalman gain:
The predicted value Ŷ
(st,st+1)




(st+1) + B · X̂(st,st+1)t+1|t
(N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1) (1× 1)
 Updating step




t+1|t = Yt+1 − Ŷ
(st,st+1)
t+1|t
(N × 1) (N × 1) (N × 1)
The variance of ξ
(st,st+1)
t+1|t can be inferred to be:
Ξ
(st,st+1)
t+1 = B ·Γ
(st,st+1)
t+1|t · B′ + R
(N ×N) (N × 1) (1×N) (1×N) (N ×N)









(1×N) (1× 1) (1×N) (N ×N)










(1× 1) (1× 1) (1×N) (N × 1)
Γ
(st,st+1)
t+1|t+1 = ( 1−K
(st,st+1)
t+1 · B )·Γ
(st,st+1)
t+1|t
(1× 1) (1×N) (N × 1) (1× 1)
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Then the updated values can be used to carry out the prediction step for time t + 1.
By carrying out the two steps recursively, the state variable can be derived for two regimes
for each time step.




t+1|t+1 are conditional on the regime at time t





not so. In fact, if in each recursive step, we apply the updated valued conditional on the
lagged regime, the number of possible outcomes will reach 2T and the ltering will become
intractable. To avoid this circumstance, we follow Kim (1994) to get approximations for





i=1 Pr [st = i, st+1 = j|ψt+1]X
(i,j)
t+1|t+1
























Pr [st+1 = j|ψt+1]
(4.19)
where j = 1, 2 is the regime at time t + 1, and ψt+1 is the information up to time t + 1:
ψt+1 = {Yt+1, Yt, . . . , Y0}.
In order to get the value of relevant probabilities in above equations, we follow Kim
(1994)'s four steps:
 Step 1
Calculate the joint conditional probability mass function of consecutive regimes:
Pr [st = i, st+1 = j|ψt] = Pr [st+1 = j|st = i] · Pr [st = i|ψt]
where Pr [st+1 = j|st = i] is the element at the ith row and jth column in the P
measure transition probability matrix. The initial value of Pr [st = i|ψt] is to be
estimated.
 Step 2
Calculate the joint conditional probability density function:
f (Yt+1, st = i, st+1 = j|ψt) = f (Yt+1|st = i, st+1 = j, ψt) · Pr [st = i, st+1 = j|ψt]
where f (Yt+1|st = i, st+1 = j, ψt) = (2π)−
N
2
∣∣∣Ξ(i,j)t+1 ∣∣∣− 12 ·exp(−12 · ξ(i,j)t+1|t′ · (Ξ(i,j)t+1 )−1 · ξ(i,j)t+1|t)
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 Step 3
Update the joint conditional probability mass function of consecutive regimes:
Pr [st = i, st+1 = j|ψt+1] =
f (Yt+1, st = i, st+1 = j|ψt)
f (Yt+1|ψt)




i=1 f (Yt+1, st = i, st+1 = j|ψt)
 Step 4
Update the conditional probability mass function of the current regime
Pr [st+1 = j|ψt+1] =
2∑
i=1
Pr [st = i, st+1 = j|ψt+1]
By conducting the above four steps at each time step, we can collapse the 2 out-
comes for Xt+1|t+1 and the 2 for Γt+1|t+1 both to one in each iteration by using the
formulas 4.18 and 4.19.














where θ is a vector composed of the unknown parameters (i.e. ε, µst , λst , σst , p
P ,
pQ, qP , and qQ). Therefore the estimates for those parameters can be obtained by
using a nonlinear optimization procedure. We use @fmincon in MATLAB to obtain
the estimate.
4.5 Data
Futures contract prices are for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) as reported by DataStream.
We use data for 17 contracts with dierent times to maturity from less than 1 month to 17
months. We apply the notation F1 to represent the futures contract that is closest to the
maturity, F2 to represent the futures contract that is the second closest to the maturity,
and so on. For a specic contract, the time to maturity changes over time. For example, one
contract that currently has two months life span will have the life span of only one month
a month from now on. This contrasts with the estimation procedure which requires sets of
futures contracts with constant time to maturity. The time to maturity for all contracts is
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depicted in Figure 4.2. From the graph, we can see that each contract's time to maturity is
within a small range. For example if we want to look at contracts with a time to maturity
of 1 year, we can consider those contracts whose time to maturity varies between 0.9 and
1.0 year(s). We may expect the stochastic process that best describes historical data will
change depending on the particular time period considered. The estimates of risk premium
reected by dierent futures contracts with dierent times to maturity are usually not the
same. To observe the impacts of dierent studied periods and times to maturity on our
estimation results, we use three data sets to proceed with our examination.
1. Contracts F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 from January 6, 1995 to December 16, 2016;
2. Contracts F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 from January 6, 2006 to December 16, 2016;
3. Contracts F1, F5, F9, F13, F17 from January 6, 2006 to December 16, 2016.
The data sets 1 and 2 above use identical groups of futures contracts in dierent periods.
While data sets 2 and 3 examine the same time period but using dierent groups of
contracts. Table 4.1 describes the means and standard errors of the futures contracts'
prices and times to maturity. Since the purpose of our research is to nd out the stochastic
behaviour of real crude oil spot prices, we use Consumer Price Index (CPI) for All Urban
Consumers reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to convert nominal futures
prices into real prices. We use data from January 6th, 1995 to December 16th, 2016 to
create time series for the 17 contracts.
It was observed in the introduction that the WTI spot price as reported by the U.S.
EIA is very similar to the one month futures contract price. Hence when examining the
models' performance, we use the one month futures contract prices to approximate the
true oil spot prices.
4.6 Empirical results
Table 4.2 shows the estimates for Model 1. From the results, we can see that Model 1
does not appear to provide a good t for the data. For the whole sample period, the
estimated mean reverting speed is a negative number, which makes no economic sense. As
indicated by Balvers et al. (2000), without a signicant nding of the reverting speed, we
cannot conrm mean reversion. This negative speed implies that there is no signicant
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Figure 4.2: Time to maturity each week for the 17 futures contracts
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Table 4.1: Summary of Futures Contracts (price in $/barrel)
Futures Contract
Mean Price ($) Mean Maturity (year)
(Standard Error) (Standard Error)



















evidence of mean reversion in the whole sample period. We note that the estimated speed
of mean reversion does have the expected sign in the two sub-sample periods. The negative
signs of the log-likelihoods for all three data sets imply that theMSEs of the measurement
variable's forecast are not low. These non-trivialMSEs might be caused by either the linear
approximation of the predicted state variable's MSEs during ltering or the untness of
a regular mean-reverting model.
Table 4.3 shows the estimates for Model 2. For the full sample period (i.e. from January
1995 to December 2016), the estimated speed of reverting is not signicantly dierent from
zero. Therefore the dynamics of oil prices in this whole sample period show little evidence
of log mean reversion. For sub-sample period from January 2006 to December 2016, the
estimates show that the prices evolve following a log mean-reverting process. The log-
likelihoods for all three data sets are positive. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that Model
2 outperforms Models 1 simply based on the log-likelihoods comparison. First, we can not
determine the exact cause of the negative log-likelihoods in Model 1. Secondly, since Model
1 and 2 are not nested, the log-likelihoods derived from them are not comparable.
Schwartz (1997) also applied a Kalman lter to estimate Model 2, using data sets from
an earlier period. One of the data sets he used is from January 1990 to February 1995,
composed of contracts F1, F5, F9, F13, and F17. It is comparable to one data set we used,
which is from January 2006 to December 2017, composed of the same set of contracts.
The mean reversion speed estimated by Schwartz (1997) is 0.428, which is higher than our
result, which is 0.14. It shows a weaker mean reversion from 2006 to 2016 compared to the
period between 1990 and 1995. In addition, the long run mean log spot price estimated
by Schwartz (1997) is 2.991, lower than our estimate, 4.46. His estimates for market price
of risk and volatility are 0.002 and 0.257 respectively, compared to our results, -0.13 and
0.31.
For both Model 1 and Model 2, in the sub-sample period, the estimates of mean re-
version speed are less when the contracts with shorter times to maturity are used. This
phenomenon is the same as what Schwartz (1997) found in his one factor log mean-reverting
model.
The estimates for Model 3 are exhibited in Table 4.4. The results show that the regime
switching log mean-reverting model provides a reasonable description of the data in all
three periods examined. In addition, when the contracts with shorter times to maturity
are used for the sub-sample period estimation, the estimated reverting speed is higher.
This is dierent from Models 1 and 2. However, since we assume the two regimes have
the same reverting speeds, we cannot determine how the estimates of speeds for the two
regimes (if they are dierent) change while longer contracts are used.
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About Model 3, in the existing literature, Chen (2010) applied a non-linear least square
approach to calibrate its parameter values using data with a dierent time interval and
dierent futures contracts. The data are between January 1997 and May 2009. The futures
contracts are F2, F5, F8, F12, F18, F24, F36, F48, F60, and F72. The mean reversion
speed estimate using this data set is 0.06, which is not greater than all three estimates listed
in Table 4.4. It shows that for the period and contracts examined in this chapter, the mean
reversion is not weaker than those examined in Chen (2010). In Chen (2010), the long run
mean log spot price for regime 1 is estimated to be 4.87, fairly close to three estimates
reported in Table 4.4. However, for the regime 2, the estimate in Chen (2010) is 0.92,
which is much lower than those reported in Table 4.4. With regard to the volatility, the
estimate by Chen (2010) for regime 1 is 0.98, much higher than those listed in Table 4.4.
The volatility estimate for regime 2 in Chen (2010) is 0.20, which is relatively close to
those listed in Table 4.4. The probabilities of switching from regime 1 to regime 2 and
from regime 2 to regime 1 estimated by Chen (2010) are 0.36 and 0.08 respectively, which
are both much higher than the probabilities we estimate.
Furthermore, it can be observed that for all three models, the estimated volatilities do
not vary much across dierent data sets.
Table 4.2: Results for Model 1
Futures contracts F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 F1, F5, F9, F13, F17
Sample period Jan 1995  Dec 2016 Jan 2006  Dec 2016 Jan 2006  Dec 2016
Number of observations 1146 572 572
ε -0.04 (0.0000) 0.14 (0.0000) 0.12 (0.0000)
P̄ 63.00 (0.0006) 108.00 (0.0013) 97.02 (0.0006)
σ 0.25 (0.0002) 0.32 (0.0000) 0.31 (0.0001)
λ 0.50 (0.0006) 0.50 (0.0013) 1.48 (0.0011)
log-likelihood -11877 -6366 -6725
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the associated estimates.
Figure 4.3 shows the estimated state variable (i.e. log of spot prices of crude oil)
according to the three models and log of the actual spot prices approximated by log of the
prices of the closest maturity futures contract F1. It can be observed that the estimated
values are quite close to, although not exactly the same as, the actual values.
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Table 4.3: Results for Model 2
Futures contracts F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 F1, F5, F9, F13, F17
Sample period Jan 1995  Dec 2016 Jan 2006  Dec 2016 Jan 2006  Dec 2016
Number of observations 1146 572 572
ε 1.65e-08 (4.14e-04) 0.20 (0.0000) 0.14 (0.0000)
µ 4.90 ( 0.0000 ) 4.47 (0.0001) 4.46 (0.0000)
σ 0.29 ( 0.0000 ) 0.33 (0.0000) 0.31 (0.0000)
λ 1.06 ( 0.0000 ) -0.20 (0.0001) -0.13 (0.0000)
log-likelihood 10704 6361 6027
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the associated estimates.
Table 4.4: Results for Model 3
Futures contracts F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 F1, F3, F5, F7, F9 F1, F5, F9, F13, F17
Sample period Jan 1995  Dec 2016 Jan 2006  Dec 2016 Jan 2006  Dec 2016
Number of observations 1146 572 572
ε 0.06 (0.0000) 0.16 (0.0000) 0.20 (0.0000)
µs1 4.23 (0.0000) 4.21 (0.0000) 4.77 (0.0000)
µs2 4.98 (0.0000) 2.87 (0.0000) 3.79 (0.0000)
σs1 0.32 (0.0000) 0.33 (0.0000) 0.33 (0.0000)
σs2 0.23 (0.0000) 0.27 (0.0000) 0.28 (0.0000)
λs1 -3.26 (0.0000) -1.09 (0.0000) -0.40 (0.0000)
λs2 3.74 (0.0000) -1.46 (0.0000) -0.51 (0.0000)
pP 0.9919 (0.0000) 0.9885 (0.0000) 0.9765 (0.0000)
qP 0.9923 (0.0000) 0.9521 (0.0000) 0.9749 (0.0000)
pQ 0.9821 (0.0000) 0.9575 (0.0000) 0.9775 (0.0000)
qQ 0.9954 (0.0000) 0.9863 (0.0000) 0.9999 (0.0000)
log-likelihood 13190 7426 6884
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the associated estimates.
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As mentioned in the previous section, the three models are not nested, so the log-likelihoods
are not comparable. In this section, we compare the three models' performance from two
perspectives: the forecast errors for the futures prices, and the term structure of the futures
prices.
One motivation of our study of oil prices is to determine the best model to us in our
stochastic optimal control problems examined in Chapters 2 and 3. The lifespans of the
projects to be evaluated are all more than 1 year. Specically, in Chapter 2 the life of
projects are 10 years, in Chapter 3, the lives of projects vary from 5 years to 136 years.
Therefore, in this section, we focus on the results based on the data set with longer futures
contracts.
4.7.1 Forecast Errors for the Futures Prices
The forecast error refers to the dierence between the actual value of a variable (in this
section, the measurement variable Y ) observed at a point in time and the forecasted value of
this variable based on the information obtained up to the prior point in time. We compare
the forecast errors of the three models by using both in-sample criteria and out-of-sample
criteria.
4.7.1.1 Forecast Errors Comparison Using In-sample Criteria
To do the in-sample forecast comparison, for each time point t in the sample period except
for time 0, we forecast the measurement variables' values in market based on the informa-
tion up to time t − 1 (i.e. the prior information) and obtain the dierence between the
observed values of the measurement variables and the forecasted values. Then we compute
the mean absolute error (MAE) of the forecast.
Figure 4.4 shows the forecast errors of the three models using the data of ve futures
contracts F1, F5, F9, F13, and F17 from January 2006 to December 2016. The gure shows
that the forecast errors are quite close for the three models. The MAE of the forecast for
three models are 0.0369, 0.0390, and 0.0339 respectively. They amount to 0.85%, 0.90%,
and 0.78% of the average3 of the log of futures prices.
3We calculated the percentage for each time step and calculated the MAE for those percentages.
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F1 F5 F9 F13 F17
Figure 4.4: Log of futures prices forecast errors comparison for three models
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Table 4.5 lists the MAE values for the three models, for single futures contracts and all
of them. It is observed that, consistent with what is shown in Figure 4.4, when taking into
consideration all the futures contracts, the MAEs for the three models are close. Model
3 has the lowest MAE and Model 2 has the highest MAE. Nevertheless when considering
the individual futures contracts, it is observed that for the longer contracts such as F13
and F17, the MAEs for Model 2 are lower than the MAEs for Model 1.
Table 4.5: In-sample Futures Prices Prediction MAE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
In Log Dollars
F1 0.0579 0.0676 0.0506
F5 0.0365 0.0432 0.0369
F9 0.0279 0.0318 0.0294
F13 0.0289 0.0260 0.0261
F17 0.0334 0.0265 0.0264
All 0.0369 0.0390 0.0339
In Percentage
F1 1.3573 1.5793 1.1991
F5 0.8408 0.9915 0.8534
F9 0.6416 0.7285 0.6770
F13 0.6599 0.5936 0.5964
F17 0.7604 0.6026 0.5983
All 0.8520 0.8991 0.7848
Chen (2010) also did an in-sample test for the regime switching log mean-reverting
model, i.e. Model 3, after calibrating it. Her results of MAE are generally larger than
those listed in Table 4.5. In addition, in Chen (2010), the forecast errors for longer term
contracts are larger. In Table 4.5, it is observed that the forecast errors decrease with the
contract term when the term is no more than 13 months and begin to increase when the
term is longer.
The MAEs of the in-sample forecast obtained by Schwartz (1997) for Model 2 is 0.33
(around 1% of the log of futures price of the contract closest to maturity). This result is
very close to our result, which is 0.0339 (0.78% of the average of the log of futures prices).
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4.7.1.2 Forecast Errors Comparison Using Out-of-sample Criteria
To examine the performances of the three models for out-of-sample forecast of futures
prices, we do two types of tests as Schwartz (1997) did in his work. One is the cross-
section test to test the accuracy of forecast on the futures contracts that are not used in
estimation. Since the contracts we use to estimate the three models are F1, F5, F9, F13,
and F17, the cross-section test examines the forecast errors for F2, F3, F4, F6, F7, F8,
F10, F11, F12, F14, F15, and F16. The other is the one-step-ahead out-of-sample test. In
this test, we forecast the most recent 50 log futures prices in the sample period by using the
parameters estimated based on the information up to the prior point in time. Specically,
assuming that in the sample period, the most recent 50 futures prices are observed at time
t−49, t−48, . . . , t, we use estimated parameters based on the information up to time t−50
to forecast the log futures price at time t− 49, and use estimated parameters based on the
information up to t−49 to forecast the log futures price at time t−48, and so on. Then we
obtain the forecast errors between these forecasted values and log of the observed futures
prices. Based on these forecast errors, we compute the root mean squared errors (RMSEs)
and MAEs for the three models.
The cross-section forecast test results are reported in Table 4.6. Table 4.7 reports
the results for one-step-ahead forecast test. The results shows that the RMSE and MAE
comparison is similar to the comparison of the in-sample forecast errors described in the
previous section. When considering all the futures contracts, Model 2 leads to the high-
est RMSE and MAE and Model 3 produces the least RMSE and MAE. When examine
individual futures contracts, it is observed that for the futures contracts with time matu-
rities more than 12 months, Models 2 and 3 give lower RMSEs and MAEs than Model 1.
Furthermore, when the futures contract is longer than 15 months, Model 2's RMSEs and
MAEs are the lowest among the three models.
Chen (2010) did the cross-section out-of-sample test for Model 3. The RMSEs and
MAEs derived by her are generally larger than those in our results. In addition, similar to
the phenomenon found in the in-sample test, in Chen (2010), with the increase in contracts'
times to maturity, the RMSE and MAE become larger. In contrast, our observation is that
the RMSE and MAE decrease with the contract's length when the contract is no more than
15 months; and when the contract is longer than 15 months, the RMSE and MAE begin to
increase. Schwartz (1997) did the cross-section out-of-sample test for Model 2. He observed
that the RMSE and MAE decrease with the contract's length when the contract's time to
maturity is no more than 12 months; and when the contract is longer than 12 months, the
RMSE and MAE begin to increase. In our result, the similar pattern occurs but the turning
point is around 15 months. Moreover, for contracts with shorter terms, the RMSE and
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MAE are higher in the results in Schwartz (1997). For longer term contracts, our results
about RMSE and MAE are higher. This implies that compared to the model estimated by
Schwartz (1997), our estimated model performs better for shorter term futures contracts
price forecast and is weaker for predicting longer term contracts prices.
4.7.2 Term Structure of the Futures Prices
This section compares the three models by examining the in-sample t in terms of the
term structure of the futures prices. By using the three models, we can forecast the prices
for dierent futures contracts with various times to maturity at each time point t except
for the time point 0 based on the information obtained up to time t− 1. It turns out that
generally speaking, Model 3 can capture the actual term structure better than the other
two models. We choose four representative observation dates from the beginning part, the
intermediate part, and the latter part of the sample period respectively, including both
contango and backwardation scenarios, to illustrate the comparison of the term structures
of the futures prices implied by the three models to the observed actual term structure in
Figure 4.5.
It is shown that Model 1 and Model 2 work fairly well when the term structure is
in contango (the diagrams for 2006-01-06 and 2016-12-16). But they are not as good as
Model 3 for capturing the price dynamics when it is in backwardation (the diagram for
2007-07-27) or in the transitional period from contango to backwardation (the diagram for
2012-03-16). This nding about Model 2 is similar to that observed by Schwartz (1997).
Model 3's capability of capturing both contango and backwardation outperforms the other
two.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate three stochastic models for the crude oil prices. We use
dierent members in the Kalman lter family to estimate the parameters for the three
stochastic process models. It is shown that Model 3 (the regime switching log mean-
reverting process) can capture the dynamics of oil prices in either a 20-year period or a
10-year period. Model 1 (level mean-reverting process) and Model 2 (log mean-reverting
process) are capable of capturing the 10-year period price dynamics but are not able to
capture the 20-year period dynamics. While the forecast errors of three models are very
close, Model 3 has the least forecast errors and Model 1 has the highest forecast errors
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Table 4.6: Cross-section Forecast RMSE and MAE
RMSE MAE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
In Log Dollars
F2 0.0662 0.0774 0.0621 0.0492 0.0583 0.0446
F3 0.0582 0.0680 0.0562 0.0437 0.0516 0.0413
F4 0.0533 0.0615 0.0530 0.0399 0.0469 0.0391
F6 0.0449 0.0521 0.0462 0.0333 0.0398 0.0347
F7 0.0420 0.0483 0.0434 0.0306 0.0368 0.0325
F8 0.0398 0.0450 0.0412 0.0289 0.0341 0.0308
F10 0.0379 0.0402 0.0384 0.0276 0.0298 0.0283
F11 0.0377 0.0384 0.0373 0.0277 0.0281 0.0273
F12 0.0379 0.0370 0.0364 0.0282 0.0268 0.0266
F14 0.0391 0.0354 0.0355 0.0298 0.0256 0.0259
F15 0.0401 0.0351 0.0353 0.0308 0.0256 0.0258
F16 0.0414 0.0352 0.0354 0.0321 0.0259 0.0260
All 0.0458 0.0497 0.0442 0.0335 0.0358 0.0319
In Percentage
F2 1.5774 1.8345 1.5112 1.1433 1.3490 1.0445
F3 1.3730 1.5956 1.3439 1.0112 1.1898 0.9602
F4 1.2494 1.4358 1.2544 0.9216 1.0794 0.9069
F6 1.0482 1.2095 1.0838 0.7656 0.9122 0.8000
F7 0.9781 1.1207 1.0165 0.7051 0.8424 0.7486
F8 0.9276 1.0451 0.9644 0.6632 0.7812 0.7083
F10 0.8794 0.9313 0.8935 0.6318 0.6818 0.6499
F11 0.8713 0.8884 0.8645 0.6334 0.6425 0.6260
F12 0.8733 0.8551 0.8419 0.6449 0.6132 0.6087
F14 0.9007 0.8159 0.8152 0.6785 0.5845 0.5902
F15 0.9232 0.8078 0.8088 0.7023 0.5825 0.5870
F16 0.9514 0.8076 0.8088 0.7306 0.5898 0.5904
All 1.0690 1.1598 1.0420 0.7693 0.8207 0.7351
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Table 4.7: One-step-ahead Forecast RMSE and MAE
RMSE MAE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
In Log Dollars
F1 0.0663 0.0746 0.0779 0.0527 0.0574 0.0555
F5 0.0544 0.0620 0.0574 0.0450 0.0535 0.0491
F9 0.0438 0.0509 0.0491 0.0351 0.0428 0.0411
F13 0.0454 0.0411 0.0414 0.0359 0.0328 0.0330
F17 0.0611 0.0416 0.0397 0.0522 0.0333 0.0311
All 0.0549 0.0555 0.0549 0.0442 0.0440 0.0420
In Percentage
F1 1.8289 2.0711 2.1846 1.4242 1.5527 1.5120
F5 1.4347 1.6257 1.5189 1.1804 1.3989 1.2900
F9 1.1481 1.3279 1.2850 0.9146 1.1114 1.0696
F13 1.1878 1.0727 1.0808 0.9282 0.8506 0.8560
F17 1.5852 1.0826 1.0338 1.3456 0.8579 0.8015
All 1.4591 1.4845 1.4811 1.1586 1.1534 1.1058
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Figure 4.5: The futures term structure implied by three models on four dierent dates
(Using the data for F1, F5, F9, F13, and F17 from January 2006 to December 2016)
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taking all futures contracts into consideration. However, when individual contracts are
considered separately, Model 1's performance in terms of forecast errors is dominated by
the other two. It is also observed that Model 3's performance of capturing the term
structure of the futures prices is better than the other two models.
When the stochastic process is for solving a problem with short-term period of interest,
Model 1 and Model 3 are preferred than Model 2. However, when a long-term investment
is concerned, Model 1 is no match for the other two.
Since Chapters 2 and 3 address investments for more than 1 year, we prefer Model 3
for the study. Nonetheless, as mentioned in Chapter 2, for our study, Model 3 can lead to
more detailed results but no more insights to our problem than does Model 2. Hence what
we nally adopt for our stochastic optimal control problems is Model 2.
In summary, none of the models stands out as being clearly superior to the others. For
studying long term investments, models 2 and 3 do appear to have some advantage over
model 1 based on the fact that Models 2 and 3 create less forecast errors for long term
futures contracts than does Model 1. Model 3 can provide a better description of prices
in backwardation. As noted in Chapter 2, the inclusion in our stochastic optimal control
problem of two price regimes as required for price model 3, would considerably complicate





This thesis systematically studies a command and control policy addressing the manage-
ment of a key natural resource, i.e. surface water, in a stochastic optimal control setting.
The policy of interest, i.e. the Water Management Framework issued by the Alberta gov-
ernment, includes two phases which are examined in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.
The Phase 1 Framework came into force in 2007. It was in some sense a interim phase
with an intent to initiate water quantity protection for the Athabasca River. There is
limited information about the development process of the rule set proposed by the Phase
1 Framework. We know little about the environmental eects of it. To investigate the
framework's impact on economy, in Chapter 2, we examine the potential costs of this
framework to the oil sands sector through modelling the prot maximizing behavior of a
hypothetical oil sands rm using a stochastic optimal control approach. We contribute
to the literature by introducing an uncertain regulation inuenced by a varying natural
environmental factor into the optimal natural resource extraction problem. Another con-
tribution is to apply a stochastic optimal control model to study the water policy's cost
in the oil sands mining sector. Chapter 2 shows that the optimal production behavior of
the oil sands rm is closely associated with oil price, river ow condition, and oil sands re-
serves. Under the current circumstance (i.e. 2015 status), generally speaking, the Phase 1
Water Management Framework does not impose a large cost on oil sands rms. We derive
the marginal cost curve of fresh water constraint, which is a non-monotonic curve due to
the possibility of applying a new technology (i.e. water storage). This marginal cost curve
provides a reference from economic perspective for measuring the social welfare condition
and determining the ecient level of water constraints. However, a marginal benet curve
from the perspective of environment is not available for now, which is a problem that is
beyond our research scope.
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While the Phase 1 Framework was in eect, the Alberta government began to improve
the framework by delegating the development of the Phase 2 Framework to the Phase
2 Framework Committee (P2FC). In 2015, the Phase 2 Framework was implemented.
Its development was based on more rigorous scientic research about the environmental
benets and a simple estimation of the economic costs. One of multiple candidate rule
sets was nally selected as the ocial regulation. The P2FC's working report provides
solid evidence of environmental benets of the candidate rule sets while leaving some gaps
regarding the economic cost assessment, which need to be lled by further investigation.
The assessment of costs of candidate rule sets determines the cost-eectiveness comparison
among them and in turn aects the nal choice of the best rule set. To address this problem,
in Chapter 3, we apply the stochastic optimal control model developed in Chapter 2 to
examine the economic costs of multiple candidate rule sets for the Phase 2 Framework in
a stochastic setting rather than using the deterministic approach applied by the P2FC.
Our results show that the economic cost of the policy is aected mostly by river ow
conditions, water storage capabilities, and oil sands production capacities among other
relevant factors. When the relevant factors alter, the rule set selected by the P2FC dose
not always dominate others in terms of the cost-eectiveness.
The main task of Chapter 4 is to examine three stochastic process models of oil prices
to select one to solve the stochastic optimal control problems raised in Chapters 2 and 3.
The rst model is a level mean-reverting process. Since it has one regime but cannot be
transformed into a linear state-space, an extended Kalman lter is used to estimate it. As
far as we know, no estimation of this model has been done by using a Kalman lter in the
literature. The second model is a log mean-reverting process. It has one regime and can be
transformed into a linear state-space, so a regular Kalman lter is used. The second model
was estimated by Schwartz (1997), using data from 1985 to 1995. we update his analysis
using data from 1995 to 2016. The third model is a regime switching log mean-reverting
process. This model was estimated by Chen (2010) by conducting calibration. Our work
is dierent in that we estimate it adopting a Kim lter, which is suitable for stochastic
processes with two regimes and being able to transformed into a linear state-space. Our
study shows that for the long-term forecasting, the second and third models perform better.
Considering the third model would complicate the interpretation of results for stochastic
optimal control problems without bringing too many insights, we choose the second model
for solving the stochastic optimal control problems in Chapters 2 and 3.
Although this thesis examines a specic regulation implemented by a certain adminis-
trative division (in this thesis, the province of Alberta, Canada), the methodology devel-
oped herein can be adopted in many other contexts of water management such as shale gas
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hydraulic fracturing in the United States1, copper and molybdenum mining in Rio Chili
watershed in Peru2, copper and gold mining in the Great Artesian Basin in Australia3,
irrigation in the Guadalquivir river Basin in Spain4, etc.
This thesis focuses on a command and control instrument's economic eects. As ex-
pected, it turns out that the command and control instrument is unlikely to realize an
ecient water allocation. Market-based instruments are known to be ecient. Which type
of market-based instrument is better for ecient water allocation? Possibilities include
water withdrawal taxes, water saving subsidies, and tradable water permit. These are all
interesting topics that we do not address in this thesis but need to be further examined.
Admittedly, due to limited space and time, we simplify some conditions and assump-
tions. For example, when we discuss the economic costs of the Water Management Frame-
work, we conne the scope to only the costs to oil sands rms. However, in fact, there
are other costs such as the administrative costs associated with the regulation, incurred by
the regulatory agency, and the costs associated with uncertainty in terms of eciency loss.
These costs could also have signicant eects on social welfare. These costs are worthwhile
to be considered in the future research. Another assumption that can be further investi-
gated is the justication of using P measure river ow process in the stochastic optimal
control problem.
1The background can be found in Rahm (2011).
2The background can be found in Garner et al. (2012).
3The background can be found in Garner et al. (2012).
4The background can be found in Berbel et al. (2011).
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Numerical Solution Details and
Sensitivity Analysis Results for
Chapter 2
A.1 Semi-Lagrangian Discretization
For simplicity, we only elaborate the problem in a certain stage m. Hence the expressions
at this stage can be simplied by eliminating the subscript m temporarily.
There are two types of approaches to solve this kind of problem. One is to do sim-
ulations, and the other one is to solve PDEs. Since the latter one is more accurate, we
adopt it in this thesis. To solve the PDEs (2.16), we apply the extended semi-Lagrangian
discretiztion approach introduced in Chen & Forsyth (2007) (with no regime switching)























λk→u(V u − V k)− rV k
}
(A.1)
Since control variables Ww and Wp only have eects on state variables Z and Q, we


























λk→u(V u−V k)−rV k
(A.2)











k→u(V u − V k)− rV k,





























− LV k = 0 (A.4)
The terms in the square brackets in the above equation can be written as a lagrange

































− LV k = 0 (A.8)
We apply unequally spaced grids in the directions of P , I, S, and τ : [P1, P2, . . . , Pimax ],
[I0, I1, . . . , Ijmax ], [S0, S0, . . . , Slmax ], and 0 = τ
0 ≤ τ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ τN = T (∆τn = τn+1 − τn),
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where T is the lifespan of a development license. Normally a lifespan is several decades.
Since a certain set of control variables varies both Z and Q, we must treat these two state
variables as a pair. With a certain path of control variables (Ww,Wp), the set of I and S
follows a certain path.
Suppose P is xed at the grid Pi, if at τ
n+1 the set of I and S reaches a discrete grid
point (Pi, Ij, Sl), the departure point at τ = τ
n, I(τn;Pi, Ij, Sl, τn+1,Ww(τn),Wp(τn)) and




(τ ;Pi, Ij, Sl, τ
n+1,Ww(τ),Wp(τ)) = −Q(Wkp (τ)) for τ < τn+1,
dI
dτ
(τ ;Pi, Ij, Sl, τ
n+1,Ww(τ),Wp(τ)) =Wkp (τ)−Wkw(τ) for τ < τn+1,
S(τ ;Pi, Ij, Sl, τn+1,Ww(τ),Wp(τ)) = Sl for τ = τn+1,
I(τ ;Pi, Ij, Sl, τn+1,Ww(τ),Wp(τ)) = Ij for τ = τn+1.
(A.9)
Solving S(τ = τn;Pi, Ij, Sl, τn+1,Ww(τ = τn),Wp(τ = τn)) (simply written as S(τn))
and I(τ = τn;Pi, Ij, Sl, τn+1,Ww(τ = τn),Wp(τ = τn)) (simply written as I(τn)), we get:
S(τn) = Sl −
∫ τn+1
τn
−Q(Wkp (τ)) dτ (A.10)
I(τn) = Ij +
∫ τn+1
τn
(Wkp (τ)−Wkw(τ)) dτ (A.11)
Note that S(τn), I(τn) do not necessarily reside exactly at a grid point. Later we will
use a two dimensional bilinear interpolation introduced by Press, William, et al. (1987) to
address this problem.
Integrating both sides of (A.8) from τ = τn to τ = τn+1 with P xed at Pi and Ww,

















dτ = V k(Pi, Sl, Ij, τ
n+1)− V k(Pi,S(τn), I(τ), τn) (A.13)
it gives:
V k(Pi, Sl, Ij, τ
n+1) = max
Ww,Wp







LV k(Pi,S(τ), I(τ), τ) dτ (A.14)
where S(τ) = S(τ ;Pi, Ij, Sl, τn+1,Ww(τ),Wp(τ)) and I(τ) = I(τ ;Pi, Ij, Sl, τn+1,Ww(τ),Wp(τ)).
A.2 Fully Implicit Timestepping
A fully implicit timestepping is used to solve the PDEs (2.16).
From Chen & Forsyth (2010) we know that fully implicit timestepping approach is suf-
cient to get a satisfactory result. So in this thesis, we only use fully implicit timestepping




where τ ∈ (τn, τn+1).
Then we can obtain:





Snl(i,j,n+1) = Sl(j) + ∆τ ·Q · (Wp)i,j,l,(k)(τn+1)
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.
Then (A.14) can be discretized as:
V n+1i,j,l = minWw,Wp
V ni,j,l(i,j,l,n+1) + ∆τ · π(Pi,Wp(τ)) + ∆τn(LhV )n+1i,j,l (A.15)
As aforesaid, S(τn), I(τn) do not necessarily reside exactly at a grid point. Hence the
corresponding V ni,j,l(i,j,l,n+1) should be calculated by interpolating a set of values V
n
i,j,l. We
use bilinear interpolation method herein.
Now we introduce a column vector
V n = [V1,1,1(1), V2,1,1(1), . . . , Vimax,1,1(1), V1,2,1(1), V2,2,1(1), . . . , Vimax,2,1(1), . . . , Vimax,jmax,1(1),
V1,1,2(1), . . . , Vimax,jmax,2(1), . . . , Vimax,jmax,lmax(1), V1,1,1(2), . . . , Vimax,jmax,lmax(2), . . . , V1,1,1(3), . . . ,
Vimax,jmax,lmax(3)]
T
with imax × jmax × lmax × 3 entries.
Let L be a matrix such that







i+1,j,l(k) − (αni + βni + r)V ni,j,l(k) +
∑3
u=1,u 6=k λ
k→u(V ni,j,l(u) − V ni,j,l(k))
Let Φn+1 be the interpolation matrix such that
[Φn+1V n]i,j,l(k) = V
n
i,j,l(i,j,l,n+1) + interpolation error.
Hence the matrix form of the PDEs can be written as:
V n+1j,l(k) −∆τ
n[LV n+1]j,l(k) = [Φ
n+1V n]j,l(k) + ∆τ
nπ(P,Wp(τ))
where V n+1i,j,l(k) = argmin
Ww,Wp
(V ni,j,l(i,j,l,n+1)(k) + ∆τ
nπ(Pi,Wp(τ)) + ∆τ
n(LhV )n+1i,j,l(k))
for j = 0, ..., jmax, l = 0, ..., lmax and k = 1, 2, 3.
The above discrete optimization problem is solved numerically.
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A.3 Accuracy Test
Since it is not feasible to solve the partial dierential equation continuously, the extent
to which we rene the discretized nodes is important to the solution accuracy. However,
the smaller the mesh sizes are, the higher the algorithm complexity is. To balance the
computation cost and accuracy, we test various mesh sizes and choose the discretization
method shown in Table A.1.
Table A.1: The Discretized Nodes Without Rening
Coarse mesh size





















By rening the spacing between nodes along all these three dimensions once and twice,
we get the convergence performance as Table A.2 shows.
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Table A.2: Project Value (in Million Dollars) Convergence Performance
Current oil
price ($/barrel)





30 4739 4816 4875 77 59 1.31 1.2%
40 5700 5793 5861 93 68 1.37 1.2%
60 8299 8426 8514 127 88 1.44 1.0%
120 15526 15757 15888 231 131 1.76 0.8%
Yellow zone
30 4732 4809 4868 77 59 1.31 1.2%
40 5691 5785 5853 94 68 1.38 1.2%
60 8286 8412 8500 126 88 1.43 1.0%
120 15496 15727 15858 231 131 1.76 0.8%
Red zone
30 4698 4773 4831 75 58 1.29 1.2%
40 5647 5739 5806 92 67 1.37 1.2%
60 8216 8340 8427 124 87 1.43 1.0%
120 15337 15564 15693 227 129 1.76 0.8%
The values in column 2, 3, and 4 are the project's value when decision is making. By
rening nodes spacings twice, the relative changes in values are less than 3%. This is an
acceptable convergence performance. Considering the computation cost, we choose the
rene once results as the base of our discussion.
A.4 Tables and Figures for Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix shows the details of the sensitivity analyses carried out for the case when
there is an option to install the water storage facility. Sensitivities are analysed for the
long-run mean log price, water productivity, and volatility.
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Green Yellow Red Red
Stage Stage Stage Stage
1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5
550 70 35 35 60 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35
600 75 35 35 70 35 35 45 35 35 40 45 35
630 0.5µ 75 35 35 70 35 35 45 35 35 40 45 35
660 75 35 35 70 35 35 45 35 35 40 45 35
690 75 35 35 70 35 35 45 35 35 40 45 35
720 75 35 35 70 35 35 45 35 35 40 45 35
550 70 35 35 60 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35
600 70 35 35 60 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35
630 0.6µ 70 35 35 60 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35
660 70 35 35 60 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35
690 70 35 35 60 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35
720 70 35 35 60 35 35 40 35 35 35 40 35
550 55 30 30 50 30 30 35 30 30 35 35 30
600 55 30 30 50 30 30 35 30 30 35 35 30
630 0.7µ 55 30 30 50 30 30 35 30 30 35 35 30
660 55 30 30 50 30 30 35 30 30 35 35 30
690 55 30 30 50 30 30 35 30 30 35 35 30
720 55 30 30 50 30 30 35 30 30 35 35 30
550 45 25 25 40 25 25 30 25 25 30 30 30
600 45 25 25 40 25 25 30 25 25 30 30 30
630 0.8µ 45 25 25 40 25 25 30 25 25 30 30 30
660 45 25 25 40 25 25 30 25 25 30 30 30
690 45 25 25 40 25 25 30 25 25 30 30 30
720 45 25 25 40 25 25 30 25 25 30 30 30
550 45 15 15 40 15 15 35 15 15 25 20 20
600 40 15 15 35 15 15 30 15 15 25 20 20
630 0.9µ 40 15 15 35 15 15 30 15 15 25 20 20
660 40 15 15 35 15 15 30 15 15 25 20 20
690 35 15 15 35 15 15 30 15 15 25 20 20
720 35 15 15 35 15 15 30 15 15 25 20 20
550 55 5 5 50 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
600 50 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
630 µ 50 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
660 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
690 40 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
720 40 5 5 35 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
550 90 0 0 80 0 0 70 0 0 35 0 0
600 75 0 0 70 0 0 60 0 0 25 0 0
630 1.1µ 70 0 0 65 0 0 55 0 0 25 0 0
660 65 0 0 60 0 0 50 0 0 20 0 0
690 60 0 0 55 0 0 45 0 0 20 0 0
720 55 0 0 50 0 0 40 0 0 15 0 0
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Table A.4: Marginal Costs of Increased Water Restrictions Under Various Mean Log Oil
Prices ($/barrel)
Mean log Oil price W_L D_S
price ($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red
20 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
0.5µ 50 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.18
70 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.42
100 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.74
20 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
0.6µ 50 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.26
70 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.57
100 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.95
20 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
0.7µ 50 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.44
70 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.85
100 0.06 0.06 0.09 1.33
20 0 0 0 0
30 0.03 0.03 0.03 0
0.8µ 50 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.86
70 0.06 0.06 0.08 1.37
100 0.08 0.09 0.12 1.91
20 0.03 0.03 0.03 0
30 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.81
0.9µ 50 0.07 0.07 0.08 1.56
70 0.09 0.09 0.11 2.04
100 0.11 0.11 0.14 2.59
20 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.33
30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.63
µ 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 2.16
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.63
100 0.13 0.13 0.16 3.23
20 0.11 0.11 0.11 2.07
30 0.12 0.12 0.12 2.36
1.1µ 50 0.13 0.12 0.12 2.77
70 0.13 0.13 0.14 3.28
100 0.16 0.16 0.18 3.98
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels. µ = 4.59. Stage
1, prior to building water storage.
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Table A.5: Total Costs To the Oil Sands Project Due To the Water Constraints Under
Various Mean Log Oil Prices (in Million Dollars)
Mean log Oil price W_L D_S
price ($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red
20 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
0.5µ 50 17.61 21.85 42.63 146.80
70 37.69 44.32 45.56 267.36
100 47.04 47.16 48.62 437.92
20 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
0.6µ 50 23.46 27.77 43.65 192.18
70 45.70 46.28 47.27 351.08
100 49.28 49.40 50.89 559.42
20 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
0.7µ 50 41.72 46.11 48.18 325.09
70 51.45 51.53 52.54 530.54
100 54.93 55.05 56.57 780.53
20 0 0 0 0
30 21.13 22.13 27.64 116.40
0.8µ 50 54.31 54.37 55.02 540.41
70 57.84 57.92 58.92 781.25
100 60.77 60.89 62.39 1062.65
20 29.80 29.81 29.84 185.54
30 50.81 51.21 53.64 523.97
0.9µ 50 62.63 62.68 63.25 859.98
70 64.47 64.54 65.44 1087.48
100 66.24 66.36 67.74 1370.38
20 58.39 58.39 58.40 781.91
30 63.11 63.17 63.56 906.39
µ 50 66.99 67.02 67.42 1110.61
70 67.77 67.83 68.54 1332.22
100 68.97 69.07 70.26 1634.74
20 62.53 62.53 62.54 1134.39
30 65.74 65.74 65.76 1255.55
1.1µ 50 68.12 68.90 69.40 1375.49
70 69.61 69.65 70.11 1591.20
100 70.75 70.82 71.72 1928.82
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels.
Total cost is the project value without water withdrawal restrictions less
project value with water restrictions in the W_L scenario.
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The total costs on the oil sands project due to the water constraints
when the river flow is in the green zone
under various mean log oil prices
Mean log oil price = 0.5
Mean log oil price = 0.6
Mean log oil price = 0.7
Mean log oil price = 0.8
Mean log oil price = 0.9
Mean log oil price = 
Mean log oil price = 1.1
Figure A.1: Total cost under dierent mean log oil prices (Total cost is the project value
without water withdrawal restrictions less project value with water restrictions in the W_L
scenario.)
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The marginal costs when the river flow is in the green zone
under various mean log oil prices
Mean log oil price = 0.5
Mean log oil price = 0.6
Mean log oil price = 0.7
Mean log oil price = 0.8
Mean log oil price = 0.9
Mean log oil price = 
Mean log oil price = 1.1
Figure A.2: Marginal cost under dierent mean oil prices (The marginal cost is the loss in
value to the project on a $/barrel basis of an increase in water withdrawal restrictions as
outlined in Section 2.6.2, page 33 in the W_L scenario.)
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Green Yellow Red Red
Stage Stage Stage Stage
1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5
550 30 5 5 25 5 5 25 5 5 25 20 20
600 30 5 5 25 5 5 25 5 5 25 20 20
630 0.1 25 5 5 25 5 5 25 5 5 25 20 20
660 25 5 5 25 5 5 25 5 5 25 20 20
690 25 5 5 20 5 5 20 5 5 25 20 20
720 25 5 5 20 5 5 20 5 5 25 20 20
550 40 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 25 10 10
600 40 5 5 35 5 5 35 5 5 20 10 10
630 0.2 35 5 5 30 5 5 30 5 5 20 10 10
660 35 5 5 30 5 5 30 5 5 20 10 10
690 30 5 5 30 5 5 25 5 5 20 10 10
720 30 5 5 25 5 5 25 5 5 20 10 10
550 55 5 5 50 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
600 50 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
630 0.3 50 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
660 (base case) 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
690 40 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
720 40 5 5 35 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
550 H 5 5 450 5 5 275 5 5 35 5 5
600 H 5 5 400 5 5 250 5 5 30 5 5
630 0.4 450 5 5 400 5 5 250 5 5 25 5 5
660 450 5 5 350 5 5 225 5 5 25 5 5
690 400 5 5 350 5 5 225 5 5 25 5 5
720 400 5 5 350 5 5 200 5 5 20 5 5
550 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 40 5 5
600 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 40 5 5
630 0.5 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 35 5 5
660 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 35 5 5
690 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 30 5 5
720 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 30 5 5
550 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 45 5 5
600 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 45 5 5
630 0.6 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 40 5 5
660 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 40 5 5
690 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 35 5 5
720 H 5 5 H 5 5 H 5 5 35 5 5
H means that the critical prices is higher than $500/barrel. Since in the history the oil price never exceeded $500/barrel,
it implies that it is never optimal to proceed from operating stage 1 to stage 2.
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The Critical Prices to build a water storage facility
when the river flow is in the green zone
under various water productivities for S_W_L
Water productivity = 0.1
Water productivity = 0.2
Water productivity = 0.3
Water productivity = 0.4
Figure A.3: Critical prices to switch from stage 1 to 3 (i.e. to construct water storage)
under dierent water productivity levels
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Table A.7: Marginal Costs To the Oil Sands Project Due To the Water Constraints Under
Various Levels of Water Productivity ($/barrel)
Water Oil price W_L D_S
productivity ($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red
20 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.00
30 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.78
0.1 50 0.86 0.86 0.87 1.55
70 1.04 1.06 1.09 2.04
100 1.27 1.29 1.34 2.71
20 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.91
30 0.42 0.42 0.42 1.22
0.2 50 0.50 0.51 0.54 1.78
70 0.60 0.61 0.66 2.28
100 0.74 0.76 0.83 2.78
20 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.32
30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.62
0.3 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 2.15
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.62
100 0.13 0.13 0.15 3.22
20 0.15 0.15 0.15 1.13
30 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.30
0.4 50 0.19 0.19 0.21 1.57
70 0.21 0.22 0.26 1.90
100 0.23 0.24 0.21 2.35
20 0 0 0 0.08
30 0 0 0 0.08
0.5 50 0 0 0 0.08
70 0 0 0 0.10
100 0 0 0 0.12
20 0 0 0 0.02
30 0 0 0 0.01
0.6 50 0 0 0 0
70 0 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels.
The marginal cost is the loss in value to the project on a $/barrel basis of
an increase in water withdrawal restrictions as outlined in Section 2.6.2,
page 33.
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Table A.8: Total Costs To the Oil Sands Project Due To the Water Constraints Under
Various Levels of Water Productivity (in Million Dollars)
Water Oil price W_L D_S
productivity ($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red
20 1232.22 1232.26 1232.47 2770.14
30 1462.68 1463.57 1466.90 4206.06
0.1 50 1809.07 1834.28 1891.49 5893.26
70 2161.75 2202.04 2307.71 7249.87
100 2621.66 2681.44 2836.09 8902.98
20 296.73 296.73 296.78 1686.30
30 337.04 337.23 337.96 2050.92
0.2 50 384.13 389.24 413.62 2660.98
70 447.51 456.16 497.49 3215.89
100 535.95 550.01 616.97 3925.90
20 58.17 58.17 58.18 777.81
30 62.87 62.93 63.32 901.40
0.3 50 66.74 66.77 67.14 1103.97
70 67.47 67.53 68.21 1324.01
100 68.61 68.70 69.83 1624.37
20 13.78 13.78 13.78 172.96
30 15.65 15.66 15.73 190.81
0.4 50 17.91 18.20 20.06 211.71
70 21.53 22.07 25.52 241.95
100 26.73 27.64 33.42 284.53
20 0 0 0 58.61
30 0 0 0 62.24
0.5 50 0 0 0 62.65
70 0 0 0 62.61
100 0 0 0 62.67
20 0 0 0 55.00
30 0 0 0 59.32
0.6 50 0 0 0 62.29
70 0 0 0 62.20
100 0 0 0 62.18
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels.
Total cost is the project value without water withdrawal restrictions less project
value with water restrictions in the W_L scenario.
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$) (i) Water productivity = 0.1














$) (ii) Water productivity = 0.2

















(iii) Water productivity = 0.3
(Base case)
















$) (iv) Water productivity = 0.4
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$) (v) Water productivity = 0.5
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$) (vi) Water productivity = 0.6
the green zone the yellow zone the red zone
Figure A.4: Total cost to the oil sands project due to the water constraints under various
water productivity levels for the scenario W_L (Water productivity is in barrels of bitu-
men/barrel of water. Total cost is dened as the project value without water withdrawal
restrictions less project value with water restrictions.)
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Green Yellow Red Red
Stage Stage Stage Stage
1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5 1→3 1→5 3→5
550 60 5 5 60 5 5 55 5 5 35 5 5
600 55 5 5 55 5 5 50 5 5 30 5 5
630 0 55 5 5 50 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
660 50 5 5 45 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
690 45 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 20 5 5
720 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
550 60 5 5 60 5 5 55 5 5 30 5 5
600 55 5 5 55 5 5 50 5 5 25 5 5
630 0.3σ 55 5 5 50 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
660 50 5 5 45 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
690 45 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 20 5 5
720 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
550 60 5 5 55 5 5 50 5 5 30 5 5
600 55 5 5 50 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
630 0.6σ 50 5 5 50 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
660 50 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
690 45 5 5 40 5 5 40 5 5 20 5 5
720 40 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
550 55 5 5 55 5 5 45 5 5 30 5 5
600 50 5 5 50 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
630 0.9σ 50 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
660 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
690 40 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
720 40 5 5 35 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
550 55 5 5 50 5 5 45 5 5 25 5 5
600 50 5 5 45 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
630 1.2σ 50 5 5 45 5 5 35 5 5 25 5 5
660 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
690 40 5 5 35 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
720 40 5 5 35 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
550 55 5 5 50 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
600 50 5 5 45 5 5 35 5 5 25 5 5
630 1.5σ 50 5 5 45 5 5 35 5 5 25 5 5
660 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
690 40 5 5 35 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
720 40 0 0 35 0 0 30 0 0 20 5 5
550 60 5 5 50 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
600 55 5 5 45 5 5 35 5 5 25 5 5
630 1.8σ 50 5 5 45 5 5 35 5 5 25 5 5
660 45 5 5 40 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
690 45 5 5 40 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
720 45 5 5 35 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
550 65 5 5 55 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
600 55 0 0 50 0 0 35 0 0 25 5 5
630 2.1σ 55 0 0 45 0 0 35 0 0 20 5 5
660 50 0 0 45 0 0 35 0 0 20 5 5
690 50 0 0 40 0 0 30 0 0 20 5 5
720 45 0 0 40 0 0 30 0 0 20 5 5
550 65 0 0 55 0 0 40 0 0 25 5 5
600 60 0 0 50 0 0 35 0 0 25 5 5
630 2.4σ 55 0 0 50 0 0 35 0 0 20 5 5
660 55 0 0 45 0 0 30 0 0 20 5 5
690 50 0 0 45 0 0 30 0 0 20 5 5
720 50 0 0 40 0 0 30 0 0 20 5 5
550 70 5 5 60 5 5 40 5 5 25 5 5
600 65 5 5 55 5 5 35 5 5 25 5 5
630 2.7σ 60 5 5 50 5 5 35 5 5 20 5 5
660 60 5 5 50 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
690 55 5 5 45 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
720 55 5 5 45 5 5 30 5 5 20 5 5
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The Critical Prices to build a water storage facility
when the river flow is in the green zone











Figure A.5: Critical prices under dierent volatility levels
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Table A.10: Marginal Costs To the Oil Sands Project Due To the Water Constraints Under
Various Levels of Oil Price Volatility ($/barrel)
Volatility
Oil price W_L D_S
Volatility
Oil price W_L D_S
($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red ($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red
20 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.52 20 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.13
30 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.78 30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.44
0 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 2.27 1.5σ 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 1.99
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.73 70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.46
100 0.13 0.14 0.16 3.35 100 0.13 0.13 0.16 3.06
20 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.49 20 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.02
30 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.77 30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.33
0.3σ 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 2.26 1.8σ 50 0.08 0.09 0.10 1.88
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.72 70 0.10 0.10 0.12 2.35
100 0.13 0.14 0.16 3.33 100 0.13 0.13 0.16 2.93
20 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.45 20 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.95
30 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.74 30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.25
0.6σ 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 2.26 2.1σ 50 0.08 0.08 0.09 1.78
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.72 70 0.10 0.10 0.12 2.23
100 0.13 0.14 0.16 3.31 100 0.12 0.13 0.15 2.81
20 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.35 20 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.88
30 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.67 30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.17
0.9σ 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 2.19 2.4σ 50 0.08 0.08 0.09 1.69
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.65 70 0.10 0.10 0.12 2.14
100 0.13 0.13 0.16 3.25 100 0.12 0.12 0.15 2.71
20 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.24 20 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.81
30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.55 30 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.09
1.2σ 50 0.09 0.09 0.10 2.10 2.7σ 50 0.09 0.08 0.09 1.61
70 0.11 0.11 0.12 2.58 70 0.09 0.09 0.11 2.04
100 0.13 0.13 0.16 3.16 100 0.11 0.12 0.15 2.60
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels.
Marginal cost refers to the loss in value to the project on a $/barrel basis of an increase in water withdrawal restrictions as outlined in
Section 2.6.2, page 33.
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Table A.11: Total Costs To the Oil Sands Project Due To the Water Constraints Under
Various Levels of Oil Price Volatility (in Million Dollars)
Volatility
Oil price W_L D_S
Volatility
Oil price W_L D_S
($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red ($/barrel) Green Yellow Red Red
20 60.85 60.85 60.85 865.49 20 51.16 51.17 51.22 671.27
30 64.20 64.21 64.23 969.40 30 58.40 58.67 60.14 813.85
0 50 66.97 66.99 67.30 1128.66 1.5σ 50 65.30 65.34 65.82 1056.34
70 67.90 67.96 68.60 1374.55 70 66.40 66.47 67.26 1277.02
100 69.16 69.25 70.38 1689.82 100 67.81 67.91 69.18 1577.54
20 60.48 60.48 60.48 854.77 20 46.39 46.41 46.54 612.44
30 64.28 64.29 64.33 965.63 30 54.68 55.15 57.90 761.07
0.3σ 50 67.02 67.04 67.35 1128.33 1.8σ 50 63.83 63.88 64.39 1015.16
70 67.90 67.95 68.60 1369.69 70 65.12 65.19 66.03 1236.09
100 69.14 69.23 70.37 1681.52 100 66.68 66.79 68.11 1534.70
20 59.18 59.18 59.19 832.09 20 42.28 42.32 42.58 568.58
30 64.11 64.12 64.19 951.59 30 51.17 51.83 55.83 717.33
0.6σ 50 67.14 67.16 67.50 1125.05 2.1σ 50 62.38 62.43 62.97 973.56
70 67.92 67.98 68.65 1355.15 70 63.77 63.84 64.71 1192.91
100 69.13 69.22 70.37 1663.22 100 65.41 65.52 66.89 1488.36
20 57.92 57.92 57.93 787.02 20 38.27 38.34 38.77 525.34
30 63.57 63.62 63.88 923.67 30 47.45 48.26 53.37 675.23
0.9σ 50 67.13 67.16 67.54 1117.46 2.4σ 50 60.13 60.93 61.50 932.49
70 67.88 67.94 68.64 1340.43 70 62.37 62.44 63.35 1149.37
100 69.06 69.15 70.33 1644.56 100 64.09 64.20 65.60 1442.15
20 55.77 55.77 55.79 735.28 20 33.40 33.51 34.15 477.37
30 61.36 61.47 62.16 868.07 30 43.14 44.08 50.00 630.36
1.2σ 50 66.46 66.50 66.92 1091.92 2.7σ 50 56.70 59.21 59.79 889.56
70 67.36 67.42 68.17 1311.88 70 60.81 60.89 61.82 1105.40
100 68.64 68.74 69.96 1614.81 100 62.65 62.77 64.20 1396.18
The remaining resource stock is 720 million barrels.
Total cost is dened as the project value without water withdrawal restrictions less project value with water restrictions.
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The total costs on the oil sands project due to the water constraints












Figure A.6: Total cost to the oil sands project due to the water constraints under various
oil price volatility levels for the scenario W_L (Total cost is dened as the project value
without water withdrawal restrictions less project value with water restrictions.)
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The percentage loss of the oil sands project due to the water constraints
when the river flow is in the green zone











Figure A.7: The percentage loss to the oil sands project due to the water constraints when
the river ow is in the green zone under various oil price volatility levels for the scenario
W_L (The percentage loss refers to the reduction in total project value when restrictions
are imposed.)
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The marginal costs when the river flow is in the green zone











Figure A.8: The marginal costs when the river ow is in the green zone under various oil
price volatility levels for the scenario W_L (Marginal cost refers to the loss in value to the
project on a $/barrel basis of an increase in water withdrawal restrictions as outlined in
Section 2.6.2, page 33.)
202
Appendix B
Tables and Figures for Chapter 3
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Table B.1: Weekly Flow Triggers and Cumulative Water Use Limits On the Lower
Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations for Alternative Rule Sets
Alt 19
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
(Weeks 1-15) (Weeks 16-18) (Weeks 19-45) (Weeks 46-49) (Weeks 50-52)
RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits
>140 16
None 16 None 29 None 16
>110 16
<140 11.5% of RF <110 11.5% of RF
Alt 20
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
(Weeks 1-15) (Weeks 16-23) (Weeks 24-43) (Weeks 44-52)
RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits
>185 16
None 16 None 29
>185 16
<185 8.5% of RF <185 8.5% of RF
Alt 21
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
(Weeks 1-15) (Weeks 16-23) (Weeks 24-43) (Weeks 44-52)
RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits
>270 16
None 16 None 29
>270 16
<270 6% of RF <270 6% of RF
Alt 22
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
(Weeks 1-18) (Weeks 19-23) (Weeks 24-43) (Weeks 44-52)
RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits
>355 16
None 16 None 29
>355 16
<355 4.5% of RF <355 4.5% of RF
Option A
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
(Weeks 1-15) (Weeks 16-23) (Weeks 24-43) (Weeks 44-52)
RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits
>270 16 >270 16
133∼270 6% of RF None 16 None 29 133∼270 6% of RF
<133 8 <133 8
Option H
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
(Weeks 1-15) (Weeks 16-18) (Weeks 19-23) (Weeks 24-43) (Weeks 44-52)
RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits RF Triggers Limits
>270 16 >200 16
150∼270 6% of RF >87 16 >87 20 >87 29 150∼200 8% of RF
87∼150 9 87∼150 12
<87 4.4 <87 4.4 <87 4.4 <87 4.4 <87 4.4
1. RF stands for the river's ow;
2. Limits means cumulative water withdrawal limits;
3. RF Triggers and Limits are both measured in cubic metres per second.
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Table B.2: The Ranges of Weekly Flow for River Flow Regimes Dened In Dierent Water
Management Rule Sets
Alt 19
Zone 1 2 3
Weekly ow (m3/s) (−∞,110) [110,140) [140,+∞)
Alt 20
Zone 1 2
Weekly ow (m3/s) (−∞,185) [185,+∞)
Alt 21
Zone 1 2
Weekly ow (m3/s) (−∞,270) [270,+∞)
Alt 22
Zone 1 2
Weekly ow (m3/s) (−∞,355) [355,+∞)
Option A
Zone 1 2 3
Weekly ow (m3/s) (−∞,133) [133,270) [270,+∞)
Option H
Zone 1 2 3 4 5





















Corresponds to the green zone
Correspond to the yellow zone









Figure B.1: The corresponding relationship between the regimes dened by dierent alter-
native rule sets and the three zones in the Phase 1 Framework
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Phase 1: yellow zone Phase 1: red zone Zone 1 Zone 2
Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
Figure B.2: Comparison of the Phase 1 rules and alternative rule sets for the Phase 2 Frame-
work in terms of the cumulative weekly water withdrawal limits on the Lower Athabasca
River for oil sands operations
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Table B.3: Cumulative Weekly Withdrawal Limits for Each Regime On the Lower
Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations (in Million Barrels)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0
Zone 3 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6
Zone 4 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6
Zone 5 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6
Zone 6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6
Zone 7 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6
Zone 8 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3
Zone 9 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5
Zone 10 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0
Zone 3 45.6 45.6 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3
Zone 4 45.6 45.6 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0
Zone 5 45.6 45.6 81.2 81.2 81.2 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3
Zone 6 45.6 45.6 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 124.3 124.3 124.3
Zone 7 45.6 45.6 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 8 53.3 53.3 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 9 71.5 71.5 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 10 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0
Zone 3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3
Zone 4 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0
Zone 5 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3
Zone 6 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3
Zone 7 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 8 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 9 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 10 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0
Zone 3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3
Zone 4 71.0 71.0 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9
Zone 5 91.3 91.3 91.3 91.3 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9
Zone 6 124.3 124.3 124.3 124.3 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9
Zone 7 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9
Zone 8 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0
Zone 9 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Zone 10 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
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Table B.4: Cumulative Weekly Withdrawal Limits for Each Regime Dened In Alt 19 On
the Lower Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations (in Million Barrels)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Zone 1 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2
Zone 2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2
Zone 3 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Zone 1 64.2 64.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 64.2 64.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 3 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 3 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 64.2 64.2 64.2
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Zone 3 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Table B.5: Cumulative Weekly Withdrawal Limits for Each Regime Dened In Alt 20 On
the Lower Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations (in Million Barrels)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Zone 1 76.9 74.8 72.5 71.7 70.4 68.6 67.1 66.5 66.5 66.9 68.7 72.0 79.3
Zone 2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Zone 1 79.8 79.8 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
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Table B.6: Cumulative Weekly Withdrawal Limits for Each Regime Dened In Alt 21 On
the Lower Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations (in Million Barrels)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Zone 1 54.3 52.8 51.2 50.6 49.7 48.4 47.4 46.9 47.0 47.3 48.5 50.8 56.0
Zone 2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Zone 1 66.2 82.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 82.2 82.2 82.2 75.9 68.2 62.3 59.9 58.9 57.1
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Table B.7: Cumulative Weekly Withdrawal Limits for Each Regime Dened In Alt 22 On
the Lower Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations (in Million Barrels)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Zone 1 40.7 39.6 38.4 37.9 37.3 36.3 35.5 35.2 35.2 35.4 36.4 38.1 42.0
Zone 2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Zone 1 49.7 73.9 81.0 81.0 81.0 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.0 81.0 70.4 56.9 51.1 46.7 44.9 44.2 42.8
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
210
Table B.8: Cumulative Weekly Withdrawal Limits for Each Regime Dened In Option A
On the Lower Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations (in Million Barrels)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Zone 1 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6
Zone 2 54.3 52.8 51.2 50.6 49.7 48.4 47.4 46.9 47.0 47.3 48.5 50.8 56.0
Zone 3 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Zone 1 40.6 40.6 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 66.2 82.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 3 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 3 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Zone 1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 82.2 82.2 82.2 75.9 68.2 62.3 59.9 58.9 57.1
Zone 3 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
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Table B.9: Cumulative Weekly Withdrawal Limits for Each Regime Dened In Option H
On the Lower Athabasca River for Oil Sands Operations (in Million Barrels)
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6
Zone 3 54.3 52.8 51.2 50.6 49.7 48.4 47.4 46.9 47.0 47.3 48.5 50.8 56.0
Zone 4 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9
Zone 5 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Week 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 45.6 45.6 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 3 60.9 60.9 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 4 66.2 82.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 5 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 3 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 4 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Zone 5 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1
Week 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Zone 1 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
Zone 2 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9
Zone 3 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 79.9 78.5 76.1
Zone 4 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
Zone 5 147.1 147.1 147.1 147.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2
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Figure B.3: The relationship between the total economic costs due to water management
rule sets and the water storage capacities when the river ow condition is in scenario 2B
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Figure B.4: The relationship between the total economic costs due to water management
rule sets and the water storage capacities when the river ow condition is in scenario 2C
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Figure B.5: The relationship between the total economic costs due to water management
rule sets and the water storage capacities when the river ow condition is in scenario 2D
215
Table B.10: Hazard Rate Matrices In the Three River Flow Scenarios for Alternative Rule
Sets
Scenario 2B Scenario 2C Scenario 2D
Alt 19
n/a n/a n/a0 37.14 14.86
0 3.47 48.53
 49.52 0 2.4852 0 0
0 1.73 50.27





































34.67 17.33 05.78 43.33 2.89
0 1.68 50.32
 49.64 2.36 08.67 34.67 8.67
0 2.17 49.83





n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
43.33 0 4.33 4.33 0
0 17.33 34.67 0 0
0 0 17.33 17.33 17.33
0 0 0 1.68 50.32


n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
0 49.64 2.36 0 0
0 17.33 17.33 0 17.33
0 0 17.33 34.67 0
0 0 0 2.17 49.83


52 0 0 0 0
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a





n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
0 0 0 0 0 0 43.33 4.33 4.33 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 17.33 34.67 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.33 17.33 17.33
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.68 50.32


n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
0 13 0 13 26 0 0 0 0 0
0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 6.5 6.5 19.5 6.5 13 0 0 0 0
0 10.4 0 31.2 0 10.4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 17.33 0 17.33 0 17.33 0 0
0 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 17.33 17.33 0 17.33
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.33 34.67 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.17 49.83


52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

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Horizon Kearl Muskeg Jackpine Base Mildred
Extraction method Surface mining







































Equation (2.7) 3164 5447 2044 1245 2139 5158 5,6,7,8



















W̄ Water withdrawal constraints
(million barrels/week)
Equation (2.4) 11%W̄c 8%W̄c 11%W̄c 7%W̄c 35%W̄c 29%W̄c 5,6,7,8
ρ Discount of bitumen prices
against WTI prices
Equation (2.9) 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83%
C The construction cost of the wa-
ter storage(million dollar)
Table 2.1 Specied in Table B.12 5,6,7,8
Ī Water storage capacity (million
barrels)
Equation (2.3) Specied in Table B.12 5,6,7,8
csf
The xed cost of water storage
(million $/year)
Equation (2.9) Specied in Table B.12 5,6,7,8
csv
The variable cost of water storage
($/barrel)
Equation (2.9) 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028
Carbon emissions (tonnes/barrel) Equation (2.9) 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
cove
Energy variable operating cost (%
of the WTI price)




Equation (2.9) 7.98 7.98 7.98 7.98 7.98 7.98
cof







































Income tax rate (%) Equation (2.9) 25 25 25 25 25 25
Carbon tax ($/tonne) Equation (2.9) 40 40 40 40 40 40
Cm Mothball cost (million $) Table 2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cre Reactivating cost (million $) Table 2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Clarge
A large number to prevent stage
switching (million $)
Page 24 109 109 109 109 109 109

















ε Speed of reverting to the mean log
oil price
Equation (2.8) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
µ Long run mean log oil price Equation (2.8) 4.59 4.59 4.59 4.59 4.59 4.59
σ Volatility of oil prices Equation (2.8) 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
River ows Refer to the hazard matrices given in Table B.10 5,6,7,8
r Risk free interest rate Equation (2.16) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
W̄c denotes the weekly cumulative water withdrawal limit, i.e. the total amount of water that is allowed to be withdrawn by all oil sands projects each week.
It is specied in Table 3.8.
The column of Production Level shows the categarization into H or L of the production capacity. H means that the production capcity is at the high
level assumed by the P2FC. L represents the current relative low production level.
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Table B.12: The Volume of the Water Storage Facilities Built by Oil Sands Projects In
Alternative Rule Sets In Dierent Cases and Dierent River Flow Scenarios
Phase 1 Alt 19 Alt 20 Alt 21 Alt 22 Option A Option H Phase 2
C Ī Csf C Ī C
s
f C Ī C
s
f C Ī C
s
f C Ī C
s
f C Ī C
s
f C Ī C
s













CNRL Horizon 126 64 6.8 70 36 3.8 148 76 8.0 215 110 11.6 283 145 15.2 189 97 10.2 140 72 7.5 n/a n/a n/a
Imperial Kearl 91 47 4.9 51 26 2.7 107 55 5.8 155 80 8.4 205 105 11.0 136 70 7.3 101 52 5.4 n/a n/a n/a
Shell Muskeg River 128 66 6.9 71 37 3.8 151 78 8.1 219 112 11.8 288 148 15.5 192 99 10.4 142 73 7.7 n/a n/a n/a
Shell Jackpine 83 42 4.5 46 24 2.5 98 50 5.3 141 72 7.6 186 95 10.0 124 64 6.7 92 47 4.9 n/a n/a n/a
Suncor 414 212 22.3 230 118 12.4 489 251 26.3 708 363 38.1 932 478 50.2 622 319 33.5 460 236 24.8 n/a n/a n/a







CNRL Horizon 147 75 7.9 91 47 4.9 168 86 9.0 227 116 12.2 288 148 15.5 189 97 10.2 159 81 8.6 n/a n/a n/a
Imperial Kearl 106 54 5.7 66 34 3.5 121 62 6.5 164 84 8.8 208 107 11.2 136 70 7.3 115 59 6.2 n/a n/a n/a
Shell Muskeg River 150 77 8.1 93 47 5.0 171 88 9.2 231 119 12.5 294 151 15.8 192 99 10.4 162 83 8.7 n/a n/a n/a
Shell Jackpine 96 49 5.2 60 31 3.2 110 57 5.9 149 77 8.0 190 97 10.2 124 64 6.7 105 54 5.6 n/a n/a n/a
Suncor 483 248 26.0 299 153 16.1 552 283 29.7 748 384 40.3 950 487 51.1 622 319 33.5 524 269 28.2 n/a n/a n/a







CNRL Horizon 147 75 7.9 105 54 5.6 180 92 9.7 237 122 12.8 295 151 15.9 189 97 10.2 182 93 9.8 n/a n/a n/a
Imperial Kearl 106 54 5.7 76 39 4.1 130 67 7.0 172 88 9.3 214 110 11.5 136 70 7.3 131 67 7.1 n/a n/a n/a
Shell Muskeg River 150 77 8.1 107 55 5.8 183 94 9.9 242 124 13.0 301 154 16.2 192 99 10.4 185 95 10.0 n/a n/a n/a
Shell Jackpine 96 49 5.2 69 35 3.7 118 61 6.4 156 80 8.4 194 100 10.5 124 64 6.7 119 61 6.4 n/a n/a n/a
Suncor 483 248 26.0 345 177 18.6 593 304 31.9 783 401 42.1 973 499 52.4 622 319 33.5 599 307 32.2 n/a n/a n/a
















CNRL Horizon 68 35 3.6 68 35 3.6 68 35 3.6 68 35 3.6 68 35 3.6 68 35 3.6 68 35 3.6 68 35 3.6
Imperial Kearl 49 25 2.6 49 25 2.6 49 25 2.6 49 25 2.6 49 25 2.6 49 25 2.6 49 25 2.6 49 25 2.6
Shell Muskeg River 69 35 3.7 69 35 3.7 69 35 3.7 69 35 3.7 69 35 3.7 69 35 3.7 69 35 3.7 69 35 3.7
Shell Jackpine 45 23 2.4 45 23 2.4 45 23 2.4 45 23 2.4 45 23 2.4 45 23 2.4 45 23 2.4 45 23 2.4
Suncor 223 114 12.0 223 114 12.0 223 114 12.0 223 114 12.0 223 114 12.0 223 114 12.0 223 114 12.0 223 114 12.0











CNRL Horizon 8 4 0.5 3 2 0.2 7 3 0.4 8 4 0.5 12 6 0.6 8 4 0.5 8 4 0.5 8 4 0.5
Imperial Kearl 6 3 0.3 2 1 0.1 5 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 9 4 0.5 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3
Shell Muskeg River 9 4 0.5 3 2 0.2 7 4 0.4 9 4 0.5 12 6 0.7 9 4 0.5 9 4 0.5 9 4 0.5
Shell Jackpine 6 3 0.3 2 1 0.1 4 2 0.2 6 3 0.3 8 4 0.4 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3
Suncor 28 14 1.5 11 6 0.6 22 11 1.2 28 14 1.5 39 20 2.1 28 14 1.5 28 14 1.5 28 14 1.5







CNRL Horizon 8 4 0.5 7 3 0.4 8 4 0.5 12 6 0.6 17 9 0.9 8 4 0.5 8 4 0.5 8 4 0.5
Imperial Kearl 6 3 0.3 5 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 9 4 0.5 12 6 0.7 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3
Shell Muskeg River 9 4 0.5 7 4 0.4 9 4 0.5 12 6 0.7 17 9 0.9 9 4 0.5 9 4 0.5 9 4 0.5
Shell Jackpine 6 3 0.3 4 2 0.2 6 3 0.3 8 4 0.4 11 6 0.6 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3
Suncor 28 14 1.5 22 11 1.2 28 14 1.5 39 20 2.1 56 29 3.0 28 14 1.5 28 14 1.5 28 14 1.5







CNRL Horizon 8 4 0.5 8 4 0.5 12 6 0.6 12 6 0.6 17 9 0.9 8 4 0.5 17 9 0.9 17 9 0.9
Imperial Kearl 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 9 4 0.5 9 4 0.5 12 6 0.7 6 3 0.3 12 6 0.7 12 6 0.7
Shell Muskeg River 9 4 0.5 9 4 0.5 12 6 0.7 12 6 0.7 17 9 0.9 9 4 0.5 17 9 0.9 17 9 0.9
Shell Jackpine 6 3 0.3 6 3 0.3 8 4 0.4 8 4 0.4 11 6 0.6 6 3 0.3 11 6 0.6 11 6 0.6
Suncor 28 14 1.5 28 14 1.5 39 20 2.1 39 20 2.1 56 29 3.0 28 14 1.5 56 29 3.0 56 29 3.0
















CNRL Horizon 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1
Imperial Kearl 14 7 0.8 14 7 0.8 14 7 0.8 14 7 0.8 14 7 0.8 14 7 0.8 14 7 0.8 14 7 0.8
Shell Muskeg River 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1 20 10 1.1
Shell Jackpine 13 7 1.1 13 7 1.1 13 7 1.1 13 7 1.1 13 7 1.1 13 7 1.1 13 7 1.1 13 7 1.1
Suncor 66 34 3.5 66 34 3.5 66 34 3.5 66 34 3.5 66 34 3.5 66 34 3.5 66 34 3.5 66 34 3.5
Syncrude 53 27 2.9 53 27 2.9 53 27 2.9 53 27 2.9 53 27 2.9 53 27 2.9 53 27 2.9 53 27 2.9
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Appendix C
The Derivation of the Expectation of
Oil Price for Model 1 In Chapter 4
In this appendix we show the derivation of the expected value of price, P , when P is
described by the following stochastic dierential equation.
dP = ε
(
P̄ − λ− P
)
dt+ σPdZ∗







= Et [Pt] + Et
[∫ t+T
t





= Pt + Et
[∫ t+T
t








= Pt + ε(P̄ − λ) · T − ε ·
∫ t+T
t





= Pt + ε(P̄ − λ) · T − ε ·
∫ t+T
t
Et [P ] dζ
Taking derivative with regard to variable T on both sides, we obtain




P̄ − λ− Et [Pt+T ]
)
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Arranging the above equation, we obtain the following linear dierential equation of
rst order:
d (Et [Pt+T ])
dT





We apply the method of variation of a constant to solve this linear dierential equation
of rst order.
First we consider the homogeneous equation:
d (Et [Pt+T ])
dT
+ ε · Et [Pt+T ] = 0 (C.2)
We transform the above equation to:
d (Et [Pt+T ])
Et [Pt+T ]
+ ε · dT = 0
d (lnEt [Pt+T ]) = −ε · dT
∫
d (lnEt [Pt+T ]) = −
∫
ε dT
lnEt [Pt+T ] = −ε · T + C
where C is an arbitrary constant (the constant of integration).
Then we get the general solution of the Equation (C.2):
Et [Pt+T ] = C ′ · e−ε·T
where C ′ = eC
Replacing constant C ′ by v(T ), which is an unknown function of T , we obtain:
Et [Pt+T ] = v(T ) · e−ε·T (C.3)
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v(T ) · e−ε·T
)
dT









· eε·T + C ′′
where C ′′ is the constant of integration.
Substituting the expression of v(T ) into Equation (C.3), we obtain the general solution
of Equation (C.1):




+ C ′′ · e−ε·T





+ C ′′ = Pt
Therefore,
C ′′ = Pt − (P̄ − λ)
Then the solution of Equation (C.1) is






Pt − (P̄ − λ)
)
· e−ε·T
Re-arranging the above equation, we get the following equation:






+ Pt · e−ε·T
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